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Abstract
In Denmark and in many countries around the world, housing markets are of considerable
importance for households and policy-makers alike. As the boom and bust in the US and
Danish housing market so aptly demonstrated, disruptions in the housing market potentially
have wide-ranging consequences for individual households and for the aggregate economy.
Housing is important because we all have to live somewhere, but also because it serves as a
considerable source of both wealth and debt. As such, housing market policy can not only
create vast benefits for many, but can also have substantial negative impacts for all, and
should therefore be a topic of major interest for economists and policy makers alike.
This Ph.D. thesis, entitled “Essays on Housing Markets”, analyzes the Danish housing
market during the 2000s, with a focus on how policy changes affected house prices and
how changes in house prices affect households. While independent, each chapter in this
thesis attempts to contribute to our understanding of how housing markets function, and
has important lessons for policy-makers and economists around the world.
The first chapter, “Examining the Housing Boom in Denmark”, provides an overview of
the Danish housing and mortgage market and describes how house prices developed between
1998 and 2010. While the Danish boom closely resembles developments in the United States
over the same period, many of the explanations for house price gains in the United States
do not apply to Denmark. Of particular note is the fact that the Danish housing market has
been highly praised for its design, which provides incentives for lenders to carefully assess
borrowers, and works to transfer risk to investors who are capable of bearing it. This stands
in sharp contrast to the United States, where declines in lending standards and increases in
sub-prime borrowing are linked to house price gains.
Between 1998 and 2003 house price gains were relatively modest, with low dispersion
between different areas in Denmark. This quiet period was following a period of substantial
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volatility between 2004 and 2007. The highest price growth is observed in dense, urban
areas with inelastic supply. During this boom period, fundamental determinants of house
prices fail to explain why house prices went up by so much. Most of the price gains between
2004 and 2007 were erased in the down-turn that started in 2007, and house prices reverted
back to their pre-boom level. There are important differences in when the decline started
across municipalities, which present difficulties for theories that attribute the end of the
boom to national factors.
In the second chapter, “Prime Borrowers and Financial Innovation in the Housing Boom
and Bust”, written together with Chandler Lutz, we use a natural experiment to assess
the impact on house prices of a new form of mortgages, interest-only loans. While many
proposed explanations for the housing boom in the United States have focused on securiti-
zation and subprime lending as the leading cause, the housing boom in the United States
also coincided with an dramatic increase in the use of alternative mortgage products. In this
chapter we construct a model to show that changing amortization requirements, a common
feature of alternative mortgage products, can lead to an increase in credit demand even ab-
sent changes in income. We test the model on the full population of Danish households, and
find that the fraction of buyers who purchased housing increased following the introduction
of interest-only mortgages. On the aggregate level the results indicate that the introduction
of interest-only mortgages amplified the housing market cycle. Our results suggest that
Denmark would have experienced an increase in house prices without interest-only loans,
but that the boom-bust would have been significantly smaller in magnitude. Our results
suggest that interest-only loans increased house prices by 35 percent over the counter-factual
that also experienced a housing boom. These results cannot be explained by a shift in credit
supply, or by fundamental increases in income growth.
The third chapter, entitled “Consumption and Housing Wealth: Theory and Evidence”,
written together with Natalia Khorunzhina, estimates how house price changes affects the
real economy. In an extensive empirical literature on both the aggregate and household level,
changes in house prices have a large impact on consumption. This impact is attributed to
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three separate factors: a wealth effect, a collateral effect and a common factors hypothesis.
However, the relative importance of these factors is difficult to disentangle. In this chapter,
we use the full population of Danish households and an imputed measure of consumption
to estimate the impact that changing house prices have on the real economy. Further,
we examine whether the housing wealth effect is driven by a wealth or collateral effect,
while controlling for the common factors hypothesis. Our results indicate that house prices
have a large impact on consumption, and that the estimated effect is mainly driven by
collateral borrowing. We find the largest effects during the Danish housing boom between
2003 and 2007, and we find that borrowing constrained households are the main drivers of
the effect. The results are similar when we use an instrumental variable strategy, although
the estimated coefficients are substantially larger in magnitude. Overall, our results suggest
that collateral borrowing is the most important channel.
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Sammanfattning (Abstract – Swedish)
Bostadsmarknaden är av stor betydelse för hushåll och beslutsfattare i Danmark och i andra
länder runt om i världen. Den amerikanska bostadskraschen visade tydligt att problem
på bostadsmarknaden kan leda till omfattande konsekvenser för enskilda hushåll och den
samlade ekonomin. Vår bostadssituation är viktig inte bara för att vi alla behöver en
plats att bo på, men också för att en stor del av vår förmögenhet och skuld är knuten till
vår bostad. Förändringar på bostadsmarknaden kan således ha stor positiv och negativ
inverkan för alla, och det är av stor vikt för både ekonomer och beslutsfattare att nå en
bättre förståelse för hur bostadsmarknaden fungerar. Denna doktorsavhandling, med titeln
“Essays on Housing Markets”, analyserar den danska bostadsmarknaden under 2000-talet.
Avhandlingen fokuserar på att beskriva och förklara den stora uppgång och nedgång i pris
som Danmark upplevde under den här tiden, och på att analysera hur perioden påverkade
enskilda hushålls situation. Alla tre kapitel är oberoende, men syftar till att öka förståelsen
för hur husmarknader fungerar. Det första kapitlet, “Examining the Housing Boom in
Denmark”, ger en översikt över den danska bostads- och bolånemarknaden och beskriver hur
huspriserna utvecklades mellan 1998 och 2010. Prisutvecklingen på den danska marknaden
liknar utvecklingen på den amerikanska marknaden under samma period, men många av
förklaringarna till den amerikanska bostadsboomen är inte tillämpbara i Danmark. Detta
beror till stor del på att den danska bolånemarknadens design ger incitament till långivare
att noggrant utvärdera låntagare och att inte ge ut lån till de som inte rimligen kan betala
tillbaka, och att samtidigt arbeta för att överföra riskerna till investerare som är kapabla att
bära dem. Till skillnad från USA så är minskning av kreditkvalitet inte en stor faktor i den
danska bostadskraschen. Husprisökningen mellan 1998 och 2003 var relativt blygsam, med
låg spridning mellan olika områden och utan större prissvingar. Den efterföljande perioden,
mellan 2004 och 2007, kännetecknas av kraftiga prisökningar, där de största ökningarna
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observeras i täta, urbana områden. Det är svårt att rationalisera de stora prisökningarna
under den här perioden med enbart fundamentala förklaringsfaktorer. Priserna föll sedan
med start år 2007, då mestadelen av den tidigare prisuppgången raderades. Nedgången
skedde dock inte samtidigt i alla kommuner, vilket är svårt att förklara med teoretiska
modeller som tillskriver slutet på en husprisboom till nationella faktorer.
I det andra kapitlet, “Prime Borrowers and Financial Innovation in the Housing Boom
and Bust”, skriven tillsammans med Chandler Lutz, använder vi ett naturligt experiment
i Danmark för att bedöma effekterna av en ny bolåneform; amorteringsfria lån. Många
föreslagna förklaringar till bostadsboomen i USA har fokuserat på ökad värdepapperisering
eller rollen som mindre kreditvärdiga låntagare spelat, medan mindre fokus har lagts på den
ökande populariteten av nya alternativa låneformer. I det här kapitlet analyserar vi effekten
av nya låneformer genom att först konstruera en teoretisk modell för att visa att förändringar
i amorteringar, ett vanligt inslag i alternativa låneformer, leder till en ökad efterfrågan på
kredit även utan inkomstökningar. Vi finner empiriskt att införandet av amorteringsfria lån
i Danmark ledde till en kraftig ökning i antalet transaktioner på bostadsmarknaden, vilket
följdes av kraftiga prisökningar. Resultaten visar att införandet av amorteringsfria lån ledde
till ökad volatilitet på den danska bostadsmarknaden. Specifikt visar vi att Danmark hade
upplevt en bostadsboom även utan amorteringsfria lån, men att den hade varit betydligt
mindre omfattande i storlek. Amorteringsfria lån ledde till att bostadspriserna ökade med 35
procent, vilket förklarar ungefär hälften av den totala ökningen mellan 2004 och 2007. Dessa
resultat kan inte förklaras av en förändring i kreditutgivning eller genom grundläggande
faktorer såsom inkomsttillväxt.
Det tredje kapitlet, “Consumption and Housing Wealth: Theory and Evidence”, skrivet
tillsammans med Natalia Khorunzhina, analyserar hur den danska bostadsmarknaden påverkade
den danska ekonomin. Förändringar i huspriser har i omfattande empirisk litteratur visats
ha stor inverkan på konsumtion. Denna inverkan tillskrivs tre separata hypoteser: en för-
mögenhetshypotes, en lånehypotes, och en hypotes om gemensamma faktorer som påverkar
både huspriser och konsumtion. Dock är det svårt att mäta den relativa betydelsen av dessa
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tre hypoteser. I detta kapitel använder vi data för hela den danska befolkningen för att es-
timera effekten förändringar i huspriser har på konsumtion. Vidare undersöker vi om denna
effekt drivs av en förmögenhets- eller en låneeffekt. Vi visar att den största uppmätta effek-
ten av husprisförändringar skedde under den danska bostadsboomen mellan 2003 och 2007;
att det främst är hushåll med hög belåningsgrad som reagerar på bostadsprisförändringar;
och att effekten uteslutande drivs av en låneeffekt. Slutligen finner vi liknande resultat när
vi använder en instrumental variabel-strategi.
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Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis is composed of separate three chapters and a general conclusion. While
all three chapters are independent and can be read as such, they each provide insight
into housing market dynamics and its impact on the aggregate economy. The first chapter
details the institutional context and background of the Danish housing market, and provides
an overview of the developments between 1998 and 2010. In particular, the first chapter
describes in detail how the Danish housing boom evolved over time and space, and finds
that even a well-designed housing and mortgage market is prone to boom-bust episodes.
The second chapter finds that the introduction of interest-only mortgages can explain a
large fraction of the boom and subsequent bust. The third chapter analyzes the effect that
this boom-bust cycle had on household consumption, and investigates whether house price
changes affects consumption through a wealth effect or through increased borrowing.
All chapters in this dissertation attempt to improve our understanding of how housing
markets by building upon existing research. Since the sharp rise in mortgage defaults in the
United States in 2006 precipitated the financial crisis, both academics and policy makers
have tried to understand how housing market booms and busts can lead occur, and how
they propagate throughout the economy. As economists, the focus is on identifying the
underlying causal factor, a task which is complicated in housing markets by the multitude
of simultaneous explanations for a single fact – housing prices increased dramatically and
then plunged down. For example, the cause of the U.S. housing boom has been attributed to
declining interest rates Himmelberg et al. (2005); Mayer and Sinai (2009), mortgage credit
expansion (Mian and Sufi, 2009), sub-prime lending (Coleman et al., 2008), optimistic house
price expectations (Foote et al., 2012; Shiller, 2014) and other explanations discussed in
Mayer (2011) and Glaeser and Nathanson (2015).
All three chapters focuses on the Danish housing market, a market that experienced a
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sizable boom and bust episode during the 2000s. The Danish housing market have several
design features that prove instructive for understanding housing market dynamics elsewhere.
For instance, the design of the mortgage system is set up to provide lenders with an incentive
to carefully screen borrowers, and attempts to allocate capital to investors who are capable
of bearing risk (Campbell, 2013). As I will argue, this removes many of the proposed
explanations for the financial crisis in the United States, especially the concerns related
to subprime borrowing and bad incentives within the mortgage industry. At the same
time, full recourse mortgages lowers the value of strategic default on mortgage debt (Ghent
and Kudlyak, 2011), which further limits the impact of strategic behavior on the part of
borrowers, particularly in the form of speculation on rising house prices. Indeed, these
two design features combine to remove many of the confounding factors present in any
study of the US housing markets. The fact that we observe such a similar housing market
dynamics in Denmark and the United States is instructive about the operating of housing
markets, and suggests that housing markets may exhibit an inherently different type of
volatility than other asset markets. Indeed, Glaeser and Nathanson (2015) note that while
house prices exhibit the same pattern of excess volatility as other asset classes, it does
so in a different way. While stock markets tend to have higher volatility than changes in
fundamentals would suggest during almost all periods, housing markets are prone to episodes
of substantial volatility, followed by quieter periods where prices do not deviate substantially
from fundamentals. Studies of the Danish housing market, and indeed on markets in other
countries, help us understand how these dynamics arise, and thereby help inform policy and
regulation.
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Examining the Housing Boom in Denmark
Claes Ba¨ckman∗
Copenhagen Business School.
September 26, 2016
Abstract
I document several findings of a housing boom and bust cycle in the 2000s that is
nearly equivalent in magnitude to the United States housing cycle, but where securi-
tization and sub-prime lending were non-existent. Fundamental factors can explain a
large fraction of the increase in prices for most of the period, but in 2006 and 2007
house prices increased in excess of what fundamentals would predict. The magnitude
and timing of the boom and bust in Denmark during the 2000s varied across locations,
where the largest and earliest price increases are found in urban areas.
∗Department of Economics. Email: cb.eco@cbs.dk. I would like to thank Marcus Asplund, Fane Groes,
Julie Marx, Søren Leth-Petersen and Ralf Wilkes for helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
Following the spectacular rise and fall of house prices in the 2000s in the United States,
academics have primarily focused on explaining developments in the housing market in the
United States. Despite the fact that housing booms were ubiquitous around the developed
world in the 2000s, several of the proposed explanations are specific to the institutional
setting in the United States. For instance, an expansion in sub-prime lending (Mian and
Sufi, 2009; Coleman et al., 2008), implicit government guarantees, or increased securitization
(Nadauld and Sherlund, 2013; Keys et al., 2010) are used to as explanations for the rapid
house price gains in the United States, but cannot explain the appearance of housing booms
and busts in other markets (Mayer, 2011).1
In this paper I examine the housing market cycle in Denmark between 1996 and 2010, a
market which is designed to provide clear incentives for lenders to assess the quality of their
borrowers, where sub-prime borrowing is non-existent, and where full recourse mortgages
make default prohibitively costly (Campbell, 2013). Even so, housing market dynamics
in Denmark and the United States during the 2000s share remarkable similarities. Figure
1 shows that real Danish house prices increased by 67 percent from 2000 to 2007 and
subsequently declined by 31 percent. In comparison, real house prices in the United States
increased by 89 percent from 2000 until 2006, before declining by 35 percent. The purpose
of this paper is to document the Danish housing boom, and to answer two questions: 1)
what is the shape of the Danish housing market cycle over time and space, and 2) can house
price changes be explained by economic fundamentals such as interest rates or incomes?
To begin, I construct repeat-sales house price indices for Danish municipalities and doc-
ument several facts about the Danish housing market.2 The boom-bust pattern in Denmark
is reminiscent of the pattern in the United States, where a period of relatively steady house
price gains between 1996 and 2004 was followed by a boom period with dramatic house price
gains between 2004 and 2007 (see Sinai, 2013, for similar evidence for the United States).
1Alternative explanations with more universal application include the global savings glut of Bernanke
et al. (2007) or overly optimistic house price expectations Shiller (2006, 2015).
2A Danish municipality is approximately the size of a US county.
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After the boom period, prices declined rapidly between 2007 and 2009, and as a result al-
most all of the gains between 2004 and 2007 were erased in the downturn. Overall, Danish
housing returns exhibit the same pattern of short-run momentum (price increases in this
year predicts price increases next year) and long-run mean reversion (price increases this
year predicts price decreases in 3-5 years) as in the United States, although the estimated
effect is smaller than in comparable studies for the United States (Head et al., 2014; Glaeser
and Nathanson, 2015).
Additionally, there is considerable heterogeneity in the timing of both the peaks and the
troughs across Danish municipalities, as several areas experienced peaks already in 2006,
whereas others only peaked in 2008. Furthermore, house price growth returned to certain
areas quickly, whereas others continued to decline. This presents a challenge to theories
linking house prices to a national factor such as changing interest rates.
There is considerable spatial variation in both the absolute level and the growth rate
of house prices across Denmark in both boom and non-boom periods.3 The largest price
increases during the boom occurred in municipalities where population density was high,
housing supply was constrained, and the average square meter price was high. Price growth
was especially high in dense urban area such as Copenhagen.4
The question is whether the dramatic house price increased during the boom and the
difference in timing across municipalities can be explained by fundamental factor. While
the evidence from the United States suggest that the time series of house prices are difficult
to explain without resorting to non-fundamental explanations (house price expectations for
example), it is worthwhile to examine Denmark through the same lens, especially consid-
ering the differences in institutional design. I examine whether house price growth can be
explained by lower interest rates or rising incomes, following the methodology developed
in Poterba (1984).5 The results show that a majority of the increase in house prices prior
3See Glaeser and Nathanson (2015); Cotter et al. (2014); Ferreira and Gyourko (2012) for evidence for
the United States.
4Spatial patterns in house price developments are well documented in the literature. Geographical
differences in income (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2011), housing supply (Saiz, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2009) or
credit (Favara and Imbs, 2015) can lead to differential house price growth across locations.
5See also Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Mayer and Sinai (2009).
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to 2006 can be rationalized by lower interest rates and high incomes. In 2006 however,
house prices continued their ascent even as interest rates started rising. Importantly, the
fraction of income going to interest payments for new buyers increased over this period.
Within the user-cost model, this behavior can be explained by buyers anticipating higher
capital gains on their housing investment, which would compensate for the higher inter-
est payments. This is essentially an explanation based on higher house price expectations.
It is certainly possible that buyers in 2006 and 2007 expected continued high returns on
housing investments, especially if expectations are extrapolative (Case et al., 2012; Piazzesi
and Schneider, 2009). As there is no long-running survey on household expectations in
Denmark over this time-period, it is difficult to test whether expectations are extrapolative.
However, if expectations are indeed extrapolative, then increasing prices in the early stages
of the boom lead to higher expectations and thus higher prices later in the boom. There
is evidence for momentum in the Danish housing boom, especially during the boom years.
As house price growth continues even as interest rates increase in early 2006, it is plausible
that expectations played a role in the Danish housing boom.
Importantly, the evidence does not suggest that the boom started because of high house
price expectations, as the correlation between house price growth in the pre-boom (1996 to
2004) and boom period (2004-2007) is low.6 The conclusion of this paper is that housing
boom and bust episodes can occur even in well-designed mortgage markets. This observation
suggests that we should consider what factors are similar across Denmark and the United
States, and that we need further research on what common factors create the dynamics so
frequently observe in housing markets across the developed world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Danish housing
and mortgage markets, section 3 provides a theoretical framework, section 4 details the data
and the methodology for estimating a repeat sales price index. Section 5 documents the
shape and determinants of the Danish housing market cycle in the 2000, section 6 examines
whether fundamentals can explain house price gains, and section 7 concludes.
6See also Dam et al. (2011) and Rangvid et al. (2013) for Denmark.
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2 Housing and Mortgage Finance in Denmark
Mortgage Market Design
The Danish mortgage system traces its roots back to 1795, when a large fire burned down
a quarter of Copenhagen. In order to provide credit for the rebuilding of the city, lenders
provided loans secured by properties, funded by issuing bonds to investors (Andersen et al.,
2014). Today there are 7 mortgage credit banks which operate independently subject to
regulatory oversight. There is no government-sponsored entity that intervenes directly in
the mortgage market.7
There is no sub-prime lending in Denmark, and there is no continuous credit scoring
system. Credit is granted on the condition that the borrower is able to afford a 30-year
mortgage, even in the face of increasing interest rates (Ministry of Economic and Business
Affairs, 2007). The mortgage banks are required to assess the value of the underlying
property and the credit worthiness of the borrowers, and are strictly prohibited from granting
a mortgage in excess of 80 percent of the assessed value. Moreover, mortgage banks are
legally required to retain all credit risk associated with their lending. The retention of
credit risk ensures that the mortgage banks have an incentive to carefully monitor the
borrower’s financial situation, thus reducing potential concerns over insufficient or reduced
monitoring as the driver of boom-bust patterns (Campbell, 2013). During the boom and
bust, there are limited concerns over fraudulent income statements, increased securitization
or lower lending standards.8
Mortgage banks sell the proceeds from loans to investor in the form of mortgage bonds.
All individual bonds sold to investors are matched exactly to an underlying mortgage pro-
vided to borrowers. In the case of a default, the mortgage bank is legally obliged to replace
any defaulting mortgage in the pool backing the bond. The bond holders therefore face no
credit risk (provided the issuing lender remains solvent), but instead assume interest rate-
7See Campbell (2013), Association of Danish Mortgage Credit Banks (2009) and Danske Bank Markets
(2013) for a detailed description of the Danish mortgage system.
8For studies on these issues from the United States, see Mian and Sufi (2015) for fraudulent income
statements, Keys et al. (2010) and Nadauld and Sherlund (2013) on securitization, and Mian and Sufi
(2009) for lower lending standards and expansion of credit to low-quality borrowers.
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and pre-payment risk. In over 200 years of operation, no mortgage bond has ever defaulted
(Andersen et al., 2014); every single mortgage bond has been repaid in full to investors.
As Campbell (2013) notes, the system is set up to give incentives to lenders to monitor
borrowers by requiring them to retain credit risk, while transferring interest-rate risk to
investors capable of bearing it. Instead of collapsing when the housing market declined, the
Danish mortgage market continued operating well and has received considerable praise for
its performance in recent years (e.g. Campbell, 2013; International Monetary Fund, 2011).
For borrowers, the Danish mortgage design shares several similarities with the United
States. Historically mortgages in both Denmark and the United States consisted of fixed-
interest, 30-year contracts with fee-free repayment, where mortgage interest is tax-deductible.
Borrowers in Denmark can finance up to 80 percent of any house price purchase using low
interest mortgage credit, and a further 15 percent with higher-interest bank debt. The in-
terest rate on mortgage debt is entirely decided by the investors into mortgage bonds, and
not by the issuing bank. Mortgage interest is tax deductible, but at a rate that has de-
creased from 73 percent in 1987 to approximately 50 percent in 1993, to 46 percent between
1993 and 1998, and to 33 percent in 2001. The maximum contract term is 30 years, and
borrowers can choose between fixed and variable interest loans. Variable interest loans were
introduced in 1996, and deferred amortization mortgages were introduced in October 2003.
Deferred amortization mortgages allow the household to postpone repayments of principal
for up to 10 years, while retaining the requirement that the mortgage has to be repaid within
the 30-year contract. Borrowers are at all times legally allowed to refinance their mortgage
to take advantage of lower interest rates, regardless of their current income or the value of
their property. Since 1992 borrowers are allowed to extract housing equity using mortgage
loans.9
Finally, mortgage debt in Denmark is full-recourse. If a borrower defaults, the mortgage
bank can trigger a forced sale of the property, where any residual claim is converted into a
9See Backman and Lutz (2016) for more detail on the introduction of IO mortgages, Leth-Petersen (2010)
and Browning et al. (2013) for an analysis of the 1992 mortgage reform, and Andersen et al. (2014) for an
analysis of borrower refinancing decisions.
26
private claim against the borrower. If the borrower has an outstanding balance after a sale,
any residual debt is converted into higher-interest, unsecured bank debt. Mortgage default
in Denmark is therefore very costly. This implies that assuming mortgage debt to finance
house purchases is riskier than in the United States, as the strategic default option is simply
not available. Full recourse mortgages contributed to the far fewer problems with default
and foreclosures than in the United States, even though house prices declined by similar
amounts (Campbell, 2013). Mortgage arrears as a share of total repayments peaked at 0.6
percent in 2009, whereas non-performing loans to total loans peaked at close to 6 percent
in the United States. Palmer (2014) finds that nearly 70 percent of sub-prime defaults were
due to losses on home equity, and that strategic defaults were a contributing factor to the
decline in U.S. house prices. Campbell et al. (2011) finds that forced sales and foreclosures
had a negative impact on house prices in the United States. Such negative externalities
are likely not as important in Denmark due to the lower number of defaults and forced
repossessions.
Housing
Home-ownership is prevalent in Denmark, and like in the United States, housing represents
the largest item on the balance sheet for most households (Campbell and Cocco, 2007).
Approximately 60 percent of households were home-owners during at least one year between
1996 and 2010, and with a conservative valuation, housing wealth made up an average of
45 percent of total gross wealth.10
Nearly all properties are subject to a residency requirement (bopælspligt), where the
property has to be occupied by either the owner or a renter chosen by the owner. Addi-
tionally, a renter receives occupation rights after two years of renting, after which the owner
is not allowed to take possession of his property again without the explicit consent of the
renter.
There are several types of housing in Denmark. The first is the owner-occupied housing,
10The share of home-owners is 52 percent on average from 1996 to 2010. The conservative valuation
comes from the annual tax assessment of property values from Danish Tax and Customs Administration,
SKAT. This number underestimates the importance of housing wealth in the population, and the wealth
share if housing was estimated at market values is higher.
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in the form of apartment (condominiums) and single- and multi-family houses. The market
for these properties is liquid, and purchases can be financed by mortgage debt. The second
type is cooperative housing, which is an indirect form of ownership. Households can buy a
share of a cooperative, thereby acquiring the right to reside in a housing unit owned by the
cooperative. Since the cooperative owns the unit and reserves the right to use the property
as collateral, the purchase cannot be financed by mortgage debt, and is instead financed
by higher interest bank debt. The square meter price for cooperative housing is subject to
a price ceiling set by the cooperative itself. The third type is rental, which may be price
controlled. Finally, social housing is provided by non-profit housing associations and made
up 20 percent of the housing stock in 2006 (Erlandsen et al., 2006).
Owner-occupied housing is subject to a property-value tax (ejendomsværdiskat) and
land-value tax (grundskyld). Prior to 1998 the property-value tax was calculated based on
an estimated value contingent on property characteristics, which then became a part of the
household’s capital income and was taxed accordingly. From 1998 to 2002, the property tax
was calculated as a percentage of the property value based on an annual assessment. The
property-value tax was frozen in nominal terms in 2002, and afterwards it is calculated as
1 percent of the 2002 tax valuation for values up to a threshold of 3,040,000 DKK (408.000
EUR), and 3 percent of the value above this threshold. The land value is based on an
assessment conducted by Danish Tax and Customs Administration (SKAT ). The tax is set
by the local municipality and is limited to be between 0.16 and 0.34 percent of land values.
Property owners are not subject to a capital gains tax, provided that they have occupied
the property with the purpose of permanent residence at some time during ownership.
Temporary occupation does not qualify a household for a tax exemption, but the owner
does not need to live in the property at the time of the sale.
3 Theoretical Framework
In real estate economics the benchmark “user-cost” model provides the foundation for un-
derstanding house price changes (Poterba, 1984). In the model a single price for housing,
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paid by all owners, is derived from an inter-temporal no-arbitrage condition. The value of
housing today equals the net benefit of owning today, plus the discounted property value to-
morrow: Pt = Bt +
E(Pt+1)
1+r
. Using recursive substitution, the fundamental value for housing
can be written as:
P = E
( ∞∑
j=0
(1 + r)−jBt+j
)
, (1)
where Bt is the net benefit of owning after costs, and 1/(1 + r) is a discount factor.
11 House
prices thus reflect the sum of discounted net benefit of owning. House price changes must
come from changes in the fundamental value Bt, where any change in prices is due to either
changing gross benefits, Rt, or due to changes in the annual cost of ownership, the user-cost
ut. While Rt is unobserved, it is occasionally approximated by the market rent for housing,
i.e. the rental cost. The user cost can be written as:
ut = Pt(ωt + (1 − τmt )rmt + δt + γt − gt+1). (2)
This equation reflects costs and offsetting benefits of owning. The first term is the one-year
property tax, ωt. The second term is the annual mortgage cost Pt(1− τmt )rmt , calculated as
the mortgage rate rmt after mortgage deductions τ
m
t . The third term δt reflects maintenance
costs and capital depreciation, and the fourth term γt is a risk premium to compensate
home-owners for a higher risk of owning versus renting. The final term is expected growth
in house prices gt+1. The sum of these terms gives the annual cost of ownership.
In equilibrium the annual cost of ownership is equal to the annual cost for renting the
same property. A change in the annual cost of ownership have to be compensated by
changing house prices, or equivalently, an increase in gross benefits must be accompanied
by an increase in house prices to maintain the equilibrium. Consider the below equation:
Rt = Ptut, (3)
where Rt is the annual rental cost, and ut is the user cost of housing (the annual cost of
11The above expression imposes a transversality condition to rule out non-fundamental factors.
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housing per unit of property value). Changes in the price of housing Pt derive from changes
in either the rental value Rt, or through changes in the user cost ut. This implies that
changes in the interest rate or changes in the gross value give rise to empirically predictable
changes in house prices.
The above model addresses the demand side of housing. However, the spatial and time-
series patters in housing are difficult to explain in a rational user-cost model (Wheaton,
1999). Interest rates, for example, are set on a national level, which means that rationalizing
differences across locations is difficult. Glaeser et al. (2008) postulate that a shock can
interact with housing supply to produce differential rates of growth in prices. The time
it takes for supply to expand and re-establish equilibrium prices leads to a period where
prices are above their fundamental level. The more inelastic housing supply is, the longer
the adjustment takes. Saiz (2010) shows that housing supply is a strong predictor of both
the level and growth rate of house prices. Hetserogeneity in housing supply helps to explain
differential increases in prices across locations, and why house prices tend to display short-
term momentum and long-run mean reversion.
4 Data
All property transactions in Denmark are listed in the Danish Gazette (Statstidende) as a
part of the judicial process of transferring ownership, and I use this data to construct house
price indices for each Danish municipalities. The register contains data on the sale price,
the percentage sold, the date of purchase, the date ownership is assumed, the municipality
where the property is located, and an identification number for each property. To ensure
that property characteristics are unchanged between transactions, I obtain year-over-year
property characteristics through the Housing Register (Bygnings- og Boligregister, BBR).
The Housing Register covers all properties and is continuously updated by municipalities
with new information, in particular from planning permissions.12 The register contains data
12Planning permissions is required e.g. for larger renovations, for merging two apartments, for additions
to a house, or for any renovation that involves changes the plumbing.
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on whether the property is a single-family house or apartment, interior size, basement size,
the number of bathrooms and kitchens, and construction year. I match each property to its
owner to identify buyers and sellers.
I further collect demographics and financial information from the official Danish Civil
Registration System (CPR Registreret). I collect demographic data including date of birth,
marital history (marriages, divorces, and widowhoods) and date of death. This data includes
a unique identification of all individuals across time, which I use to identify within family-
trades and trades due to divorce or death.13
In addition, I collect financial information from SKAT. This information is supplied to
SKAT through third-party reporting, which ensures that the information is comprehensive
and accurate. I collect data on disposable income, wealth, mortgage debt, and mortgage
interest payments. Disposable income is defined as the sum of income after taxes, interest
payments, rental value of owned properties, alimony payments and repaid social benefits.
Mortgage debt is the market value of each individual’s mortgage bond, which by design is
slightly larger than the actual mortgage size (see Andersen et al., 2014, for more details). I
define owners as individuals with positive registered housing wealth, and conversely renters
as individuals without registered housing wealth.14 All individuals are aggregated into
households using a unique family-identifier.
I use administrative data on interest payments for mortgage and bank debt to calculate
an actual housing burden ratio as interest payments divided by income. I calculate buyer
income as the weighted average of all individuals who purchase the property, where the
weights is the percentage that they purchase. Further, I calculate leverage as buyer mortgage
divided by the sales price.
Finally, I construct several municipality level variables. Housing supply is calculated as
the square meter size of all registered properties per municipality, divided by the square
meter size of the municipality. Population density is the number of households divided by
13Property ownership can be transferred within a family (to grandparents, parents or children) at a
minimum price equal to the latest public valuation minus 15%.
14The owner of cooperative housing are not considered as owner in this definition, as the value of coop-
erative housing is not available in the data.
31
municipality size in square meters. I define a measure of income inequality as the income of
households in the 90th percentile divided by the income of households in the 50th percentile.
4.1 A Repeat-Sales Index
It is difficult to characterize a “typical” house. Houses are distinct, where size, location, type
of property and property quality can vary substantially between different areas and across
time. This presents a problem for measuring changes in house prices over time, as variation
over time in traded property characteristics can introduce bias into the estimation of a house
price index.15 Furthermore, observed transactions are infrequent, as most properties are only
traded on single occasions. Several approaches have been suggested to address these issues,
where perhaps the most prominent approach is the repeat-sales price methodology first
introduced by Bailey et al. (1963), and later refined by Case and Shiller (1987, 1989). The
repeat-sales methodology attempts to circumvent the problem of heterogeneous properties
by comparing the price of the same property across time. In the repeat-sales procedure the
data requirements are minimal and it is not necessary to specify functional form for the
estimation.
Formally, following Harding et al. (2007), consider the equations for the price of a prop-
erty at time t and t+ τ :
Pt = e
γtf(Xt; βt), (4a)
and
Pt+τ = e
γt+τf(Xt+τ ; βt+τ ), (4b)
where f(Xt; βt) is an unknown function of the period-specific characteristics of the prop-
erty (X) and their shadow price (β). The characteristics in X include both area- and
property-specific characteristics. The terms γt and γt+τ are time varying factors that are
specific to the housing market in which the property is located.
15A municipality reform in 2006 provides further difficulty in Denmark. There is no disaggregated, high-
frequency index available for the full time period.
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Suppose now that X and β remain constant over time. Substituting 4a into 4b gives:
Pt+τ = e
γt+τ−γtPt. (5)
After taking logs and rearranging, I get that the difference in prices between time t and
t+ τ is:
log
Pt+τ
Pt
= γt+τ − γt (6)
Under the assumption that X and β are time-invariant, f(Xt; βt) drops out of the model,
and it is not necessary to specify its functional form. The percentage change in quality
adjusted prices is measured as the difference between γt+τ and γt.
4.2 Estimation
Estimation of a repeat-sales index requires several methodological choices. I use transactions
data for single-family houses and owner-occupied apartments from 1994 to 2010, a total of
539,452 transactions. I follow convention in the literature and exclude non arm-length
transactions, transactions with short holding period, outliers in sales prices and outliers in
house price growth, as they may not be representative of market prices.16 Specifically, I
exclude trades between family members, sales due to divorce and death, sales-pair with a
holding period of less than 2 quarters, sales where the property is transacted multiple times
per year, and the top and bottom 1 percent of sales price and price growth.17 Table 8 in
the appendix shows the details of the sample selection.
The equation of interest is equation (6), and its sample equivalent:
log
Pt+τ,i
Pt,i
=
τi∑
t=1
γtDt,i + ωt,i for all properties i = 1, . . . , n (7)
where ωt,i is an error term, and Dt,i equals −1, 0 or 1 depending on whether the property in
16Non arm-length transactions are typically not sold at market prices, and a short holding period may
be because professional house buyers renovate the property with the intention to re-sell it at a higher price.
Additionally, a distressed sale may occur due to job loss or divorce.
17It is not possible to identify buyers and sellers if the property is transacted more than once a year.
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period t is traded for the first time, not traded, or traded for the second time, respectively.
The time dimension is quarterly. Under the assumption that ωt,i has zero mean and constant
variance, equation (7) can be estimated with OLS, and the exponentiated coefficient of γt
is interpreted as the quality-adjusted price index.18 Case and Shiller (1987) suggest that
observations with a long time between sales should be given less weight in the estimation
as the error term is likely related to the length of time between transactions. I use the
following method to down-weight observations. First, I estimate equation (6) by OLS to
obtain the vector of regression residuals. Second, I run a regression of the squared residuals
on a constant term and the time interval between sales. Third, I re-estimate equation (6)
where each observation is weighted by the square root of the fitted value for the second
step.19
The main disadvantage of the repeat-sales methodology is that it discards a large fraction
of all observations, as only properties traded twice or more are included (Gatzlaff and Haurin,
1997; Clapp et al., 1991; Jiang et al., 2015). In other words, while the methodology avoids a
specification-bias, it may introduce a sample selection bias, as properties traded repeatedly
may not be representative of the entire market. Table 1 provide summary statistics on
observed characteristics for single transactions and repeat sale transactions, and t-test for
the difference between single and repeat sales.20 There are 539,452 properties transacted
two times or more during the sample period, and 267,318 transactions where the property
was sold only once. The average square meter price for single-sale (repeat-sales) transactions
is 9,018 DKK (9,686 DKK), the average size is 127 (109) square meters and the average
property age is 51 (56) years. There is a statistically significant difference between single-
and repeat-sales for all three categories.
Even with these differences however, the repeat-sales index remains the most appropriate
methodology to use for this study. To see why, consider the alternative estimation methods.
18For more details and a practical guide to different house price indexes, see Balk et al. (2013).
19A robustness check confirms that the results are similar if do not down-weight observation based on
time between sales.
20The equivalent table when the sample is split between single-family houses and owner-occupied apart-
ments can be found in table 9 and 10 in the Appendix.
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One alternative is the hedonic house price methodology, which uses a bundle of property
characteristics and their associated prices to derive a price index. This methodology re-
quires a correctly specified functional forms for each characteristic, an inherently difficult
proposition. Shiller (2008) argues that a repeat sales index is the “only way to go”, as there
are too many different permutations of hedonic data that could possibly allow the researcher
to chose their own results. Another alternative is the appraisal-based methodology, which
uses data from appraisals (normally tax appraisals) to calculate an index. Tax values are
generally available for all properties, which makes this methodology attractive. Indeed, the
official property index available from Denmark Statistics is constructed with the appraisal-
based method. However, the appraisal-based index relies on having a good assessment of
property values. High quality on-site value assessments in Denmark was conducted annually
by SKAT prior to 2002. After the freeze of nominal property tax values in 2002 the appraisal
is no longer conducted on-site, and housing values are instead estimated from a model of
housing transactions. This likely lowers the quality of the appraisal, and therefore limits the
attractiveness of the index. Appendix C compares the estimated repeat-sales indices with
the official Denmark Statistics property indices, and find a strong level of correspondence
between the two different approaches prior to 2002, but also finds that there are increasing
differences between the two methodologies after the on-site assessment was abolished in
2002.
Due to the dependency on quality of assessments and to the inherent difficulty in speci-
fying a functional form for a hedonic index, I chose to construct a repeat-sales index. With
the repeat-sales index, there is no dependence on assessments, and there is no specification
bias. As the repeat-sales methodology is prominently used in the United States, this also
enables an easier comparison to US house price indices.
5 Results
This section describes the Danish housing market from 1996 to 2010, with a focus on house
price developments on a municipal level. There is considerable variation across locations
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in both the timing and the amplitude of house price growth. In fact, the geographical
clustering, the difference in timing and the difference in amplitude during this period are
reminiscent of what Sinai (2013) and Abel and Deitz (2010) document for the US housing
market between 1980 and 2010. Further, Danish house prices display the type of short-run
momentum and long-run mean reversion that Glaeser et al. (2014) and Head et al. (2014)
document for the United States.
5.1 House Price Growth Over Time
The Danish housing market between 1996 and 2010 is characterized by three distinct phases,
which I will refer to as the pre-boom, the boom and the bust period. Figure 2 plots the
distribution of annual house price growth over time. Within each year-quarter observation
there are 93 municipalities, where the dots indicate the median house price growth in the
period and the black box indicates the 25th and 75 percentiles. In the pre-boom period
the median annual growth rate was 6 percent, consistent with growing real incomes, lower
interest rates and low unemployment rates (Dam et al., 2011). During the boom period
between 2004 and 2007 the median growth rate was 11 percent, and house price volatility
was substantially higher. The peak median growth rate was over 20 percent per year, a rate
at which house prices would double in approximately 4 years. Third, during the bust period
from 2007 to 2009, the median price growth was negative 6.4 percent. During this time
most of the gains from the boom period were erased, and at the end of this period prices
had returned to their pre-boom level. The over-arching pattern of a relatively stable period
followed by periods of substantial volatility and subsequent reversion in price growth is also
found in the United States (Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015; Sinai, 2013).
However, even within booms and busts, there are differences in timing. Figure 3 shows
that municipality-specific peaks in house prices occurred over a 2-and-a-half-year period,
and that a large fraction of the peaks took place prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis
in 2008. The date at which price declines stopped and prices started growing again (the
through) also differs across municipalities. In certain municipalities house prices rebounded
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quickly and started growing again already in early 2009, but other municipalities had not
seen the end of price declines in 2010.21 The differences in peaks present a challenge for
theoretical models that attribute the end of the boom to national factors. For example, it
seems unlikely that reverberation from the onset of the financial crisis can explain that the
peak in certain areas of Denmark occurred in 2006, or that increasing interest rates in 2006
can explain that the decline in prices started in 2008.
Figure 4 shows how the three periods are related by plotting changes in house prices
in the pre-boom period against changes in house price in the boom period in a), and price
changes in the boom against price changes from the peak to the trough in b). Somewhat
surprisingly, and in contrast to the evidence from US housing markets presented in Glaeser
and Nathanson (2015), the correlation between pre-boom and boom house price growth is
low, and several areas that experienced substantial increase in prices in the boom period
experienced low growth in the pre-boom period. The substantial mean reversion observed
in b) is familiar from studies of the United States’ housing market.
House price dynamics over time are well documented for the United States. Two em-
pirical regularities that regularly appear in studies of the United States’ housing market
are long-run mean reversion and short-term momentum (Glaeser et al., 2014; Glaeser and
Nathanson, 2015). If housing markets are efficient and house prices follow a random walk,
the coefficient on past house prices should be zero. I investigate whether Danish house
prices exhibit the same patterns in table 3, which shows the result when log price growth is
regressed on lagged price growth. And indeed, the observed pattern is similar in Denmark
and the US. Price growth displays serial correlation at high frequencies and mean revert at
longer frequencies.22 The estimated coefficients on the 1-year lag of 0.18 shows evidence of
short-run momentum, although it is substantially lower than the estimated coefficients of
0.6 in Glaeser et al. (2014) and 0.75 in Head et al. (2014). The negative coefficient on the
21House price peaks and troughs are more concentrated in time in Denmark than in the United States.
There are several areas in the United States with a peak in house prices in 2000 or 2001, although a majority
of peaks occurred between 2005 and 2007 (Sinai, 2013; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2012).
22The regression equation is: ∆rk,t = ∆Pk,t−j + κk + k,t for j = 1, 2, 3, 5, where ∆Pk,t is the log j-th
difference in the repeat sales index in year t for municipality k, and κk are municipality dummies.
37
3-year lag implies that house prices mean-revert, which is consistent with the evidence in
previously mentioned studies. The one-year serial correlation is difficult to reconcile with
rational models of housing market, as fundamental factors such as interest rates or rental
prices do not display high enough variation over time to justify the strong movements of
house prices over time (Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015).23
The serial correlation is not uniform across municipalities. Glaeser et al. (2008) show
how elastic supply mitigates housing bubbles by allowing a quicker supply response. If
supply is elastic and can be added quickly, then house prices should reflect construction
cost. If supply is inelastic however, prices may increase for a longer period of time before
new construction brings prices back down. The implication of this is that there should be
less momentum in more elastic areas. Panel B reports the results when the one-year lag
of house price changes is interacted with 4 groups of housing supply, where the 1st group
is low (unconstrained) housing supply, and the 4th group is the most constrained supply.
The coefficient on one-year lagged changes in prices is negative in municipalities with low
housing supply, and is positive and significant in areas with constrained supply. These result
indicate that supply is an important determinant of house price dynamics.
Finally, the degree of serial correlation differs across time. Panel C shows the coefficients
where the one-year lag in house price growth is interacted with year dummies. Figure 5
plots the coefficients and the associated confidence intervals. The coefficients are the highest
during the boom years of 2005 and 2006, and during the downturn of 2008 and 2009. This
pattern is also observed in the U.S. housing market during the same time period (compare
figure 5 with figure 11.4 in Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015).
5.2 Geographic Distribution
How is house price growth distributed geographically? Figure 6 plots the growth in house
prices for each municipality in Denmark for different periods. Panel (a) plots the increase
23It is possible to rationalize the observed empirical patterns in alternative models of the housing market.
The positive coefficients can be due to costly learning, where households learn about the state of the housing
market from prices, or due to search and matching as in Head et al. (2014).
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from 1998Q1 up to 2004Q1 (pre-boom period); panel (b) plots the increase in prices from
2004Q1 to the municipality-specific peaks; and panel (c) plots the decrease in prices from the
peak to trough. Note that values in panel (c) denote decreases in prices. The largest price
increases in the pre-boom period occurred in the eastern regions of Denmark (specifically in
the area around Copenhagen), while smallest price changes occurred in western Denmark,
where house prices declined in some municipalities and growth was generally low. During
the boom, prices increased substantially in all local markets – the average increase was 54
percent from 2003Q3 to the peak in house prices. The largest price increases are again found
in the area around Copenhagen, on the east coast of Denmark. In contrast to the pre-boom
period however, the largest increases were not concentrated only in eastern Denmark. Two
other high growth areas of the boom are located around the cities of Odense and Aarhus, the
second and third largest cities in Denmark; areas that were not among the fastest growing
municipalities prior to 2003. During the bust, all municipalities experienced substantial
decreases in prices – the smallest decrease was 14 percent from peak to trough, and the
average decrease was 31 percent. Price declines were concentrated in areas that previously
experienced substantial price growth, in particular the area around Copenhagen.
Table 4 presents evidence on differences in observable characteristics between munici-
palities. Specifically, I present results for municipality characteristics from 2002, before the
boom occurred. All municipalities are divided into four groups based on price appreciation
during the boom in columns (1)-(4), and the last column shows the results of a t-test of
differences between the first and fourth column. Between 2004Q1 and the peak prices ap-
preciated by 40 percent on average for the 23 municipalities with the lowest appreciation in
column 1, and by 71 percent for the municipalities with the largest appreciation in column
4. Note that even the group of municipalities with the lowest appreciation rate experienced
a substantial increase in prices during the housing boom. However, most of these gains were
reversed during the boom. For the municipalities with the largest appreciation (column
4), a 69% increase followed by a 39% decline meant that house prices increased by just
3% between 2004 and the trough. Average income, the average income of renters below
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the age of 35 (young renters), population density and income inequality (as measured by
the ratio of the 90th income percentile and the 50th income percentile for each munici-
pality, the P90/P50 ratio) were all significantly larger in high-growth areas compared to
low-growth areas. The boom was larger in magnitude in municipalities with a higher initial
price level, higher levels of income, higher levels of inequality, and in municipalities with
more constrained housing and higher population density. Taken together, this suggests that
the boom was mainly a city phenomenon, and that consistent with the theory of Glaeser
et al. (2008), house price growth was higher in areas with less elastic housing supply, only
to decline more when prices adjusted.
Table 5 presents the results of a regression of municipality-level growth in house prices
during the boom separately on several variables measured in 2002. Price increases during
the boom is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of income, whether
measured by the average income, income for renters below the age of 35, or buyer income.
The P90 / P50 ratio, a measure of income inequality, is also positively correlated with
house price appreciation, showing that more unequal municipalities experienced a larger
increase in prices. Neither the unemployment rate nor the population size in 2002 are
significantly related to house price growth. Moreover, non-income related variables such
as housing supply, the pre-boom increase, the square meter price, and population density
are all positively correlated with house price appreciation. The square meter price and
density explain 39 and 30 percent of the variation in house price growth across municipalities
respectively, and buyer income explains 20 percent.
Table 6 further characterizes where the boom occurred. Column (1) shows the result
when price increases during the boom are regressed on all the above variables related to
income and labor markets in 2002. While the signs remain positive for income and the
P90 / P50 ratio, none of the income variables are significant. The level of unemployment
in 2002 is the only significant variable. Column (2) shows that municipalities with higher
initial house prices experienced higher house price growth during the boom. This positive
correlation remains in column (3), where all variables are included. In addition to the square
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meter price, column (3) shows that log population and pre-boom house price growth are
negatively correlated with boom growth. Overall, the results suggest that about half of the
variation in house prices can be explained by observed characteristics of municipalities.
6 Explaining the Boom
There are two facts that require explanation. The first is the spatial differences across
municipalities in the size of the boom. Section 5 already covered differences across munic-
ipalities in terms of housing supply, and other explanations related to levels. This section
will extend this analysis to cover changes in variables, such as income, that may explain
the differential pattern observed across municipalities. If income changes are substantially
higher in Copenhagen for example, this explain why house prices expanded more rapidly in
Copenhagen than in other areas.
The second fact that require explanation is the size of the boom itself. I will focus on
three potential explanations: an increase in income as a proxy for increasing benefits of
housing, a decrease in interest rates to measure the reduced gross cost of housing, and the
potential role of expectations in explaining the Danish housing boom.24 These explanations
are motivated by the user-cost model described in section 3.
Income Growth and Differences Across Municipalities
It is difficult to rationalize differences across municipalities within the user-cost model,
as the factors that cause house prices to fluctuate generally do not vary on the national
level. Mortgage rates are set nationally and can therefore not explain differences across
municipalities. While the previous results suggest that differences in housing supply and
density can help explain differential increases in prices, an alternative explanation is that
the benefit of living in certain locations are higher. For example, living in Copenhagen is
24An alternative method for evaluating the benefits of housing is to use rental values as a measure of the
annual benefit of owning, and to calculate a price-to-rent ratio. First, owned and rented properties may
differ significantly, as Glaeser and Gyourko (2009) finds. Second, at least a portion of the rental market
is price-controlled, and another part of the housing market is subsidized. This violates the assumptions of
the user-cost model, which assumes that the rental housing market is free and efficient. Third, there is no
municipality-level data on rental prices available in Denmark. Comparing house prices to rent in Denmark
is therefore of limited value.
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more expensive, which could be because amenities are higher or because incomes are higher.
While amenities are difficult to measure, we can examine whether high growth areas also
had higher income growth, which thereby could explain differences in house price growth.
I use three different samples when calculating changes in average income; the full sample,
only buyers and only young renters. A large fraction of buyers is below 35 years of age, and
the income growth for these young households may be relatively more important than the
average income in the municipality. Young income growth also proxies for future incomes.
Furthermore, Gyourko et al. (2013) show that in some “superstar” cities an increasing
number of high-income households crowd out low-income households, leading to high house
price appreciation rates. Figure 7 plots the ratio of buyer income to average income for 4
groups based on house price growth during the boom. In municipalities with the highest
price growth, the ratio is around 1.35, meaning that the income of buyers is 35 percent
higher than the average incomes. In the group with the lowest growth , the ratio is slightly
below 1.3. Except for an increase between 2003 and 2004 for the third group, the ratios
remain stable over time prior to 2006.
Table 7 investigates differences in income growth rates between high and low growth areas
for all households, for buyers and for young households. All incomes increased between 2002
and 2006. However, the largest increased are observed in the lowest growth areas, not the
highest growth area. The same pattern is observed for buyer income, which increased by
approximately 6 percent for the municipalities in columns (1) - (3), but only 4.40 percent
in column (4). For households below the age of 35, there was no statistically significant
difference in income growth across municipality. It is therefore difficult to explain the
spatial differences in house price growth through income changes alone – the low growth
areas in column (1) actually experienced higher income growth.
The Decline in Costs and the Magnitude of the Boom
As the user-cost model predicts, declining costs for ownership lead to a predictable increase
in house prices. As depreciation rates and tax rates are relatively stable over time, the major
driver of price changes in the user cost model is mortgage interest rates.25 I therefore focus
25Dam et al. (2011) report that the tax freeze was accompanied by an increase in the land-value tax, and
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on declines in interest rates as the main change in costs of ownership and as the main cause
of rising house prices. In figure 8 the long mortgage rate declines from 5.65% in 2003 to a
low of 4.17% in 2005. Interest rates were generally going down over the period, but started
rising again in the end of 2005. As an illustration of the effect of the decline in mortgage
rate, consider taking out a mortgage of 1,000,000 DKK in the beginning of 2004 when the
long term mortgage rate was 5.65 percent.26 The total interest cost of the mortgage over
the 30-year contract is 1,078,049 DKK. When the long-term bond rate declined to a low
of 4.17 percent in 2005, a household could increase their borrowing by 43 percent and pay
the same total amount over the loan contract.27 This implies an elasticity of borrowing to
interest rates of 29.
The elasticity implied in the above exposition is higher than the econometrically esti-
mated elasticity in the literature. Dam et al. (2011) estimate a model for the Danish housing
market and find an elasticity of -15, whereas Himmelberg et al. (2005) estimate an elastic-
ity of -20. In Glaeser et al. (2012), the elasticity ranges from -19 for a naive case where
households expect interest rates to remain at the lower level, to -7 in a more comprehensive
model where households anticipate mean-reversion in interest rates. As borrowers can fix
interest rates in Denmark for 30 years, expected mean-reversion in interest rates may be
less important than in countries with variable interest rates. Using this range of estimates,
the approximately 1.5 percentage point decline in the long bond rate increased house prices
by between 10.5 percent and 30 percentage point between 2003 and 2005. Given that price
growth were much higher than this during the boom, especially in high growth areas where
the average increase was 65 percent, it is not sufficient to explain the price movements in all
municipalities. However, declines in interest rates can explain most of the increases in house
prices in low growth areas, where house prices increased by 35 percent. Importantly, note
that interest rates increase in late 2005 as house prices continued their ascent. The decline
that the net effect on house prices was negligible.
26Himmelberg et al. (2005) recommends using a long-term interest rate, as the expected future interest-
rate may be higher than the short-term rate.
27When calculating the cost of the contract, I assume an annuity contract where the sum of interest and
amortization payments are the same across years, and that the loan is repaid over 30 years.
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in house prices began at a much later stage than the increase in interest rates, suggesting
that there was another factor that caused the house price to grow in 2006 and 2007.
The data suggests that incomes went up and interest rates went down. To combine
these two observations I plot the distribution of interest payments to income (the housing
burden) in figure 9, where each line indicates a separate year. The distribution of interest
payments to income is almost identical in 2004 and 2005, but shifts to the left in 2006 and
2007. This can be seen more clearly in figure 10, where I plot the average housing burden
per quarter in the lowest and highest house price growth groups defined earlier. There was
a sharp increase in the housing burden starting in 2006; households were willing to accept a
higher interest share as a percentage of income in 2006 and 2007, compared to 2004. Within
a user-cost model, the explanation for the willingness of households to accept higher interest
payments is normally taken as expectation of capital gains. Higher house price expectations
compensate owners for the higher interest payments. Several papers have made the claim
that unreasonably high expectations of capital gains were to blame for housing crisis in
the United States (Shiller, 2015; Foote et al., 2012; Case et al., 2012), a claim also made
in Denmark (Rangvid et al., 2013; Dam et al., 2011). Case et al. (2012) find that new
home-owners expected large increases in prices, and that these expectations peaked at the
height of the boom. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) find similar evidence. As there is no
long-running survey on expectations in Denmark, this proposition is difficult to test. The
data is consistent with such an explanation, as households were willing to pay more for
housing relative to income in 2006 and 2007.
Finally, a note on an implicit assumption of the user cost model. As interest rates go
down, the user-cost model predicts that house prices go up, which generates large increases
in wealth for owners. The increase in wealth can be used to finance the down-payment for
the next housing purchases (Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006). The usual assumption in the
empirical application of the user-cost model is that housing purchases are fully leveraged
(?).g.][]himmelberg2005assessing. In contrast to this assumption, figure 11 shows that the
distribution of buyer leverage for each year between 2004 and 2007 shifts towards the left,
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showing that leverage is reduced as the boom progresses. The annual cost of housing was
therefore not changing by as much as can be inferred from simply observing mortgage
rates. This also suggests that the implied risk of a house price fall is lower than what
is commonly assumed, as a lower leverage provides an larger buffer against declines in
house prices. Indeed, for households concerned with the possibility of a bubble in housing
market, a higher equity buffer may be desirable as an insurance policy. Moreover, a higher
percentage of equity corresponds to a lower degree of debt, which naturally translates into
lower interest-payments and thus makes housing more affordable.
7 Conclusions
This paper has documented several facts about the Danish housing boom. Overall, there
are striking similarities between the Danish and the US housing boom, especially given the
differences in institutional design. The boom was most prominent in the area surrounding
the capital region of Copenhagen, where prices increased very rapidly between 2004 and
2006. These municipalities, where house prices deviated substantially from fundamentals,
are characterized by high average incomes, constrained housing supply and high popula-
tion density. However, the boom was not concentrated to a subset of municipalities. All
municipalities experienced substantial increases in prices between 2004 to 2007. The fact
that prices increased substantially across all municipalities is suggestive of a national shock
affecting all municipalities in 2004. The heterogeneous growth in prices between municipal-
ities and the pattern of structural breaks in house prices suggest that this shock interacted
with local area characteristics to produce differentially sized booms.
It is difficult to explain the increase in prices that occurred over this period using fun-
damental factors only. Neither interest rates nor heterogeneous income growth can fully
explain the large fluctuations in house prices observed across Denmark, nor can they ex-
plain the differing start and end dates of the boom. Indeed, interest rates declined only until
mid 2005, only to increase again afterwards. Even as interest rates started increasing in late
2005, house prices continued rising. There is some suggestive evidence that expectations of
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capital gains were important in the later stages of the Danish housing boom, as the later
stage of the boom cannot be explained by reductions in costs. However, as this is a residual
explanation, some caution is required with this interpretation of the Danish housing boom.
46
References
Abel, Jaison R, and Deitz, Richard. 2010. Bypassing the bust: The stability of upstate New
York’s housing markets during the recession. Current Issues in Economics and Finance,
16(3).
Andersen, Steffen, Campbell, John Y, Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, and Ramadorai, Tarun.
2014. Inattention and inertia in household finance: Evidence from the Danish mortgage
market. Available at SSRN 2463575.
Association of Danish Mortgage Credit Banks. 2009. The Traditional Danish Mortgage
Model.
Backman, Claes, and Lutz, Chandler. 2016. The Consequences of Interest Only Loans for
the Housing Boom and Bust.
Bailey, Martin J, Muth, Richard F, and Nourse, Hugh O. 1963. A regression method for real
estate price index construction. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(304),
933–942.
Balk, Bert, Fenwick, David, Diewert, Erwin, de Haan, Jan, and Prud’homme, Marc. 2013.
Handbook on residential property prices indices (RPPIs). World Bank Group.
Bernanke, Ben, et al. 2007. Global imbalances: recent developments and prospects. Bun-
desbank Lecture speech, September.
Browning, Martin, Gørtz, Mette, and Leth-Petersen, Søren. 2013. Housing Wealth and
Consumption: A Micro Panel Study. The Economic Journal, 123(568), 401–428.
Campbell, J. Y. 2013. Mortgage Market Design. Review of Finance, 17(1), 1–33.
Campbell, John Y., and Cocco, Joa˜o F. 2007. How do house prices affect consumption?
Evidence from micro data. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3), 591–621.
Campbell, John Y, Giglio, Stefano, and Pathak, Parag. 2011. Forced Sales and House Prices.
The American Economic Review, 2108–2131.
Case, Karl E, and Shiller, Robert J. 1989. The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family
Homes. The American Economic Review, 125–137.
Case, Karl E., Shiller, Robert J., and Thompson, Anne. 2012. What have they been thinking?
Home buyer behavior in hot and cold markets. Working paper. 00035.
Case, KE, and Shiller, RJ. 1987. Prices of single-family homes since 1970: New indexes for
four cities. New England Economic Review, 45–56.
Clapp, John M, Giaccotto, Carmelo, and Tirtiroglu, Dogan. 1991. Housing price indices
based on all transactions compared to repeat subsamples. Real Estate Economics, 19(3),
270–285.
Coleman, Major, LaCour-Little, Michael, and Vandell, Kerry D. 2008. Subprime lending
and the housing bubble: Tail wags dog? Journal of Housing Economics, 17(4), 272–290.
47
Cotter, John, Gabriel, Stuart, and Roll, Richard. 2014. Can housing risk be diversified? A
cautionary tale from the housing boom and bust. Review of Financial Studies, hhu085.
Dam, Niels Arne, Hvolbøl, Tina Saaby, Pedersen, Erik Haller, Sørensen, PB, and Thams-
borg, SH. 2011. Developments in the market for owner-occupied housing in recent years–
Can house prices be explained. Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, 1st Quarter,
1–82.
Danske Bank Markets. 2013. Danish Covered Bond Handbook.
Erlandsen, Espen, Lundsgaard, Jens, and Hu¨fner, Felix. 2006. The Danish Housing Market.
Favara, Giovanni, and Imbs, Jean. 2015. Credit supply and the price of housing. The
American Economic Review, 105(3), 958–992.
Ferreira, Fernando, and Gyourko, Joseph. 2012. Heterogeneity in Neighborhood-Level Price
Growth in the United States, 1993 2009. The American Economic Review, 134–140.
Ferreira, Fernando V, and Gyourko, Joseph. 2011. Anatomy of the Beginning of the Housing
Boom: US Neighborhoods and Metropolitan Areas, 1993-2009. NBER Working Paper.
Foote, Christopher L., Gerardi, Kristopher S., and Willen, Paul S. 2012. Why did so many
people make so many ex post bad decisions? The causes of the foreclosure crisis. Working
paper.
Gatzlaff, Dean H, and Haurin, Donald R. 1997. Sample selection bias and repeat-sales index
estimates. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 14(1-2), 33–50.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Nathanson, Charles G. 2015. Chapter 11 - Housing Bubbles.
Pages 701 – 751 of: Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson, and Strange, William C.
(eds), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics. Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, vol. 5.
Glaeser, Edward L., Gyourko, Joseph, and Saiz, Albert. 2008. Housing supply and housing
bubbles. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(2), 198–217.
Glaeser, Edward L., Gottlieb, Joshua D., and Gyourko, Joseph. 2012. Can cheap credit
explain the housing boom? In: Housing and the Financial Crisis. University of Chicago
Press.
Glaeser, Edward L, Gyourko, Joseph, Morales, Eduardo, and Nathanson, Charles G. 2014.
Housing dynamics: An urban approach. Journal of Urban Economics, 81, 45–56.
Glaeser, Edward Ludwig, and Gyourko, Joseph E. 2009. Rethinking federal housing policy:
how to make housing plentiful and affordable. American Enterprise Institute.
Gyourko, Joseph, Mayer, Christopher, and Sinai, Todd. 2013. Superstar Cities. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(4), 167–99.
Harding, John P, Rosenthal, Stuart S, and Sirmans, CF. 2007. Depreciation of housing
capital, maintenance, and house price inflation: Estimates from a repeat sales model.
Journal of urban Economics, 61(2), 193–217.
48
Head, Allen, Lloyd-Ellis, Huw, and Sun, Hongfei. 2014. Search, liquidity, and the dynamics
of house prices and construction. The American Economic Review, 104(4), 1172–1210.
Himmelberg, Charles, Mayer, Christopher, and Sinai, Todd. 2005. Assessing High House
Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals and Misperceptions. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
19(4), 67–92.
International Monetary Fund. 2011. Housing Finance and Financial Stability - Back to
Basics?
Jiang, Liang, Phillips, Peter CB, and Yu, Jun. 2015. New methodology for constructing
real estate price indices applied to the Singapore residential market. Journal of Banking
& Finance.
Keys, Benjamin J, Mukherjee, Tanmoy, Seru, Amit, and Vig, Vikrant. 2010. Did Securiti-
zation Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 125(1), 307–362.
Leth-Petersen, Søren. 2010. Intertemporal consumption and credit constraints: Does total
expenditure respond to an exogenous shock to credit? The American Economic Review,
1080–1103.
Mayer, Christopher. 2011. Housing bubbles: A survey. Annu. Rev. Econ., 3(1), 559–577.
00021.
Mayer, Christopher, and Sinai, Todd. 2009. US house price dynamics and behavioral finance.
Policy Making Insights from Behavioral Economics. Boston, Mass: Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston.
Mian, Atif, and Sufi, Amir. 2009. The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: Evidence
from the US mortgage default crisis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1449–
1496.
Mian, Atif R, and Sufi, Amir. 2015. Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage Appli-
cations during the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005. Working paper.
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. 2007 (Jan). Nye tider p˚a boligmarkedet. Working
paper.
Nadauld, Taylor D, and Sherlund, Shane M. 2013. The impact of securitization on the
expansion of subprime credit. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2), 454–476.
Ortalo-Magne, Francois, and Rady, Sven. 2006. Housing market dynamics: On the contri-
bution of income shocks and credit constraints. The Review of Economic Studies, 73(2),
459–485.
Palmer, Christopher. 2014. Why Did So Many Subprime Borrowers Default During the
Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices?
Piazzesi, Monika, and Schneider, Martin. 2009. Momentum Traders in the Housing Market:
Survey Evidence and a Search Model. The American Economic Review, 99(2), 406–411.
49
Poterba, James M. 1984. Tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing: an asset-market ap-
proach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 729–752.
Rangvid, Jesper, Grosen, Anders, Østrup, Finn, Møgelvang-Hansen, Peter, Jensen,
Hugo Frey, Thomsen, Jens, Schu¨tze, Peter, Galbo, Julie, Ølgaard, Christian, Frederiksen,
Niels Kleis, et al. 2013. Den finansielle krise i Danmark: A˚rsager, konsekvenser og læring.
Working paper.
Saiz, Albert. 2010. The geographic determinants of housing supply. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 125(3), 1253–1296.
Shiller, Robert J. 2006. Long-term perspectives on the current boom in home prices. The
Economists’ Voice, 3(4).
Shiller, Robert J. 2008. Derivatives markets for home prices. Working paper.
Shiller, Robert J. 2015. Irrational exuberance. Princeton University Press.
Sinai, Todd. 2013. House Price Moments in Boom-Bust Cycles. Housing and the Financial
Crisis, 19.
Wheaton, William C. 1999. Real Estate “Cycles”: Some Fundamentals. Real Estate Eco-
nomics, 27(2), 209–230.
50
8 Figures
Figure 1:
House Prices in the United States and Denmark (2000Q1=100)
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Source: United States: S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Composite Home Price Index c©,
Index Jan 2000=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted. Deflated by the Consumer Price
index.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Annual House Price Growth
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Notes: Figure plots the distribution of year-over-year house price growth across munici-
palities. The black dot shows the median and the black box ranges from the 25th to the
75th percentile.
Figure 3: Peaks And Troughs in House Prices
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Notes: Figure plots the fraction of municipalities with a peak/trough in house prices in
a given quarter. Peaks are defined as the highest value for the municipality house price
index before 2010.
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Figure 4: Momentum and Mean Reversion
a) Pre-Boom versus Boom
Copenhagen
Aarhus
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Lo
g 
P
ric
e 
G
ro
w
th
, 2
00
3Q
1 
to
 P
ea
k
0 .2 .4 .6
Log Price Growth, 1998Q1 to 2003Q1
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Notes: Percentage increase in house prices for each municipality over the specified period. Pre-boom period occur between
1998Q2 to 2003Q3. Boom period occur between 2003Q3 and the municipality-specific peak in house prices. Bust period begin
at the peak in house prices and end in the municipality-specific trough.
Figure 5: Coefficient on annual price growth on lag of annual price growth
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Notes: Dependent variable is the first quarter year-over-year price change. Figure plots
the coefficients and a 95 % confidence interval from a regression of annual price growth
on lagged annual price growth interacted with dummies for years and municipality fixed
effects. Coefficients available in table form in Table 3.
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Figure 6: Spatial Distribution of House Price Growth
(a) Increase in Prices during Pre-boom Period
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Notes: Percentage increase in house prices for each municipality over the specified period.
Pre-boom period occur between 1998Q2 to 2003Q3. Boom period occur between 2003Q3
and the municipality-specific peak in house prices. Bust period begin at the peak in
house prices and end in the municipality-specific trough.
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Figure 7: Ratio of Buyer Income to Average Income
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Figure 8: Mortgage Interest Rate
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Figure 9: Distribution of Housing Burden
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Notes: The sum of interest payment on mortgage debt and bank debt, divided by dis-
posable income, in year t for households who purchased households in year t− 1.
Figure 10: Housing Burden over Time
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Notes: The average housing burden over time, calculated as the sum of interest payment
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purchased households in year t − 1. Lowest House Price growth (Highest House Price
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Figure 11: Buyer Leverage
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Notes: Seasonally adjusted average leverage for buyers in each quarter.
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9 Tables
Table 1:
Single and Repeat Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Single Sale Repeat Sale T-test
Square Meter Price 9,018 9,686 -668***
(5,935) (5,872) [-48]
Square Meters Size 127 109 18***
(43) (50) [169]
Property Age 51 56 -6***
(37) (37) [-64]
N 267,318 539,452 806,770
Notes: Summary statistics for all property transactions from 1994 to 2010. The corresponding statistics for owner-occupied
apartments and single-family houses are available in Table 9 and 10 respectively. Single Sale in Column 1 are transactions
where the property is transacted a single time, and repeat sale in Column 2 where a property is transacted two or more times.
Column 3 provides T-tests for the difference in means. Size (M2) is the square meter residential property size. Price (M2) is
calculated as the observed transactions price divided by the square meter size of the property. Property Age is the age of the
building. Standard deviations in parenthesis, and t-statistics in brackets.
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Table 2:
Single and Repeat Sales Over Time
Panel A: Single Sale Panel B: Repeat Sale
Price (M2) Size (M2) Age Price (M2) Size (M2) Age
1994 6,039 126 44 5,877 112 49
1995 6,308 123 46 6,083 109 50
1996 6,928 123 48 6,779 108 52
1997 7,214 124 48 7,170 106 53
1998 7,943 124 51 7,982 106 55
1999 8,209 125 52 8,610 105 55
2000 8,609 127 52 9,065 107 56
2001 8,860 127 52 9,626 107 57
2002 8,901 129 51 9,880 107 56
2003 9,080 129 52 10,141 108 57
2004 9,733 130 52 11,072 109 58
2005 10,528 130 54 12,276 109 60
2006 11,642 131 55 13,330 111 62
2007 12,442 128 54 13,518 111 61
2008 11,668 128 54 12,566 112 61
2009 11,003 126 52 11,801 112 61
2010 11,411 127 52 12,251 112 61
N 267,318 267,318 267,318 539,452 539,452 539,452
Notes: Summary statistics for all property transactions from 1994 to 2010. Panel A show statistics for properties transacted
a single time, and Panel B show statistics for properties transacted a mulitple times. Size (M2) is the square meter residential
property size. Price (M2) is calculated as the observed transactions price divided by the square meter size of the property.
Property Age is the age of the building.
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Table 3:
Serial Correlation in Prices
Coefficient SE R-Squared Obs
Panel A: Different Lags
∆Pi,t−1 .18 .03 .03 1302
∆Pi,t−2 -.1 .04 .01 1209
∆Pi,t−3 -.63 .04 .17 1116
∆Pi,t−5 -.01 .07 0 930
Panel B: Housing Supply - One Year Lags
∆Pi,t−1 X Housing Supply = 1 -.16 .06 .02 322
∆Pi,t−1 X Housing Supply = 2 .16 .06 .02 294
∆Pi,t−1 X Housing Supply = 3 .35 .05 .12 350
∆Pi,t−1 X Housing Supply = 4 .26 .05 .07 336
Panel C: Year by Year Regressions
∆Pi,t−1 X 1997 .15 .08 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 1998 .39 .11 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 1999 .21 .1 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2000 -.17 .12 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2001 .08 .15 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2002 -.28 .14 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2003 -.14 .17 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2004 -.46 .17 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2005 .26 .15 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2006 1.01 .09 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2007 .06 .05 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2008 -.42 .1 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2009 1.54 .11 .26 1302
∆Pi,t−1 X 2010 -.02 .05 .26 1302
Notes: Dependent variable is annual change in house prices.
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Table 4:
Summary Statistics
Lowest 2 3 Highest (Highest)-(Lowest)
Annualized Pre-Boom Price Growth 2 4 5 5 3***
(1) (3) (2) (3) [4]
Annualized Boom Price Growth 5 7 10 10 5***
(1) (1) (1) (2) [13]
Annualized Bust Price Growth -13 -16 -16 -19 -7**
(12) (10) (8) (8) [-2]
Boom Price Growth 35 47 57 65 31***
(7) (3) (2) (4) [17]
Bust Price Growth -23 -31 -37 -39 -16***
(8) (10) (8) (9) [-7]
Panel A: Summary Statistics for 2002
Square Meter Prices 6,131 7,840 11,088 11,650 5,519***
(1,652) (2,836) (3,224) (3,786) [7]
Income 312,071 335,551 359,894 350,255 38,184***
(11,622) (50,928) (53,060) (57,193) [3]
Income, Young Renters 404,581 425,092 459,201 456,297 51,716***
(18,461) (59,635) (58,632) (55,659) [4]
Number of Households 27,868 22,617 24,877 37,419 9,551
(17,703) (13,455) (29,161) (60,429) [1]
Population Density 82 196 571 1,369 1,287**
(69) (301) (699) (2,314) [3]
Apartments 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.25 0.06
(0.18) (0.18) (0.32) (0.28) [0.91]
Pct. Owners 0.63 0.64 0.57 0.54 -0.09***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) [-3.03]
Housing Supply 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.30 0.29***
(0.01) (0.12) (0.27) (0.38) [3.72]
Mortgage Rate 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) [0.67]
Employment Ratio 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) [1.24]
P90 / P50 Ratio 2.12 2.12 2.18 2.26 0.15***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.23) (0.24) [2.91]
Notes: Summary statistics for four groups municipalities. Groups are based on house price growth between 2003Q3 and
the municipality-specific peak in house prices. List of municipalities and groups are provided in Table 11. All variables
are averages for municipalities. Five municipalities were excluded due to an insufficient number of transactions. The last
column provides a T-test of the difference in means between Lowest and Highest. Standard deviations in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 6:
Multivariate Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Log Income 0.11 -0.13
(0.190) (0.189)
Log Income, Young Renters 0.21 -0.15
(0.205) (0.200)
Log Buyer Income 0.10 0.019
(0.136) (0.134)
P90 / P50 Ratio 0.013 0.024
(0.053) (0.053)
Unemployment 0.029*** 0.0073
(0.009) (0.010)
Log Population -0.011 -0.034**
(0.012) (0.015)
Log Square Meter Price 0.11** 0.24***
(0.043) (0.065)
Housing Supply -0.070 -0.074
(0.059) (0.066)
Log Density 0.024 0.0078
(0.019) (0.020)
Pre-Boom Price Growth -0.00058 -0.0013**
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 93 93 93
R2 .31 .42 .48
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from regressing boom-period
increase in house prices (2004Q1 until the peak) on income and other deter-
minants of house prices. All independent variables are averages for munici-
palities. ∆0206 indicates the percentage change between 2002 and 2006. Five
municipalities were excluded due to an insufficient number of house transac-
tions. Standard errors in parentheses. T-statistics in square brackets. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 7:
Changes in Fundamentals
Lowest 2 3 Highest (Highest)-(Lowest)
Changes Between 2002 and 2006
∆0206 Income 5.57 5.05 4.55 4.68 -0.89**
(0.82) (1.38) (1.91) (1.20) [-2.98]
∆0206 Buyer Income 6.04 6.53 6.34 4.40 -1.64
(3.86) (3.51) (4.20) (5.36) [-1.21]
∆0206 Young Income 3.90 3.72 3.37 3.50 -0.40
(1.69) (3.74) (3.39) (2.38) [-0.67]
Changes Between 2006 and 2009
∆0206 Income -0.43 0.07 0.64 0.91 1.34**
(1.28) (1.44) (1.36) (1.43) [3.38]
∆0206 Young Income 0.12 0.23 1.46 1.95 1.82*
(2.39) (2.71) (2.95) (3.38) [2.14]
∆0206 Buyer Income -3.14 0.64 3.43 5.76 8.90**
(6.79) (4.48) (9.30) (10.47) [3.47]
Notes: Summary statistics for four groups municipalities. Groups are based on house price growth
between 2003Q3 and the municipality-specific peak in house prices. List of municipalities and
groups are provided in Table 11. All variables are averages for municipalities. Five municipalities
were excluded due to an insufficient number of transactions. The last column provides a T-test
of the difference in means between Lowest and Highest. Standard deviations in parentheses. T-
statistics in square brackets.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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A Appendix: Figures
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B Appendix: Tables
Table 8:
Sample Selection
Dropped Remaining
All Observations
Inital . 1,312,909
Single Sales 475,853 837,056
Non Arms Length 178,551 658,505
Summer Houses 78,098 580,407
Outliers in Prices 33,883 546,524
Not 100% sold 7,104 539,420
Repeat Sales Pairs
Repeat Sales Pairs . 263,733
Sales less than 6 months apart 3,044 260,689
Outliers in Price Changes 4,014 256,675
Final Sample 256,675
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Table 9:
Apartments – Single and Repeat Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Single Sale Repeat Sale T-test
Square Meter Price 12,519 12,450 69
(9,533) (6,860) [1]
Square Meters Size 79 71 8***
(32) (25) [37]
Property Age 57 64 -7***
(38) (34) [-28]
N 25,847 163,178 189,025
Notes: Summary statistics for apartment sales from 1994 to 2010. Single Sale in Column 1 are transactions where the property
is transacted a single time, and repeat sale in Column 2 where a property is transacted two or more times. Column 3 provides
T-tests for the difference in means. Size (M2) is the square meter residential property size. Price (M2) is calculated as the
observed transactions price divided by the square meter size of the property. Property Age is the age of the building. Standard
deviations in parenthesis, and t-statistics in brackets.
Table 10:
Single Family Houses – Single and Repeat Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Single Sale Repeat Sale T-test
Square Meter Price 8,643 8,487 155***
(5,274) (4,928) [12]
Square Meters Size 132 125 7***
(41) (50) [62]
Property Age 50 53 -3***
(36) (38) [-32]
N 241,471 376,274 617,745
Notes: Summary statistics for all single-family housing transactions from 1994 to 2010. Single Sale in Column 1 are transac-
tions where the property is transacted a single time, and repeat sale in Column 2 where a property is transacted two or more
times. Column 3 provides T-tests for the difference in means. Size (M2) is the square meter residential property size. Price
(M2) is calculated as the observed transactions price divided by the square meter size of the property. Property Age is the
age of the building. Standard deviations in parenthesis, and t-statistics in brackets.
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Table 11:
Municipalities in each Price Growth Group
Lowest 2 3 Highest
Odsherred Brøndby Ballerup København
Slagelse Høje-Taastrup Dragør Frederiksberg
Guldborgsund Ishøj Gladsaxe Gentofte
Tønder Vallensbœk Glostrup Albertslund
Varde Fredensborg Herlev Hvidovre
Vejen Frederikssund Rødovre Lyngby-Taarbœk
Aabenraa Holbœk T˚arnby Furesø
Herning Ringsted Hillerød Allerød
Holstebro Lejre Hørsholm Helsingør
Lemvig Lolland Egedal Rudersdal
Struer Nœstved Køge Greve
Ikast-Brande Nyborg Roskilde Halsnœs
Ringkøbing-Skjern Nordfyns Faxe Solrød
Morsø Haderslev Kalundborg Gribskov
Thisted Billund Vordingborg Stevns
Viborg Sønderborg Fredericia Sorø
Brønderslev Esbjerg Syddjurs Middelfart
Vesthimmerlands Kolding Norddjurs Assens
Rebild Vejle Odder Faaborg-Midtfyn
Mariagerfjord Favrskov Randers Kerteminde
Jammerbugt Hedensted Silkeborg Odense
Aalborg Skive Skanderborg Svendborg
Hjørring Frederikshavn Aarhus Langeland
Horsens
Notes: Groups are based on house price growth between 2003Q3 and a
municipality specific peak in house prices.
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C Appendix: Comparison of House Price Indices
This section compares the repeat sales price index with the official property index provided
by Denmark Statistics (DST). The DST index is constructed using appraisal-based methods,
using the official property tax valuation as the appraised value.
DST provides quarterly indices over the sample period on a regional level, not on the
municipality level. To enable a comparison, I therefore estimate regional-level quarterly
indices. Both indices are adjusted for inflation.
Figure 12 plots the values of the DST indices against the Repeat-Sales indices.
Figure 12:
House Price Index Comparison
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Notes: House price indices from Denmark Statistics (DST) on the Y-axis, and repeat-sales price indices on the x-axis.
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Figure 13:
Differences in House Price Indices over Time
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Chapter 2 - Prime Borrowers and Financial Innovation in
the Housing Boom and Bust
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Abstract
We use the introduction of interest-only (IO) mortgages in Denmark as a
natural experiment to assess the impact of alternative mortgage products on
house prices during the 2000s. We construct a model to show that lower amor-
tization payments lead to an increase in credit demand by allowing for better
consumption smoothing, even absent any shift in credit supply. In support of
the model, we find that the introduction of interest-only mortgages was followed
by a large increase in the number of buyers, even as credit quality remained con-
stant. On the aggregate level the results indicate that interest-only mortgages
amplified the boom-bust pattern in housing: house prices increased an addi-
tional 35 percent during the boom due to IO loans, and subsequently reverse
during the bust. These effects, which cannot be explained by changes in lending
standards or shifts in credit supply, are magnified in local housing markets with
higher ex-ante house price expectations. Together, the findings document the
consequences of introducing IO loans on the micro- and macro level, and illus-
trates how new mortgage products can have large impacts even in the absence
of a shift in credit supply.
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1 Introduction
The 2000s global housing boom coincided with the permeation of alternative mortgage
products that imploded into the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.
Many of these products aimed at improving affordability for households through re-
duced amortization payments, a valuable feature for households that wish to align their
life-cycle consumption to their long-term income expectations (Cocco, 2013). During
the same period, credit supply expanded rapidly following advances in securitization
and increased sub-prime lending (Mian & Sufi, 2009). Explanations for the global
housing boom have focused largely on credit supply and low quality borrowers using
the United States as a case study, and have put limited attention on the role of alterna-
tive mortgage products and prime borrowers. In this paper, we use the introduction of
a specific form of alternative mortgage products, interest-only (IO) loans, to Denmark
to answer two key questions: (1) how are households affected by the introduction of
new mortgage products; and (2) what is the aggregate effect on house prices?
Denmark provides the ideal laboratory for such an analysis, because interest-only
mortgages were introduced into the highly regulated and conservative Danish mort-
gage market through a rapidly implemented law change in 2003. The political aim was
to improve flexibility in mortgage financing for temporarily cash-constrained house-
holds. But as we will show, interest-only loans are valuable to a large fraction of the
population, as amortization payments are often not trivial. Figure 1 shows that the
first year mortgage payments can be reduced substantially with an IO loan. Indeed,
for the average buyer in Copenhagen just before the legalization, amortization pay-
ments were as high as 11 percent of annual disposable income. As Figure 2 shows, the
legalization of IO loans led to a large increase in the number of housing transactions
and an upwards spike in house prices. In the course of the housing boom that followed
between 2004 and 2007, aggregate house prices increased by 62 percent. In compari-
son, the US S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index increased by 37
percent over the same time period.
74
To begin, we construct a three-period model with wealthy hand-to-mouth households
(Kaplan et al. , 2014). The model formalizes the intuition in Cocco (2013), who
shows empirically that households with high expected income growth are more likely
to choose an alternative mortgage product. In the model, a reduction in amortization
payments raise the attractiveness of investing in an illiquid asset (housing), because
the increase in liquidity can be used to smooth consumption across periods. As the
purchase of the illiquid asset is financed through debt, the model clearly shows that re-
ducing amortizations causes an increase in credit demand, even absent any fundamental
shifts in income.1 To test the model, we estimate the probability of buying a property
using the detailed micro-level data on the full population of Danish households. Our
results show that the fraction of households who purchase a house following the reform
increase, even after including a comprehensive set of controls, and that households with
higher income growth had a larger increase in the probability of buying. These em-
pirical estimates are congruent with our theoretical framework, and thus suggest that
housing demand increasing following the law change. Additionally, we use IO loan
penetration data to show that IO loans were more prominent in areas with higher
pre-treatment house price growth, and in municipalities with higher average income
growth, in line with our theoretical predictions. These municipalities also experienced
larger increases in house prices during the boom.
We continue to estimate the aggregate impact of introducing interest-only mortgages
with the Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) and several cross-country panel datasets.
Our results indicate that the introduction of IO loans amplified the boom-bust pattern
in Danish housing markets. Specifically, the introduction of IO loans during the 2000s
caused Danish house prices (at the national level) to increase 35 percent relative to a
carefully chosen control group of housing markets that also experienced a boom but
for whom IO loans were not available. This increase accounts for 60 percent of house
price growth between 2003Q4 and 2006Q4. In contrast, during the bust (2007Q1 -
2010Q1), Danish house prices fell 23 percent more than a counter-factual that also
1Andersen et al. (2012) show that Danish households with interest-only mortgages tend to take
out a larger loan.
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experienced a housing bust. We also examine the effects of the policy innovation on
the cross-section of Danish cities.2 These results imply that the consequences of the
IO loan policy are heterogeneous and vary based on local housing supply and house
price expectations at the time of the reform. If supply is unconstrained new supply
should quickly lead prices to revert downwards. In inelastically supplied areas, such
supply responses may be slower, and thus house prices may stay above some funda-
mental level for longer (Glaeser et al. , 2008). Consistent with this, the cross-sectional
effect varies based on local housing supply, and we find that the effect of the reform is
mainly concentrated in inelastically supplied areas.
Why did house prices increase so dramatically following the reform? The evidence
is consistent with a credit demand shift following the reform. As our model shows,
introducing interest-only loans can actually lead to an increase in credit demand, even
absent any changes in income. Interest-only mortgage does not preclude the household
from saving in a different asset, and the increased liquidity could be used to increase
consumption, pay down higher-interest debt or to save in alternative asset. Danish
interest-only loans, combined with an institutional framework that allows for home-
equity withdrawal and provides all borrowers legal right to refinance to take advantage
of lower interest rates regardless of housing equity, resembles the optimal contract
derived in Piskorski & Tchistyi (2010). Piskorski and Tchistyi show that an option
ARM (Adjustable Rate Mortgage) contract with an attached credit line, is an Pareto
improvement over a traditional 30-year mortgage for both borrowers and lenders. Our
evidence is not consistent with a credit supply shift. While mortgage debt did increase
following the reform, this was a movement along the credit supply curve, not a shift of
the curve itself. We base this assertion on several facts. First, the fraction of income
spent on interest payments is lower in 2004 and 2005 compared to the year prior to
the reform. Additionally, there is no change in the income, wealth or age distribution
of buyers, and the percentage of mortgage debt for the lowest quintile of income is
stable across time. If anything, the income distribution shifts to the right (towards
2Spatial patterns in housing markets are well established. See Sinai (2013) and Ferreira & Gyourko
(2012).
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higher income) during the housing boom. There is also no decrease in borrower quality
and no shift in credit supply towards low-quality borrowers in the data. Second, non-
performing loans, forced sales of homes and default rates all remained low throughout
downturn in 2008, and are an order of magnitude lower than corresponding rates in
the United States, even though the rise and fall in house prices was similar in Denmark
and the United States. Third, these facts match official government reports on bank
lending activity and statements from the mortgage banks, which affirm that borrowers
were evaluated on their ability to afford payments on a standard 30-year mortgage. If
lending standards were unchanged following the reform, the increase in mortgage debt
is not caused by a new group of households that were earlier denied credit. Moreover,
it is also not likely that households purchased homes with IO mortgages with the intent
of defaulting if prices declined.3 Full recourse mortgage debt removes the option to
default if the value of mortgage debt exceeds housing values. If a home-owner defaults
the bank can force a sale of the property and convert any residual debt into higher-
interest bank debt.
This paper contributes to an important literature that aims to determine the origins
of the recent housing boom and its subsequent collapse. Mian & Sufi (2009) contend
that an outward shift in the supply of credit to low quality borrowers was an impor-
tant determinant of the recent boom.4 In contrast, Adelino et al. (2016) argue that
there was no outward shift in credit, and that the housing boom was a demand-side
phenomenon.5 Our work extends this literature in the following ways. First, we show
financial innovation, in the form of new mortgage products, can cause an increase in
the demand for credit, and that this increase in demand can have large effects on house
prices. This yields an additional mechanism than the one emphasized in Adelino et al.
(2016). Adelino et al attribute the boom to high house price expectations, home-
buyers who bought into expected increases in prices.6 On top of this, our theoretical
and empirical results show that IO loans provide an additional mechanism that affects
3See Barlevy & Fisher (2011).
4See also Favara & Imbs (2015) and Garmaise (2013).
5See alsoGerardi et al. (2010) and Ferreira & Gyourko (2015).
6See Brueckner et al. (2016) on house price expectations and subprime borrowing.
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house prices.
Second, we show that this increase in demand occurs throughout the income distri-
bution, consistent with recent research that has emphasized the importance of prime
borrowers in the housing boom (Adelino et al. , 2016; Ferreira & Gyourko, 2015).
The implication of the results is that financial innovation is of primary importance for
understanding the housing boom, but that the effect of financial innovation is not nec-
essarily limited to low-quality borrowers. As we show, financial innovation in the form
of new mortgages are attractive for all borrowers, and financial innovation does not
necessarily have to target worse quality borrowers to have an effect on house prices.
The increased availability of IO loans in the US, triggered by financial innovation
and shifts in credit supply, thus likely increased housing demand even among prime
borrowers.
Overall, our results provide new insights into the origins of the housing boom and show
how financial innovation and credit demand, even if they are directed towards prime
borrowers, can amplify price swings. The findings may thus warrant a re-examination
of the role of financial innovation for prime borrowers in the genesis of the US and
global housing crisis.
2 Theoretical Framework
Here, we analyze the effects of amortization payments within two models. First, we
treat the required amortization share as a policy parameter and thus exogenous in
a two-asset model. Then, we consider a simpler one-asset model where the share
paid into amortization is endogenous to determine optimal amortization payments in
terms of model parameters. These two models allow us to concisely describe the role
of amortization payments in a policy framework, and what factors affect households’
choice of amortization payments. Generally, this class of models builds on two-asset
models including those of Kaplan et al. (2014) and Kaplan & Violante (2014).
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2.1 Model 1: The Amortization Share is Policy Parameter
Consider a household that lives for periods t = 0, 1, 2, consumes only during periods
t = 1, 2, and makes a portfolio allocation decision during period t = 0. In period
t = 0, the household allocates its initial endowment, ω, between a liquid (safe) asset,
m1, that matures in period 1 and an illiquid asset, a, that matures in period t = 2.
The liquid asset is available again for purchase in period t = 1 and matures in period
t = 2 (m2). The household consumes all available funds in period 2 and cannot die
with negative financial wealth.
As we want to study the role of amortization payments, we make the assumption that
a > ω. Thus, the household can purchase the illiquid asset with a down-payment equal
to a · d, where d is the down-payment percentage and hence the household takes out a
loan to purchase the illiquid asset. The amortization share is s. The one-period gross
return on liquid asset is normalized to 1, the one-period gross return for the loan used
to purchase the illiquid asset is r, and the two-period return on the illiquid asset is
R. For simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting and no uncertainty and that
1 < r2 ≤ R. We also assume that the household can only borrow by purchasing the
illiquid asset, so that m1 ≥ 0 and m2 ≥ 0. Finally, the household earns labor income
y1 and y2 in periods t = 1 and t = 2 respectively.
Utility in consumption in period t = 0 is given by
v0 = maxu(c1) + u(c2) (1)
where u(·) is twice continuously differentiable with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0.
The resource constraint in period t = 0 is
ad+m1 = ω (2)
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and the budget constraints for periods t = 1 and t = 2 are
c1 +m2 + (r − 1)(1− d)a︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest
+ s(1− d)a︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal
= y1 +m1 (3)
and
c2 + r(1− s)(1− d)a︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest plus principal
= y2 +m2 +Ra (4)
In period t = 1, the household has potential expenditures consisting of consumption,
the liquid asset that will mature in period t = 2, interest on the debt used to purchase
the illiquid asset, and any principal repayments. Income stems from the labor market
and the liquid asset purchased in period t = 0. During period t = 2, the household
has to pay off any remaining principal plus interest, but get income from labor as well
as the liquid and illiquid assets.
In period t = 0 the household solves the following optimization problem:
maxm1,a u(c1) + u(c2)
s.t.
c1 +m2 + (r − 1)(1− d)a+ s(1− d)a = y1 +m1
c2 + r(1− s)(1− d)a = y2 +m2 +Ra
a ≥ 0,m1 ≥ 0
Taking the first order condition (FOC) of the households problem at t = 0 with respect
to a, the FOC at t = 1 with respect to m2, and combining equations yields the following
“long-run” Euler equation:
u′(c1) ≥ R¯u′(c2) (5)
where
R¯ =
[
R− r(1− s)(1− d)
d+ (1− d)(r − 1 + s)
]
(6)
The numerator of R¯ is the net period 2 return on the illiquid asset and the denominator
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is the portion of the illiquid asset that the household has paid for by the end of period 1
(down-payment percentage + interest + amortization share). Note that R¯ is increasing
in s. For a household optimizing at t = 0, equation 5 states that R¯ is the price of
consuming at t = 1 rather than t = 2. Thus a decrease in the required share to be
paid into amortization will lower the price of consumption at period t = 1 relative to
t = 2, given that the household owns the illiquid asset. Intuitively, a decrease in s
lowers the period 2 net return (numerator of R¯) while decreasing period 1 amortization
payments, allowing the household to better consumption smooth the income increase
created by illiquid asset across periods 1 and 2.
Using the FOC with respect to m2 from the optimization problem at t = 1 and the
fact that c1 ≤ c2 when u′(c1) ≥ u′(c2) yields
m2 = max
{
y1 + ω − y2 − a[2d− 1 + s(1 + r)(1− d) +R]
2
, 0
}
(7)
Here, an increase in s leads to a reduction in m2 as the household pays more in
amortization. For simplicity, we assume that u(c) has a constant elasticity of substi-
tution utility with elasticity parameter σ. If m2 is equal to zero (a Hand-to-Mouth
(HtM) household (Kaplan et al. , 2014)), the household will purchase the asset (a > 0)
when
R >
(
y2
y1 + ω
)1/σ
[d+ (1− d)(r − 1 + s)] + r(1− s)(1− d) (8)
Further, the right hand side of equation 8 is increasing in s if
(
y2
y1 + ω
)1/σ
> r (9)
In other words, for HtM households, a decrease in the required share paid into amor-
tization increases the probability of illiquid asset purchase as long as income growth,
augmented by the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is larger than the
mortgage rate. Intuitively, congruent with Cocco (2013), HtM households are more
likely to purchase the illiquid asset as s drops since lower levels of s allow households
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to smooth consumption while still owning the illiquid asset. This was also the Danish
Government’s rationale for the law change.
For non-HtM households (m2 > 0), equation 9 becomes
(
y2 + y1 + ω
y1 + ω − y2
)1/σ
> r
Here, for reasonable parameter values, and non-zero y2, a decrease in s will increase the
probability that a non-HtM household purchases the illiquid asset, because a decline
in s lowers R¯, and aids the household smoothing the gains of the illiquid asset over its
lifetime.
2.2 Model 2: The Amortization Share is Endogenous
Next, we augment the above model and let s be a choice variable at t = 1. For
simplicity, we eliminate the liquid asset. Taking the FOC of the household’s period 1
maximization problem with respect to s yields
s ≥ y1 − ry2 − arR + a(1− d)(r
2 − 1)
(1− d)(r2 − 1) (10)
The following testable predictions are immediately clear: (1) s is increasing in (y1 −
ry2), so higher second period income growth, given the interest rate, will reduce the
share that the household pays into amortization; and (2) s is decreasing in R and
thus a higher return on the illiquid asset will induce the household to make lower
amortization payments. The model also predicts that s is decreasing in r, but the
mortgage rate in our data unfortunately does not vary over the cross-section.
3 Housing and Mortgage Markets
The following section describe the housing market and mortgage system in Denmark
and the sample countries. See Campbell (2013) for more information about mortgage
market design, and Ba¨ckman (2016) for more information about the Danish housing
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market.
3.1 Mortgage Finance in Denmark
The mortgage finance system in Denmark is highly rated internationally (Campbell,
2013). Similar to the United States, Danish mortgages have historically consisted of a
long-term fixed rate mortgage without pre-payment penalties. Households can finance
up to 80 percent of home purchases using mortgage loans with a legally mandated
maximum maturity of 30 years, and can fund an additional 15 percent using higher
interest bank debt. Denmark does not have a continuous credit-score system and there
are no requirements on positive equity for refinancing. There are no pre-payment
penalties, and households are legally allowed to refinance their mortgage loans to take
advantage of lower interest-rates, provided the principal balance is not increased.
Mortgage credit in Denmark is extended to borrowers through specialized lenders
called mortgage credit banks (henceforth mortgage banks), who act as intermediaries
between borrowers and investors. These institutions face strict underwriting criteria
that require them to assess the credit worthiness of all borrowers upon granting a
mortgage, and they are prohibited from offering new products without regulatory and
legal approval, which has limited the number of mortgage products available for house-
holds. Mortgage banks are required to assess both the value of the underlying property
and the borrowers ability to afford mortgage payments (International Monetary Fund,
2011). After extending credit to borrowers, the proceeds from the loans are sold to
investors in the form of mortgage bonds. The interest rate for borrowers is therefore
set by the market for mortgage bonds. The mortgage banks is legally mandated to
hold the mortgage bond on their balance sheet throughout the loan period, thereby re-
taining any credit risk. If a borrower defaults, the mortgage bank is required to replace
the defaulting mortgage by one with similar characteristics. Mortgage bonds therefore
face no credit risk, provided the issuing lender remains solvent, and the investors in
mortgage bonds instead assume interest rate- and pre-payment risk. In over 200 years
of operation, no mortgage bond has ever defaulted (Andersen et al. , 2014).
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If a borrower defaults, the mortgage bank can trigger a forced sale of the underlying
asset. Any residual claim is converted into an unsecured personal claim, where the
interest rate is higher than the mortgage rate. In legal parlance, mortgage loans in
Denmark are full recourse. This feature of the Danish mortgage system makes default
unattractive for borrowers (see Ghent & Kudlyak, 2011, for evidence on recourse laws
and default from the United States) and default rates remained low throughout the
boom and the bust. As we describe in more detail later, mortgage arrears peaked at
0.6 percent of outstanding amounts, and forced home sales remained low throughout
the housing bust. Compare this to the United States, where mortgage default peaked
above 10 percent. Further, personal bankruptcy in Denmark is difficult and does not
necessarily reduce the debt burden.
In total, the mortgage system provide 1) originators with strong incentives to monitor
borrowers during the underwriting process (Campbell, 2013); 2) strong incentives for
the borrower to carefully assess the state of both their future income and the state of
the housing market, and to not over-extend themselves; and 3) a low risk environment
for investors in mortgage bonds. The design of the system combine to remove concerns
over moral hazard in lending, excessive points and fees, low documentation loans, and
limited monitoring of new borrowers during the Danish housing boom.
3.2 Mortgage Reform in 2003
Following a rapidly implemented law change, mortgage banks were allowed to offer
a new type of mortgage product on October 1st, 2003. The law was introduced to
the Danish parliament on March 12, 2003, and passed on June 4, 2003 with a large
majority voting in favor of the proposal. The law change allowed mortgage banks to
offer a form of interest-only loans, deferred amortization mortgages, where principal
repayments could be postponed for up to 10 years, even though the full amount still
had to be repaid over the 30-year contract.7 The intention of the government was to
7The law technically allows the mortgage to have a ten-year interest-only period. Amortization
payments can potentially be deferred forever by rolling over into a new mortgage contract after ten
years, provided that the house value does not decrease. Danish media reported on this aspect of the
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increase the flexibility of mortgage financing, thereby increasing affordability for cash-
constrained households, such as students, young adults and households on temporary
leave from the labor market. The expectation was that IO loans would be used as a
temporary niche solution. Indeed, the government expected that penetration would
be low, and that the reform would have no long-term impact on house prices.8 IO
mortgages were only granted to households who could afford a standard 30-year fixed
interest mortgage (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, 2007). Prior to 2007,
the interest rates and the fees collected by the mortgage credit institutions did not
differ between mortgage products. Further, households understood the consequences
of IO loans: In a 2011 survey of households with IO mortgages, 89 percent reported
that they were “very well informed” or “well informed” on the implications of choosing
IO mortgages (Association of Danish Mortgage Banks, 2011).
Even though an IO loan is considerably more expensive in total, the first year costs
can be substantially reduced. Figure 1 plots the first-year cost for a 1 million DKK
fixed-rate mortgage with (solid line) and without (dashed line) amortization payments.
On October 2003, total payments could be reduced by approximately 13,000 DKK
($2,000 USD) per year. For the average house buyer in Copenhagen during 2003, the
difference in annual payments for a fixed rate mortgage amounts to 7 percent of annual
disposable income, or 11 percent of annual income when comparing payments for a
variable interest-rate mortgage.9
IO loans rapidly became a popular choice across all types of households. Figure 3
plots the outstanding mortgage amounts by loan type. Prior to the reform, nearly all
mortgages were fixed interest with amortization payments, but this rapidly changed
new loans. See e.g. Politiken (2003).
8The law proposal includes a rationale the reform, along with the expected effects. The material
is available in Danish at https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=91430.
9Calculations are based on an annuity schedule, where the total monthly cost is constant across the
loan period. The reduction in monthly payments would higher with a straight amortization schedule.
The average sales price in Copenhagen was 1.3 million DKK, the average disposable income for buyers
was 204,575 DKK per year, and the average difference in payments from the introduction of IO loans
to the end of 2003 for a 1 million DKK mortgage was 13,000 DKK for a fixed rate mortgage and
22,000 DKK for a variable interest mortgage. Assuming a down-payment of 20 percent, the savings
as a percentage of disposable income is 13,000*1.3*0.8 / 204,575 = 6.7% for a fixed rate mortgage
and 22,000*1.3*0.8 / 204,575 = 11.1% for a variable rate mortgage.
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once IO mortgages were introduced. One year after the reform, 15 percent of all
outstanding mortgages were IO loans. This number increased to 30 percent in 2005
and to 50 percent in 2010. Mortgage lending expanded rapidly following the reform,
increasing by nearly 50 percent between 2003Q3 and 2007Q1. Nearly all of this growth
is attributable to IO loans. Finally, figure 4 plots the geographical distribution of
interest-only mortgages across Danish municipalities in 2012. Interest-only loans are
concentrated in the Copenhagen area, in Northern Zealand and in the area around
Aarhus.
3.3 A Comparison of Mortgage Markets
This section documents key institutional characteristics of mortgage markets, such as
predominant loan types and usual length of mortgage contracts. Table 9 in appendix
D summarizes key characteristics of mortgage markets for Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Italy, Spain and the United States.
There is considerable heterogeneity in mortgage market design across countries, reflect-
ing cultural differences and the institutional setting of the banking sector (Campbell,
2013).10 The typical loan term varies from 15 years in Italy and Spain, to 30 years
in Denmark and the United States. Fixed interest mortgages are available in Canada,
Denmark, Italy, and the United States, whereas variable interest loans are available
in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Spain and the United States. Fixed interest loans are
the predominant loan type in Denmark, Canada, Italy and the United States. The
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio can exceed 80 percent in Canada, Denmark, Spain and the
US. For all these countries except Spain, any mortgage with an LTV of over 80 percent
incurs additional costs.11 Next, all countries except Canada allow mortgage interest
deductions, and all countries in the sample have full recourse mortgages expect the
United States. Denmark, Canada and Finland allows for equity withdrawal.
10For a more detailed overview, see e.g. ECB (2003); Campbell (2013); International Monetary
Fund (2011); Scanlon et al. (2008).
11In Denmark, a households can borrow an additional 15 percent using higher interest bank loans.
In the US and Canada mortgages with an LTV over 80 percent are subject to mortgage insurance
(Crawford et al. , 2013).
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We report whether IO mortgages were available in the sample country. IO mortgages
were legal and prevalent the United States over our sample period. In all other coun-
tries, IO mortgages were either not available or were accompanied by a repayment
vehicle. In countries where IO loans are accompanied by a repayment vehicle there
are no amortization requirements per se, but households are legally required to save
in another savings vehicle for the purpose of repaying the mortgage debt at maturity.
Hence, we consider such countries as non-IO counties. In Finland, IO mortgages have
to be accompanied by a repayment vehicle where households save in some other asset,
such as stocks or bonds, making them relatively conservative in nature. Additionally,
Finish IO mortgages accounted for less than 3 percent of outstanding mortgages in
2005. Italian IO mortgages similarly have to be accompanied by an investment vehicle.
Spain legalized IO mortgages in April 2006, but as Scanlon et al. (2008) report only
a few Spanish banks offered these mortgages in 2008. IO mortgages have never been
formally allowed in Canada. These non-IO countries constitute our control group.
Last, as noted above, IO loans were introduced to Denmark in 2003.
House price growth was high for all countries between 1998Q1 and 2002Q4. Denmark’s
increase of 32 percent is very close to the observed increase in Canada, Finland and
Italy. In figure 15 in appendix E, we plot the growth in private credit flows, 10-year
government bond yields, mortgage rates, and house prices for our Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Italy, and Spain.12 The figure indicates that (1) private credit did not dis-
proportionately flow more to Denmark than to any other country; (2) mortgage and
interest rates were highly correlated across countries prior to the housing bust; and (3)
house price growth was similar across countries between 1998 and 2003.13 As private
credit flows did not disproportionately flow to Denmark, and as interest and mort-
gage rates were similar across our sample, we can abstract from international changes
in credit supply as a potential explanation for our Synthetic Control results below
in section 6.2. To clarify, we do not believe that there is a reason that something
12Mortgage rates over our sample were only available for Canada and Denmark.
13The notable exception is Spain which experienced large private credit flows and large house price
increases.
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akin to the global savings glut hypothesis of Bernanke (2007) would affect Denmark
dis-proportionally to the other countries in the sample.
Finally, as local Canadian housing markets will serve as our control group in our
city-level analysis, we provide a detailed comparison between the Canadian and Dan-
ish labor and housing markets. Although Denmark is often compared to the United
States (Campbell, 2013; Andersen et al. , 2014), the Danish housing market may more
closely resemble that of Canada. Neither Denmark nor Canada experienced a dete-
rioration of lending standards during the 2000s housing boom. In Canada, only 30
percent of mortgages are securitized and these securities are explicitly guaranteed by
the government owned Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation (Kiff, 2009). Sim-
ilarly, Danish mortgage banks retain the credit risk associated with mortgage bonds
and hence Danish mortgage bonds also carry little default risk.
The Danish labor market is characterized by a generous safety net, combined with
active labor market policies (Andersen, 2012). While the safety net in Canada are
less generous than in Denmark, it is certainly more prominent than in the United
States. Furthermore, GDP per capita, the labor force participation rate, and trade
as a percentage of GDP are all closely aligned in Denmark and Canada, along with
health expenditure per capita as a percentage of GDP.
In total, recourse laws, the social security net and the conservative nature of the
Canadian and Danish housing finance systems makes Canadian cities an apt control
group in our assessment of the introduction of IO loans to Denmark in 2003.14
4 Data
We first collect high-quality micro-data from Statistics Denmark on the full popu-
lation of households. Our dataset covers property transactions as well as detailed
demographic and economic information on the universe of all Danish households from
14Also note that Canada pursued a number of pro-cyclical housing market policies during the 2000s
and countercyclical policies after 2008. None of these polices are related to IO loans, but will make
our results more conservative in nature if they had any impact on the Canadian housing market. See
Krznar & Morsink (2014) and Kiff (2009) for more details.
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1994 to 2010. We match data on property transactions to each household using own-
ership registers. Individual- and household-level variables include household level de-
mographic information, along with financial information such as financial wealth and
household income. Unfortunately there is no loan-level data that would allow us to
identify interest-only loans from standard mortgages. For a more detailed description
of the data and the sources, see Ba¨ckman (2016).
Second, we assemble a dataset of international and city-level variable to estimate the
impact on the aggregate level. We consider data at both the quarterly and monthly
periodicities. Our aim is to estimate the impact of IO loans in Denmark where the
donor pool of potential control units consists of countries where IO loans were not
available. Unfortunately, IO loans were pervasive across many European countries
and the United States, limiting the number of potential control units. The donor
pool of potential control units consists of countries where IO loans were not available.
Our set of non-IO loan countries includes Canada, Finland, Italy, and Spain. For
each country, our data include house prices from the BIS, GDP per capita, durable
consumption per capita, and the growth in private credit flows to the non-financial
sector. All variables are in real terms.15 House prices capture dynamics in the housing
market, GDP per capita and durable consumption per capita capture national-level
economic activity, and the growth in credit flows measures changes in credit. These
data range from 1998Q1 to 2012Q1. In addition to these time series, we calculate
time-varying housing market return volatility from a fitted GARCH(1,1) model and
the pre-treatment period (1998Q1 - 2002Q4) house price growth. Appendix C contains
a complete list of all variables, their sources, different permutations of the data, and
the associated number of potential Synthetic Control units.
We also build a city-level dataset where we compare Danish and Canadian cities, as
Canada is the only non-IO country where housing data is available across cities.16
15GDP per capita is aggregate real, seasonally adjusted GDP divided by total population; and
real, seasonally-adjusted durable consumption data are transformed into Euros per capita. Currency
conversion data date back to 1998 when Euro-area countries fixed their currencies. The currency
data are from Eurostat.
16We use house price data for the following Danish regions: CopenhagenCity, CopenhagenSur-
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The data available at the city-level include house prices, fitted time-varying housing
return volatility estimated from a GARCH(1,1) model, the pre-treatment house price
growth, population in 2001, median income in 2001, and the unemployment rate in
2001.17 Canadian house price indices are available from both Statistics Canada and
from Teranet. The house price data from Statistics Canada are based on new home
construction and are available for 21 cities; while those from Teranet are repeat-sales
indices estimated in a fashion similar to the Case-Shiller indices in the US and cover
11 cities.18 These indices are constructed to ensure comparability – we closely follow
the Teranet methodology when we construct Danish repeat-sales indices.19 In our
main results, we exclude Canadian cities that experienced a resource boom during the
sample period from the donor pool.20 The inclusion of Canadian resource cities does
not qualitatively affect our results.
We subtract all pre-treatment macro predictor variables (unemployment rate, median
income, and population density) by their country-level means and divide by their
country-level standard deviations. Subtracting each macro predictor variable by its
country-level mean is akin to including country fixed effects in panel models and thus
allows us to account for unobserved heterogeneity, such as institutional or labor market
differences, across countries. Further, dividing each predictor variable by its standard
deviation creates a unit-less measure for easy comparison across countries. In our
main results below, we report our findings for the “standardized” (Std) macro data.
A robustness check confirms that our findings are similar when we use the unadjusted
macro data.
roundings, EasternJutland, EasternZealand, Fyn, NorthernJutland, NorthernZealand, SouthernJut-
land, WesternJutland, WestSouthZealand.
17Income, population, unemployment data are from Statistics Canada and Statistics Denmark,
respectively.
18Teranet cities include Calgary, Edmonton, Halifax, Hamilton, Montreal, Ottawa-
Gatineau, Quebec City, Toronto, Vancouver, Victoria, Victoria, and Winnipeg. See
http://www.housepriceindex.ca/default.aspx.
19Our results are also robust to the use of the HPIs available from Statistics Canada and an
alternate set of HPIs provided by Statistics Denmark.
20The cities in our sample that experienced a resource boom include Calgary, Edmonton, Regina,
Saskatoon, and Winnipeg. See International Monetary Fund (2010).
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5 Econometric Methodology
To estimate the impact of IO mortgages on housing markets during the recent boom, we
use the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) of Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie
et al. (2010). The SCM implements a data-driven procedure for comparative case-
studies that allows us to estimate the causal impact of a policy intervention occurring at
the aggregate level. Overall, the advantages of the SCM are manifold.21 Specifically,
Abadie et al. (2010) show that the SCM generalizes the fixed effects (difference-
in-differences) estimator as the unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity can vary over
time.
Hence, the SCM is well-suited to evaluate the effects of the introduction of IO mort-
gages. We construct a Synthetic Control unit from a convex combination of available
control units that best represents the most relevant characteristics of the treated unit
during the period prior to the policy intervention. Then in the wake of the policy,
the so-called post-policy intervention period, the path of the Synthetic Control unit
represents the counter-factual situation of the treated unit in absence of the policy
change. The causal impact of the policy is thus calculated by comparing the treated
unit to its Synthetic counterpart.
Inferential techniques within the SCM can be carried out through placebo studies. A
placebo study iteratively assigns the treatment to all other units of the donor pool.22
Then we compare the causal impact of the treatment in this placebo experiment, the
placebo effect, to the causal impact for the unit where the intervention occurred. Iter-
atively applying the treatment to random members of the control group and retaining
the subsequent placebo effects is comparable to a permutation test where a test statis-
tic is calculated under random permutations of the treatment and control group. The
magnitude and rarity of the treatment effect can then be assessed relative to the set
21See Abadie et al. (2010) and Billmeier & Nannicini (2013) for more details.
22Placebo studies can also be carried out by assigning the treatment to a random point in time.
In the results below, we follow the literature and assign the treatment to the control units. Assigning
the treatment to other time periods also supports the causal interpretation of our results.
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of estimated placebo effects. We apply the treatment to all members of the control
group and this will yield our so-called permutation test.23 The permutation test will
then be used for inference.
6 Results
In this section, we examine how the Danish housing market changed following the re-
form, and how the characteristics of Danish home-buyers changed following the reform.
We start by showing that there was an increase in the number of transactions following
the reform, and show among which groups transactions increased the most.
6.1 Results – Micro-Level Effects
We use data on the full population of Danish households to investigate how the housing
market was affected by the introduction of interest-only mortgages. Table 1 estimates
a linear probability model of the probability of buying, where the dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the household purchases a property, and zero otherwise.
The sample consists of the full population of households in 2002 and 2004; the year
prior to and the first full year following the introduction of IO loans. The variable of
interest is Post Reform, a dummy equal to one in year 2004 and zero otherwise, and
interactions between Post Reform and various other variables. All columns include
household and municipality-specific controls and region dummies.
Overall, table 1 shows that there was an increase in the probability of buying in
2004 compared to 2002, even after including several household- and municipality-level
control variables. Column 1 shows that the increase between 2002 and 2004 in the
probability of buying was positive and significant. Columns 2-5 interacts the Post
Reform dummy with select variables to provide evidence on which groups had the
largest increase in the probability of buying. Column 2 interacts Post Reform with a
dummy equal to one for households living in municipalities that later experienced a
23As in Abadie et al. (2010, 2011) we will discard any placebo studies where the mean squared
prediction error during the pre-intervention period between treated unit and its synthetic control in
the placebo experiment is more than five times larger than that for the observed experiment.
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boom.24 The positive coefficient on the interaction between boom and Post Reform
shows that the increase in demand following the reform was larger in municipalities
that later experienced a boom. A similar pattern is observed in column 3, which
shows that areas with more inelastic housing supply experienced a larger increase in
the probability of buying. In line with the predictions from the model, the coefficients
on income growth between year t and t − 1 and between year t + 1 and t (column 4
and 5) are positive and significant. Furthermore, column 6 shows that the effect of
income growth was not driven by HtM households.
To investigate the prediction from the model that IO loan use is related to future
income growth, we use data on reported IO loan penetration for Danish municipalities
made available in a Danish newspaper article from 2012 (Politiken, 2012). Note that
this is the only cross-sectional data on IO loans that is publicly available, but as the
IO loan term in Denmark is ten years the data should include a large number of IO
loans originated just after the policy date. The data was provided to the newspaper
by one of the mortgage credit bank (Realkredit Danmark), and covers their customer
base. Recall from Figure 4 that IO loans are widely used in the Copenhagen region and
on Zealand, with IO loan penetration reaching over 60 percent in some areas. These
figures are consistent with those from the London or California housing markets and
indicate that IO loans were popular with a large portion of buyers in boom markets.
Further, figure 5 shows the scatter plot of the IO loan penetration versus pre-treatment
house price growth in (a), and the IO penetration versus income growth for buyers
in (b) across Danish municipalities. The corresponding regression estimates are in
table 2.25 The penetration is higher in areas with higher income growth, and increase
with higher pre-treatment house price growth. A 1 percentage point increase in income
growth increases the IO loan penetration by 1.22 percentage points. Using lagged house
price growth as a proxy for house price growth expectations, as in Glaeser & Nathanson
(2015), Brueckner et al. (2012), DellAriccia et al. (2012), and Case et al. (2012), we
24The municipalities in question are those surrounding Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense.
25We only include 93 municipalities in the regression, due to missing data on house prices and a
low number of inhabitants.
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find that the penetration of IO loans is significantly larger in housing markets with
higher pre-treatment house price growth expectations. The R2 for this regression is
0.245, indicating that pre-treatment house price growth expectations explain a sizable
portion of the variation in IO loan penetration in 2012. Note that the results in table
2 are consistent with the results in table 1. These findings are particularly noteworthy
given the long time lag between the variables and are consistent with the prediction
from the model that high income growth and higher expected returns on the illiquid
asset increases the value of using an IO loan.
6.2 Results – Aggregate Level
In the following sections, we employ the SCM using international and city-level data
to estimate the impact of IO loans during the 2000s housing boom. To start, data
at the highest level of aggregation, the country-level, are used to assess the impact
of IO loans during the 2000s boom and its aftermath within the SCM framework. In
the international sample Denmark is the treated unit, and the donor pool consists of
all other countries. Similarly, for the city-level results Danish regions are the treated
unit, and the donor pool consists of Canadian cities. As noted above, we only include
non-IO countries in the donor pool.
We begin by estimating the impact of the policy in Denmark and then we conduct
placebo experiments where we iteratively apply the treatment to members of the donor
pool in a permutation test. The pre-treatment period used to implement the SCM
algorithm ranges from 1998Q1 to 2002Q4 as the policy was announced in 2003Q1.
The implementation date for the policy was 2003Q4.
Table 3 shows the contribution of each unit in the donor pool to the Synthetic Control
(for brevity, only countries with positive weight are listed), table 4 shows the average
pre-treatment predictor values for Denmark, its Synthetic Control, and the sample
average, and table 5 shows the estimated effects and the root mean-squared forecast
error (RMSFE).
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Overall, we believe that the Synthetic Control provide a good match for both Denmark
and for the Danish cities. To begin, we estimate the effect with country-level data.
The treated unit is Denmark, the outcome variable is the BIS house price index, and as
we can see in table 3, Finland receives all of the weight, while Canada, Italy, and Spain
receive no weight. The results in the top panel of table 4 indicate that Denmark is
nearly identical to its Synthetic Control for the key pre-treatment predictor variables,
house prices and pre-treatment house price growth. The pre-treatment house price
growth, for example, is 31.65 percent for Denmark and 29.88 percent for the Synthetic
Control. Moreover, the Synthetic Control Unit represents a much closer match to
Denmark relative to the sample average for most of the other housing and macro
variables including GARCH(1,1) volatility, GDP per capita, and private credit flows.
To further highlight the closeness of the Synthetic match, we print the root mean-
squared forecast error (RMSFE) of the Synthetic Control relative to Denmark for
house prices over the pre-treatment period in panel 1 of table 5. The RMSFE over
the whole pre-treatment period is 15.98 and thus the average RMSFE per quarter is
just 0.799. In comparison, the quarterly standard deviation of Danish house prices
over the pre-treatment period is 9.73; implying that the average RMSFE per quarter
is less than one-tenth of the quarterly pre-treatment standard deviation. Altogether,
the SCM algorithm appears to aptly build the control unit based on pre-treatment
data. Note that if Finland receives all the weight, this implies that Finland represents
the best possible match for Denmark. This is similar to letting an algorithm chose the
best control group for a difference-in-difference estimation.
Further, we reduce the geography of our data and conduct the SCM analysis at the city-
level. The donor pool consists of Canadian non-resource (coastal) cities for which the
Teranet repeat-sales house price indices are available.26 We apply the SCM approach
iteratively using the 10 Danish cities as the treated unit.27 Figure 14 in Appendix
26These cities are Halifax, Hamilton, Montreal, Ottawa-Gatineau, Quebec City, Toronto, Van-
couver, and Victoria. In robustness checks, we expand the donor pool to cover all major Canadian
cities.
27These Danish cities are CopenhagenCity, CopenhagenSurroundings, NorthernZealand, East-
ernZealand, EasternJutland, Fyn, WestSouthZealand, SouthernJutland, NorthernJutland, and West-
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E provide a map of Denmark, indicating the location of Copenhagen and the major
islands of Denmark.
As seen in the second panel of table 3, the Synthetic Control Units for the Danish
cities largely consist of Canadian cities in the Ontario province. For example, the
Synthetic match for CopenhagenCity is Ottawa-Gatineau, while that for Copenhagen-
Surroundings, Copenhagen’s Suburban area, is 86 percent Ottawa-Gatineau and 14
percent Toronto. In general, we view these matches as reasonable since the Ottawa-
Gatineau region is Canada’s capital city and Toronto is the largest city in Canada
with a substantial suburban component. Further, the respective Synthetic Controls
provide a much better match for CopenhagenCity and CopenhagenSurroundings than
the sample average for the average pre-treatment predictor values in panels 2 and 3
of table 4. For example, the pre-treatment house price growth for CopenhagenSur-
roundings is 29.75 percent and that for its Synthetic is 31.78. In marked contrast, the
average pre-treatment house price growth across Canadian cities is just 23.33 percent.
The appropriateness of the match is also highlighted in the low RMSFE values in
Table 5. The largest RMSFE occurs when CopenhagenCity is the treated unit with
a value of 42.14. Yet even for CopenhagenCity the RMFSE is small in magnitude.
Given the monthly periodicity of the data, the average RMSFE per month during
the pre-treatment period is 0.90. In comparison the monthly standard deviation of
CopenhagenCity house prices during the pre-treatment period is 12.56. Hence, the
average RMSFE per month is less than one-tenth of the monthly standard deviation.
The RMSFEs over the pre-treatment period for the other cities are all small and less
than 10 in magnitude.
We illustrate the effect for the international sample in figure 6. The plot in the top-
left panel of figure 6 presents the path of Denmark’s house prices versus the sample
average, while the plot in the top-right panel shows the path of house prices for Den-
mark versus the Synthetic Control. In the figure, the red-dashed, vertical line is the
IO loan policy announcement date (2003Q1) and the blue solid line is the policy im-
ernJutland.
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plementation date (2003Q4). Overall, the Synthetic Control provides a much better
pre-implementation period match for Danish house prices relative to the sample aver-
age: Between 1998 and 2003Q4 house prices for Denmark and its Synthetic counterpart
move in lockstep, while house prices for the sample average deviate noticeably from
those for Denmark starting in 2002. Once IO loans are introduced, Danish house prices
diverge dramatically from those of its Synthetic Control. As shown by the plot in the
top-right panel of figure 6, by 2006 Danish house prices had more than doubled from
their 1998 starting point, whereas those for Denmark’s Synthetic had only increased by
65 percent. We plot the Gap between Danish house prices and the Synthetic Control
in the bottom-left panel of figure 6. The dotted lines represent the largest estimated
placebo effect for each period from the permutation test in the bottom-right panel of
the figure. Together, the Gap and Permutation plots highlight magnitude and rarity
of the estimated effect: After the introduction of the policy, house prices increased
substantially in Denmark and this appreciation is unparalleled relative to all other
placebo effects. The uniqueness of the estimated treatment effect, relative to those
from placebo experiments, supports a causal interpretation of the results. Note that
house prices for Denmark’s Synthetic Unit also increased markedly during the 2000s,
which indicates that that Denmark would most likely have experienced an increase in
house prices after 2003 even in the absence of any policy change. Hence, the intro-
duction of IO loans amplified the ascension of house prices in Denmark relative to the
counterfactual that also experienced strong house price growth.
The numerical estimates of the impact of the policy are listed in panel 1 of table 5.
The table shows the Gap in house price growth between Denmark and its Synthetic
during the boom period (2003Q4 - 2006Q4), the bust period (2007Q1 - 2010Q1), and
the ratio of the Gap to total house price growth for Denmark over the boom and
bust periods. In the table, asterisks represent estimates for house price growth that
are larger than all placebo effects.28 First, the Gap in house price growth during the
boom was 35.80 percent, an estimate that is larger than all placebo effects. Hence,
28Specifically, for the boom (bust) period, an asterisk indicates that the effect for the treated unit
is larger(smaller) than all estimated placebo effects.
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due to the introduction of the IO loans, Danish house prices grew an extra 36 percent
compared to a counterfactual that also experienced substantial house price growth over
the sample period. Additionally, the left column in the far-right panel table indicates
that the IO loan policy explains 62 percent of the house price growth in Denmark
between 2003Q4 - 2006Q4. Therefore, the majority of house price appreciation during
the boom is due to the introduction of IO loans.
However, the effect was not uniform across Denmark. Figure 7 plots the results for
CopenhagenSurroundings, the suburban area around Copenhagen. Figure 16 in ap-
pendix E displays the permutation test plots for all Danish cities, and shows consider-
able heterogeneity in the estimated effect. After the IO loan policy is implemented in
Denmark, house prices in CopenhagenSurroundings diverge markedly from the Syn-
thetic Control, similarly to the pattern observed for Denmark as a whole.29 From
the start of the sample to the peak of the boom (1999M04 to 2006M07), house prices
in CopenhagenSurroundings increased 127 percent, whereas those for the Synthetic
increased only 62 percent. The two plots in the bottom of the figure show that this
increase in house prices is both rare and extremely large in magnitude. At the peak
of the housing boom (2006M07), the Gap between CopenhagenSurroundings and its
Synthetic, the estimated effect, is more than twice as large as that for largest esti-
mated placebo effect. Together, the plots in figure 7 indicate that the introduction
of IO loans notably changed the dynamics of the CopenhagenSurroundings housing
market, amplifying the boom that subsequently reversed during the bust. The second
panel of table 5, however, shows that while the introduction of IO loans had a sub-
stantial impact in CopenhagenCity, CopenhagenSurroundings, EasternZealand, and
NorthernZealand, other areas did not experience a boom related to IO loan use. Dur-
ing the boom the introduction of IO loans led to an increase in house prices of over 50
percent in CopenhagenCity, but just 8 percent in NorthernJutland. Further, in other
cities, such as Fyn and NorthernJutland, there was almost no change in house prices
29Note that the Teranet and Danish Repeat-Sales house prices indices are reported as a three-
month moving average. So, there is a small delay between the implementation of the IO loan policy
and an increase in house prices in CopenhagenSurroundings.
98
due to the introduction of IO loans. These heterogeneous effects lead to large differ-
ences in the contribution of the treatment effect to the total growth in house prices.
The Gap/Path ratio indicates the that the introduction of IO loans accounts for at
least 70 percent of the growth in house prices in CopenhagenCity, CopenhagenSur-
roundings, and NorthernZealand, but for approximately zero of the growth in several
other areas.
Finally, Danish house prices plunged during the bust. After 2006 housing returns
started to wane before diving markedly in 2008. By 2010, the level of Danish house
prices returned to match its Synthetic Control, erasing all relative gains accumulated
during the boom. In total, from 2007Q1 to 2010Q1 (the bust period), house prices in
Denmark fell an extra 23.36 percent compared to the Synthetic, an estimate that is
larger in magnitude than all estimated placebo effects. Furthermore, house price fell
more than the Synthetic Control in several areas that did not experience an increase
in prices due to IO-loans in the boom. The above results imply that the introduction
of IO loans amplified the boom-bust pattern in house prices.
6.3 Helsinki Placebo Test
In the previous section, we used Canadian cities to construct a Synthetic Control unit
for local Danish housing markets. One potential concern with this approach is that
a combination of Canadian cities may not yield an appropriate match for a Northern
European housing market after 2003 had the IO loan policy not been implemented. To
address this issue, we conduct a placebo experiment where we let the treated unit be
Helsinki, the capital of Finland. Recall that in section 6.2 we found that Finland was a
close match for Denmark during the pre-treatment period. Thus, we can use Helsinki
to estimate the placebo effect when the treatment is applied to a similar Northern
European capital city housing market. Because the house price index for Helsinki is
quarterly, we transform the Teranet house price indices to the quarterly frequency by
retaining the last value for the house price index in each quarter. The data run from
1999Q2 to 2008Q4. For this analysis, the outcome variable is house prices and the
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predictor variables include house prices, GARCH(1,1) housing return volatility, and
the pre-treatment house price growth (1999Q2 - 2002Q4). The results are in panel
3 of tables 3 and 5 and figure 17 of appendix E. The Synthetic Control for Helsinki
is made up of 57 percent Halifax and 41 percent OttawaGatineau and the top-right
plot in figure 17 suggests that the Synthetic yields an appropriate match for Helsinki,
especially after 2000. Indeed, the RMSFE during the pre-treatment period is small
in magnitude at 27.19. Next, after the IO loan treatment is applied to Helsinki in
2003, there is in no divergence in the path in house prices between Helsinki and its
Synthetic. As seen in the bottom two panels of figure 17 in appendix E, the estimated
Gap for Helsinki is small in magnitude and in line with the other estimated placebo
effects. In total, a combination of Canadian cities closely approximates the path of
prices in a non-IO Northern European housing market after 2003.
7 Evaluating Alternative Explanations
In this section we evaluate alternative explanations for the Danish housing boom, and
show that the results are not consistent with an shift of credit supply nor with neither
increased speculation in housing.
First, we want to be clear that we believe that the introduction of IO-loans did lead
to an increase in credit. However, the evidence is more consistent with a move along
the credit supply curve, not of a shift of the credit supply curve itself. Such a shift
would occur if banks were more willing to lend to consumer for a given level of income
or wealth. For example, shifts could occur due to increased securitization, greater risk
diversification, an increase in the value of implicit government insurance, increased
government intervention in the mortgage market, or greater moral hazard on the behalf
of originators. Recall that many of these explanations are limited by Danish mortgage
market design (Campbell, 2013). Mortgage banks are legally obliged to retain credit
risk and cannot sell this risk on to investors, so greater moral hazard on behalf of
originators is ruled out by design. There is no government intervention in the mortgage
market and no government insurance of mortgages. Further, official reports state
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that credit was extended to borrowers based on their ability to afford a 30-year fixed
mortgage (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, 2007), and ex post outcomes
such as forced home sales, non-performing loans and mortgage defaults remained low
throughout the housing market downturn and the financial crisis. Figure 8 show
mortgage arrear as a percentage of outstanding mortgage debt, and the number of
homes repossessed by mortgage banks. Mortgage arrears shows the percentage of loans
where a large share of total payments have not been met 3.5 months after the latest
due date, which peaked at 0.57 percent in Denmark (Association of Danish Mortgage
Banks, 2016). Mortgage impairments peaked at 0.2 percent of outstanding mortgages
(Rangvid et al. , 2013), a rate which the mortgage banks were able to cover themselves,
and government intervention was not required. In comparison, delinquency rates on
single-family residential mortgages peaked at 10 percent, and non-performing loans to
gross loans peaked at slightly below 5 percent in the United States (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (US), 2016; World Bank, 2016).
Furthermore, to examine the claim by mortgage banks that borrowers were evaluated
on their ability to repay the standard 30-year mortgage, we compare the distribution
of income, financial wealth and mortgage payments as a percentage of income for
all house-buyers in each year following the reform to the distribution in 2002. The
results are in figure 9-11. For ease of exposition, each plot shows the distribution of
each variable in 2002 (black, solid line) and in 2003, 2004, 2005, or 2006 (red, dashed
line). Each graph includes a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
on the right. There is no shift in the distribution towards lower income or wealth,
and the distribution of mortgage payments to income shows that buyers were less-
risky in 2004 and 2005 compared to buyers in 2002. Instead there is a statistically
significant shift towards the right in figure 9 and 10. In figure 11 buyers have lower
mortgage payments to income in 2004 and 2005 than in 2002, showing no evidence
that households were of worse quality. Therefore, after the policy change, mortgage
credit did not disproportionately flow to lower quality borrowers. In 2005 and 2006, we
do see a slight rightward movement in the income and financial wealth distributions.
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This small shift is in line with our expectations as houses were more expensive in 2005
and 2006 at the peak boom.
To further examine the credit supply hypothesis, we plot the fraction of total mortgage
debt held by each income quintile over time. If there was a shift in credit supply,
we should see a shift towards low income borrowers in the data. Figure 13 plots
the fraction of total mortgage debt held by each income quintile, which is essentially
unchanged over time. Low-income borrowers did not expand their holdings of mortgage
debt following the reform. In panel (a) we plot results for all households, whereas panel
(b) only includes households who buy in the given year.30 For both panels, the results
are very similar – following the reform, we see no evidence that low income borrowers
took on a larger fraction of the total debt.31
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we use micro- and aggregate-level data to assess the impact of IO
loan availability during the 2000s on both the micro and aggregate level. Our results
indicate that the introduction of IO loans in Denmark amplified the boom-bust pattern
in housing: After the introduction of IO loans, the Danish housing market became
much more volatile and speculative in nature. Indeed, due to IO loan availability, house
prices jumped an extra 35 percent during the boom compared to a counterfactual that
also experienced a housing boom but for which IO loans were not available. Further,
IO mortgage availability contributed 60 percent to the increase in Danish house prices
between 2003Q4 and 2006Q4. Subsequently, during the bust, Danish house prices
reversed and dropped an additional 23 percent due to IO loans. These results cannot
be explained by a change in borrower quality as lending standards or borrower quality
did not change in Denmark during the 2000s. Further, while the effects of IO loans
on housing markets are rare and large in magnitude compared to estimated placebo
30Recall that there are no pre-payment penalties for refinancing, and that we could expect that
low-income households refinanced into interest-only mortgages, even if they did not purchase a new
property.
31Note that due to third-party reporting of income and wealth data, there are no concerns regarding
misrepresented or fraudulent data in the calculation of these figures. See Mian & Sufi (2015).
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effects, they are heterogeneous across local housing markets. Specifically, the impact
of the policy change is magnified in housing markets with higher pre-treatment house
price growth expectations markets that experienced higher IO loan penetration and
substantial house price appreciation during the 2000s.
Altogether, these findings are consistent with a shift in demand for credit following the
reform, as the supply of credit did not shift. The results are in line with the predic-
tions from the theoretical model, where a reduction in required amortization payment
increases the ability of households to smooth consumption, which in turn increases
their willingness to purchase housing. These results have important implications for
other countries including the United States where IO loans were widely available. For
example, a conservative back of the envelope application of our estimates to Califor-
nia, where IO loans made up nearly half of all new mortgages in 2004, indicates that
IO loan availability led to an additional 54 percent increase in California house prices
between 2002Q1 and 2006Q4.32 Last, given the depth of the Great Recession, the
implications of our findings are wide reaching and suggest that policymakers should
be aware of how new mortgage products can drive housing cycles even in the absence
of a deterioration in borrower quality.
32FRED Series ID CASTHPI. Here, we assume that IO loan availability contributed 56 to the
increase in house prices, the median of cross-sectional estimates across Danish cities.
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A Tables
Table 1: Buyers Pre-and Post Reform – Normalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All All All
Post Reform 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0027*** 0.0039***
(0.00028) (0.00034) (0.00033) (0.00029) (0.00028)
Boom -0.0018***
(0.00047)
Post Reform X Boom 0.0025***
(0.00047)
Housing Supply 0.0036***
(0.00076)
Post Reform X Housing Supply 0.0065***
(0.00065)
Post Reform X Income Growtht, Normalized 0.0010***
(0.00005)
Post Reform X Income Growtht+1, Normalized 0.0002***
(0.00003)
Post Reform X Hand-to-Mouth=0 X Income Growtht+1, Normalized 0.0003***
(0.00005)
Post Reform X Hand-to-Mouth=1 X Income Growtht+1, Normalized 0.0000
(0.00004)
Constant -0.1654*** -0.1638*** -0.1723*** -0.1579*** -0.1665*** -0.1643***
(0.00380) (0.00387) (0.00390) (0.00382) (0.00381) (0.00378)
Observations 3,792,805 3,792,805 3,792,805 3,792,805 3,792,805 3,792,805
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimation of the probability of buying using data on the full population of Danish households in year 2002
and 2004. All regressions include municipality dummies and the following control variables. Household-level controls: The log difference between
disposable income in year t and t− 1 (Income Growtht), and year t+ 1 and t (Income Growtht+1), ; lagged values for mortgage to income and
interest payment to income; log income, changes in family size, age, age squared, education level, unemployed, housing tenure, housing tenure
squared, and a dummy for owner. Municipality-level controls include (1) new households in the municipality, the share of poor hand-to-mouth,
and wealthy hand to mouth; (2) year-over year change in the unemployment rate, mortgage rate, average disposable income, average buyer
income, and (3) the lagged annual house price change. All variables with the year-over-year change are normalized by the median income growth
in year t to account for business-cycle effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2: Regression of Interest Only Loans on Pre-Treatment
House Price Growth
IO Loan Penetration
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-Treatment House Price Growth 0.15*** 0.099***
(0.03) (0.03)
Buyer Income Growtht+2 1.22*** 0.92***
(0.20) (0.20)
Constant 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 93 93 93
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of interest-only mortgages as a
percentage of all mortgages for each municipality. Pre-Boom House Price
Growth is the percentage increase in house prices from 1998Q1 to 2003Q3.
Buyer Income Growtht+2 is the log difference in disposable income between
2004 and 2006.
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Table 3: Synthetic Control Weights
Treated Synthetic Control Weights
Panel 1: International House Prices
Denmark Finland: 1.00
Panel 2: City-Level House Prices
CopenhagenCity OttawaGatineau: 1.00
CopenhagenSurroundings OttawaGatineau: 0.86; Toronto: 0.14
EasternJutland Vancouver: 0.46; Toronto: 0.32; Hamilton: 0.22
EasternZealand OttawaGatineau: 0.74; Hamilton: 0.26
Fyn Vancouver: 0.55; Hamilton: 0.45
NorthernJutland Toronto: 0.67; Vancouver: 0.33
NorthernZealand OttawaGatineau: 0.93; Toronto: 0.07
SouthernJutland Hamilton: 0.49; Vancouver: 0.39; Toronto: 0.12
WesternJutland Vancouver: 0.52; Toronto: 0.48
WestSouthZealand OttawaGatineau: 0.83; Toronto: 0.17
Panel 3: Helsinki City-Level House Prices
Helsinki Halifax: 0.57; OttawaGatineau: 0.41; Hamilton: 0.01
Notes: Synthetic Control unit weights. Only regions with positive weight are listed.
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Table 4: Average Pre-treatment Predictor Values
Panel 1: Denmark; House Prices
Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
Dur Cons per Capita 382.48 235.71 305.80
GARCH Volatility 0.84 0.92 0.96
GDP Per Capita 41505.31 30056.68 26609.96
House Price Index 117.64 116.11 115.22
Pre-treatment HPI Growth 31.65 29.88 37.73
Private Credit Flows 118.37 125.07 132.18
Panel 2: CopenhagenCity; House Prices
Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
GARCH Volatility 0.64 0.40 0.44
House Price Index 119.73 113.83 109.54
Median Income 2001 Std -0.45 1.77 0.15
Pop 2001 Std 0.68 0.17 0.67
Pre-treatment HPI Growth 37.05 32.89 23.33
Unemp 2001 Std 1.76 -0.55 -0.12
Panel 3: CopenhagenSurroundings; House Prices
Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
GARCH Volatility 0.32 0.37 0.44
House Price Index 115.48 113.56 109.54
Median Income 2001 Std 0.96 1.78 0.15
Pop 2001 Std 0.20 0.62 0.67
Pre-treatment HPI Growth 29.75 31.78 23.33
Unemp 2001 Std -0.42 -0.53 -0.12
Notes: Average pre-treatment predictor values for selected Samples.
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Table 5: Synthetic Control–Estimated Effects of IO Loans
Gap Gap/Path
Treated Unit RMSFE Boom Bust Boom Bust
Panel 1: International House Prices
Denmark 15.98 35.80* -23.36* 0.62 1.60
Panel 2: City-Level House Prices
CopenhagenCity 42.14 52.32* -30.20* 0.77 2.98
CopenhagenSurroundings 7.53 40.32* -32.09* 0.72 2.54
EasternJutland 2.98 8.03 -15.35* 0.19 -45.32
EasternZealand 7.08 34.31* -31.07* 0.66 2.36
Fyn 2.41 -2.82 -13.58* -0.08 -9.73
NorthernJutland 3.19 -1.85 -5.89* -0.07 -0.57
NorthernZealand 9.72 36.53* -38.43* 0.70 2.06
SouthernJutland 3.12 -4.54 -4.58 -0.16 -0.46
WesternJutland 4.67 -9.38 -0.65 -0.36 -0.04
WestSouthZealand 7.37 19.89* -26.05* 0.56 3.88
Panel 3: Helsinki City-Level House Prices
Helsinki 27.19 3.68 NA 0.15 NA
Notes: The estimated causal impact of the introduction of IO loans using the SCM.
The first three columns show the sample used in the estimation, the treated unit, and
the outcome variable. The fourth column holds the RMSFE from the SCM estimation.
The right two panels show the estimated casual effects of the IO policy intervention.
When house prices are the outcome variable, Gap is the gap in the house price growth
between the treated unit and its Synthetic Control and Gap/Path is Gap divided by
total house price growth for the treated unit. The results are computed for the boom
period (2003Q4 - 2006Q4) and the bust period (2007Q1 - 2010Q1). For the boom (bust)
period, an asterisk indicates that the effect for the treated unit is larger (smaller) than
all estimated placebo effects.
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Table 6: Summary of Results–Gap in House Prices Across Boom and
Bust Periods
Boom Bust
Estimate Boot SE Estimate Boot SE
Mean–All 30.27* 2.69 -24.44* 1.23
Median–All 34.38* 4.06 -26.25* 1.36
CopenhagenCity 60.53* 3.15 -29.37* 0.32
CopenhagenSurroundings 54.69* 5.47 -29.16* 1.11
EasternJutland 25.33* 7.00 -21.65* 3.23
EasternZealand 46.68* 4.33 -32.57* 0.51
Fyn 18.79* 8.53 -17.32* 3.14
NorthernJutland 7.80 4.12 -17.12* 5.97
NorthernZealand 50.24* 5.16 -37.76* 0.31
SouthernJutland 7.89 5.42 -15.23* 2.86
WesternJutland 12.14 8.48 -18.91* 3.97
WestSouthZealand 17.95* 2.57 -25.47* 4.14
Notes: Summary of results across all of the permutations of the data listed in table
8. In each panel, the left column holds mean gap in cumulative housing returns
all permutations of the data; the corresponding bootstrapped standard error is
the the right column. The results in the boom period (2003Q4-2006Q4) are in the
left panel, while the right panel shows the results over the bust period (2007Q1 -
2010Q1). The first two rows show the mean and the median the estimated causal
effects over all permutations of the data; the remaining rows show the results for
specific Copenhagen Cities. An asterisk represents a bootstrapped p-value of less
than 0.05.
112
B Figures
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
90.000
To
ta
l C
os
t Y
ea
r 1
 (D
KK
)
20
00
w1
20
00
w2
7
20
01
w1
20
01
w2
7
20
02
w1
20
02
w2
7
20
03
w1
20
03
w2
7
20
04
w1
20
04
w2
7
20
05
w1
20
05
w2
7
20
06
w1
20
06
w2
7
20
07
w1
Fixed Rate with Amortization Fixed  Rate without Amortization
Figure 1: First Year Payments
Notes: The red vertical line indicates the introduction of interest-only mortgages. The figure plots
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(solid line) and without amortization payments (dashed line). Both lines are calculated using the
long-bond rate from the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks.
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Figure 2: Number of Transactions and House Prices
Notes: Red line shows when Interest-Only mortgages were introduced in Denmark. Solid line shows
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Source: Denmark Statistics
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Figure 3: Mortgage Loan Types
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Figure 4: Interest-Only Loan Penetration in Danish Municipalities
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Figure 5: Interest-Only Loan Penetration, Pre-Treatment House Price Growth and
Income Growth
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Figure 8: Mortgage Arrears and Repossessed Homes
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Source: Association of Danish Mortgage Banks
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Figure 9: Distribution of Income, for House-Buyers
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
2002 Smaller =      0.000
2006 Smaller =      0.998
Combined P-Value =      0.000
Notes: Distribution of income for households who purchased real estate in 2002 (black, solid line)
and subsequent years (red, dashed line). Income is total income from labor including transfers, in
logs.
Figure 10: Distribution of Financial Wealth, for House-Buyers
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
2002 Smaller =      0.000
2006 Smaller =      0.999
Combined P-Value =      0.000
Notes: Distribution of financial wealth for households who purchased real estate in 2002 (black, solid
line) and subsequent years (red, dashed line). Net wealth is the sum of stocks, bonds and cash
deposits in logs.
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Figure 11: Distribution of Mortgage Payments to Income, for House-Buyers
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
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Notes: Distribution of mortgage interest payments divded by income for households who purchased
real estate in 2002 (black, solid line) and subsequent years (red, dashed line).
Figure 12: Distribution of Age, for House-Buyers
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Notes: Distribution of age for households who purchased real estate in 2002 (black, solid line) and
subsequent years (red, dashed line).
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Figure 13: Mortgage Debt by Income Quintile
(a) All Households
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Notes: The figures show the fraction of total mortgage debt held by each income quintile. Mortgage
debt is measured at end-of-year values. Panel (a) show the results all households who hold mortgage
debt. Panel (b) shows the results for households who purchased housing in the given year.
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C Appendix: Data (For Online Publication)
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D Appendix: Tables (For Online Publication)
Table 9: Mortgage Market Characteristics
Typical Mortgage Maximum Mortgage Debt House Price
Country Loan Term Loan Type LTV Ratio (% of GDP) Growth (1998-2002)
Denmark 30 Fixed 80% 74.3 32%
Finland 15-18 Variable 80% 31.8 30%
Canada 25 Mixed* 80% 43.1 27%
Italy 15 Fixed 80% 11.4 28%
Spain 15 Variable 100% 32.3 66%
U.S. 30 Fixed NA 58.0 49%
Interest-rate Full Fee-free Equity Interest-Only
Deduction Recourse Pre-Payment Withdrawal Mortgages
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes No Yes No
Canada No Yes No Yes No
Italy Yes Yes No No No
Spain Yes Yes No Limited No
U.S. Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: We define a country as having fixed interest rates if a majority of loans have a fixed interest rate for
5 or more years. House price growth defined as the percentage increase in the BIS house price indices for
all countries from 1998Q1 to 2002Q4. Mortgage debt is defined as residential mortgage debt in 2002 for all
countries.
Sources: Catte et al. (2004), ECB (2003), Scanlon et al. (2008), and Cardarelli et al. (2008).
* The predominant loan type in Canada is defined as mixed, as Canadian mortgages typically have a fixed
25-year term, where the interest rate is negotiated every 5 years.
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E Appendix: Figures (For Online Publication)
Figure 14: Map of Denmark
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Figure 16: City-Level House Price Permutation Tests
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Notes: See the notes for figure 7. These plots show the permutation tests for Danish cities where
the donor pool consists of Canadian non-resource cities.
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F Appendix: Synthetic Control Gap Estimates (For Online Publica-
tion)
Table 10: Synthetic Control–Estimated Effects of IO Loans
Gap Gap/Path
Treated Unit RMSFE Boom Bust Boom Bust
Panel 1: Coastal Cities; Unadjusted Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 42.14 52.32* -30.20* 0.77 2.98
CopenhagenSurroundings 7.52 40.32* -32.09* 0.72 2.54
EasternJutland 2.96 8.48 -14.61* 0.20 -43.11
EasternZealand 5.21 35.98* -31.18* 0.70 2.37
Fyn 2.37 -3.04 -14.71* -0.08 -10.54
NorthernJutland 3.19 -1.82 -5.89* -0.07 -0.57
NorthernZealand 9.67 36.58* -38.42* 0.70 2.05
SouthernJutland 3.09 -5.44 -6.63* -0.19 -0.67
WesternJutland 4.67 -9.37 -0.65 -0.36 -0.04
WestSouthZealand 7.33 19.94* -26.03* 0.56 3.87
Panel 2(a): All Cities; Standardized Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 42.14 52.32* -30.20* 0.77 2.97
CopenhagenSurroundings 7.53 40.29 -32.06* 0.72 2.54
EasternJutland 2.06 5.65 -36.14* 0.13 -106.69
EasternZealand 5.94 34.05 -31.36* 0.66 2.38
Fyn 1.58 -4.11 -31.18* -0.11 -22.33
NorthernJutland 2.64 -3.61 -19.94* -0.14 -1.92
NorthernZealand 9.78 36.52 -38.75* 0.70 2.07
SouthernJutland 2.12 -6.81 -25.34* -0.24 -2.55
WesternJutland 3.60 -10.61 -20.54* -0.41 -1.29
WestSouthZealand 7.34 19.94 -25.99* 0.56 3.87
Panel 2(b): All Cities; Unadjusted Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 42.14 52.32* -30.20* 0.77 2.98
CopenhagenSurroundings 7.52 40.32* -32.09* 0.72 2.54
EasternJutland 2.06 5.63 -36.21* 0.13 -106.88
EasternZealand 5.21 35.97 -31.23* 0.70 2.37
Fyn 1.60 -4.51 -30.81* -0.12 -22.06
NorthernJutland 2.61 -3.31 -19.68* -0.13 -1.89
NorthernZealand 9.77 36.52 -38.74* 0.70 2.07
SouthernJutland 2.16 -7.55 -25.22* -0.26 -2.54
WesternJutland 3.62 -11.01 -20.86* -0.42 -1.31
WestSouthZealand 7.33 19.94 -26.03* 0.56 3.87
Notes: See the notes for table 5.
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Table 10 Continued
Gap Gap/Path
Treated Unit RMSFE Boom Bust Boom Bust
Panel 3(a): Quarterly HPIs; Coastal Cities; Standardized Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 16.57 68.73* -28.55* 0.82 1.40
CopenhagenSurroundings 2.36 69.10* -26.26* 0.82 1.43
EasternJutland 1.47 43.73* -17.71* 0.70 1.54
EasternZealand 3.77 58.29* -33.93* 0.79 1.29
Fyn 0.81 40.89* -11.61 0.74 1.51
NorthernJutland 1.69 19.25* -10.13 0.53 2.31
NorthernZealand 3.20 63.94* -36.93* 0.81 1.28
SouthernJutland 0.76 23.70* -10.42 0.62 1.74
WesternJutland 3.54 34.36* -27.16* 0.69 1.41
WestSouthZealand 0.77 21.28* -18.26 0.63 21.65
Panel 3(b): Quarterly HPIs; Coastal Cities; Unadjusted Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 16.57 68.73* -28.55* 0.82 1.40
CopenhagenSurroundings 2.36 69.10* -26.25* 0.82 1.43
EasternJutland 1.47 43.73* -17.72* 0.70 1.54
EasternZealand 3.77 58.29* -33.93* 0.79 1.29
Fyn 0.93 42.65* -11.84 0.77 1.54
NorthernJutland 1.72 21.25* -9.63 0.59 2.20
NorthernZealand 3.20 63.94* -36.93* 0.81 1.28
SouthernJutland 0.80 23.61* -10.24 0.62 1.71
WesternJutland 3.56 34.39* -27.15* 0.69 1.41
WestSouthZealand 0.49 28.34* -3.02 0.84 3.58
Panel 3(c): Quarterly HPIs; All Cities; Standardized Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 16.57 68.73* -28.55* 0.82 1.40
CopenhagenSurroundings 2.31 69.03* -26.24* 0.82 1.43
EasternJutland 1.47 43.71 -17.74* 0.70 1.54
EasternZealand 3.77 58.28* -33.92* 0.79 1.29
Fyn 0.81 40.43 -12.85 0.73 1.67
NorthernJutland 5.48 10.92 -56.43* 0.30 12.87
NorthernZealand 3.20 63.94* -36.94* 0.81 1.28
SouthernJutland 0.72 20.03 -19.79* 0.53 3.31
WesternJutland 3.51 34.38 -27.15* 0.69 1.41
WestSouthZealand 0.35 7.15 -39.17* 0.21 46.43
Panel 3(d): Quarterly HPIs; All Cities; Unadjusted Macro Data
CopenhagenCity 16.57 68.73* -28.55* 0.82 1.40
CopenhagenSurroundings 2.30 69.02* -26.22* 0.82 1.43
EasternJutland 1.47 43.71 -17.72* 0.70 1.54
EasternZealand 3.77 58.27* -33.92* 0.79 1.29
Fyn 0.83 40.84 -11.96 0.74 1.55
NorthernJutland 1.74 21.61 -9.38 0.60 2.14
NorthernZealand 3.20 63.94* -36.94* 0.81 1.28
SouthernJutland 0.72 20.12 -19.62* 0.53 3.28
WesternJutland 3.50 34.34 -27.13* 0.69 1.41
WestSouthZealand 0.35 7.13 -39.24* 0.21 46.52
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Abstract
In this paper we establish that house price growth is correlated with consumption
growth and that the main channel is through collateral constraints. In the empirical
analysis, we use detailed Danish micro-data and a household-level consumption expen-
diture measure to show that there is a strong correlation between house price changes
and consumption, driven primarily by borrowing constrained households. We find no
correlation between house price changes and consumption after we remove household
who borrow against housing collateral, suggesting collateral borrowing is the main
driver of the observed correlation between house prices and consumption. We obtain
similar results when we instrument house prices with housing supply.
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1 Introduction
Why does consumption increase when house prices increase? An extensive empirical lit-
erature argues that household consumption responds strongly to changes in house prices,
suggesting that volatility in house prices can have a large impact on aggregate consumption
dynamics. In standard models, this increase in consumption is explained by an increase in
wealth following from rising house prices. The alternative explanation is that rising house
values facilitate an increase in borrowing to fund consumption expenditure for constrained
households. As most studies focus on the combined effects of these two channels, their rela-
tive importance is unclear. The purpose of this paper is to examine the collateral and wealth
effect theoretically and empirically in an attempt to disentangle the two effects. The main
questions that we seek to answer are 1) does changes in house price affect consumption; and
if so, 2) is this effect driven by a wealth effect or a collateral effect?
Determining whether household consumption change because of a wealth effect or re-
laxed borrowing constraints has important implications for macroeconomic policy (DeFusco,
2015). On the one hand, if relaxed credit constraints lead to growth in borrowing and thereby
cause consumption to increase, Bernanke & Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki & Moore (1997)
show that even small shocks can have large effects on aggregate consumption.1 In addition,
the increase in mortgage debt implied by the collateral channel has potential consequences
for macroeconomic stability (Mian & Sufi, 2015; Mian et al., 2015). On the other hand,
an increase in consumption due to the wealth effect implies that policies that affect house
prices transmit directly into consumption. The literature however, often assumes that the
housing wealth effect is limited (Campbell & Cocco, 2007; Berger et al., 2015), because the
positive effect for certain households is offset by a negative effect for others. Since housing
is both a consumption good and a financial asset, there are well-founded theoretical reasons
to expect that the wealth effect for housing is different than for other assets. For instance,
Sinai & Souleles (2005) show that the implicit cost of consuming housing services rises at the
same rate as house prices, which eliminates any wealth effect. An alternative is that rising
1See also Iacoviello (2005).
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house prices may have a negative wealth effect for renters, which can reduce or eliminate
wealth effect on the aggregate level (Buiter, 2010; Flavin & Nakagawa, 2008).
We formulate a model of consumption and housing with constrained and unconstrained
homeowners to guide the empirical analysis. The model shows that the consumption re-
sponse to house prices may have three separate components: a wealth effect, a substitution
effect and a collateral effect. The consumption of unconstrained consumers reacts to house
price changes for two reasons. First, if house price returns are included in the inter-temporal
return, an increase in house prices causes households to increase consumption in the current
period as their future wealth is larger.2 Second, if there is a substitution effect between
housing and non-housing consumption, a rise in the cost of housing consumption leads to
an increase in non-housing consumption.3 Constrained households borrow against housing
collateral to fund consumption, and increases in house prices raises their borrowing capacity
and thereby their consumption.
In the empirical analysis we start with the full population of Danish households from
1996 to 2010, but limit our attention to two-adult households who own housing assets. For
each household, we calculate total consumption expenditure using an accounting identity
and data on disposable income and changes in wealth (Browning & Leth-Petersen, 2003;
Koijen et al., 2015). In the empirical estimation, we estimate the effect of changes in house
prices on consumption growth, using an extensive set of controls to account for common
factors that may influence the results. In a robustness check, we use housing supply as an
instrument for house prices in an attempt to address any remaining endogeneity concerns,
following Mian & Sufi (2011) and Mian et al. (2013).
The main specification implies that the marginal propensity to consume is approximately
1 cent on the dollar. This estimate is smaller in magnitude than previous estimates in the
2The existence of a wealth effect relies on house price changes being permanent (Browning et al., 2013;
Lettau & Ludvigson, 2004). In this paper, we refrain from adressing permanent versus transitory shocks to
house prices and instead focus on overall effect.
3We show that if there is non-separability between housing and consumption, house price appreciation
lead to an increase in non-consumption. This effect is discussed in Iacoviello (2004) and Berger et al. (2015),
and is mentioned in Campbell & Cocco (2007) and Mian & Sufi (2011). In the estimation we focus on the
wealth and collateral effect, as the substitution effect is difficult to observe directly in our data.
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literature (see Bostic et al., 2009, for an overview), but is similar to the results in Browning
et al. (2013) and Gan (2010), who both use household-level data. We find little difference
in the estimated effect across age groups, which is possibly due to the sample being limited
to two-adult households. The estimated effect varies over time, where the largest estimated
effect is observed between 2003 and 2006, when the Danish housing market expanded at
a historically rapid pace.4 The estimated elasticity is five times higher in 2005 than the
baseline estimates, but is insignificant and very close to zero in 2007 and 2008 when the
Danish housing market declined dramatically.
Moreover, credit constraints are an important source of heterogeneity in the estimated
effect. The previous empirical literature has often relied on indirect proxies such as available
liquidity or age to identify households who are credit constrained to provide evidence for
the importance of the collateral channel, and do not separately estimate the wealth and
collateral effect (Cooper, 2013).5 We confirm the importance of credit constraints, but only
for those related to housing equity. Specifically, households with high loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios respond strongly to house price changes, but the estimated effect for households with
low LTV ratios is close to zero. We find no difference in the consumption response to house
price changes between liquidity constrained and unconstrained households. This finding is
consistent with the theoretical model and with Kaplan & Violante (2014), as constrained
households are affected by house prices because it raises their available home equity, not
because it increases liquidity.
The implicit assumption behind using proxies for credit constraints is that these house-
holds respond more strongly because they borrow against home equity. Rising house prices
facilitate further borrowing against housing collateral for credit constrained households,
which leads to a larger estimated effect. However, it is not certain that this is due to
increased borrowing. Carroll & Kimball (1996) show in a model of consumption under
uncertainty that the marginal propensity to consume is declining in wealth. The larger esti-
4See Rangvid et al. (2013), Dam et al. (2011) and Ba¨ckman & Lutz (2016) for an overview of the Danish
housing market in this time.
5Important exceptions who estimate collateral effects without wealth effects include Leth-Petersen (2010),
DeFusco (2015) and Agarwal & Qian (2016).
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mated effects could be due to lower wealth instead of increased borrowing.6 To test whether
the effect is actually driven by collateral borrowing, we re-estimate our baseline equation
on the sub-sample of home-owners who do not extract equity. Consistent with a dominant
role of the collateral channel, we find that the estimated effect is considerably lower once
we remove households who borrow against housing collateral. Indeed, the magnitude of
the coefficient on house price changes is close to zero. Similarly for borrowing constrained
households, we find that once we remove households who extract equity, the effect of house
price changes on consumption is close to zero.
We also find suggestive evidence against unobservable factors that may increase both
consumption and house prices simultaneously, as the consumption of renters does not re-
spond to house price changes in any year of the sample. Nevertheless, the set of controls in
the empirical model may not capture all unobservables that affect both consumption and
house prices. We therefore provide a robustness check where we instrument municipality-
level house prices with housing supply (Saiz, 2010). The rationale behind the instrument is
that a common shock to the Danish housing market, for example lower interest rates, can
affect house prices differently in elastic versus inelastic areas.7 With instrumented house
prices, we find that the estimated effects are an order of magnitude larger than the cor-
responding OLS estimates. Using the same proxies for credit constraints we find that the
effect is driven by households who are constrained, both in terms of liquidity and borrowing.
Additionally, we find an even stronger effect for young households. There is no significant
effect for unconstrained households, although the standard errors include sizable effects. In
summary, the IV results show that house price changes have substantial and economically
significant effect; the marginal propensity to consume out of housing is 0.12 in the baseline
estimation.
Overall, our results indicate that house price changes impacts the real economy, but that
6Another alternative is that low levels of liquidity proxies for self-control problems.
7Housing supply is a commonly used instrument for house price growth. However, supply constraints
may be correlated with a number of demand factors (Saiz, 2010; Davidoff et al., 2016) that potentially
invalidate the exogeneity of the instrument. We provide evidence and a discussion on the validity of the
instrument in section 5.
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the effect is different across different time periods and for different groups of people. Col-
lateral constraints and collateral borrowing are likely the most important channels through
which house prices affect consumption, and there is only a limited role for housing wealth
effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model of housing and consump-
tion, section 3 describes the data, the sample selection and the empirical strategy, section
4 presents results from the OLS estimation, and section 5 presents results from the instru-
mental variable estimation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In what follows, we construct a model of consumption and housing for existing homeowners
to support the empirical analysis. In the spirit of Iacoviello (2004, 2005), we allow the
economy to be populated by unconstrained and constrained households. Unconstrained
households save and borrow unrestrictedly. Constrained households do not have sufficient
savings to finance consumption expenditures, and experience restrictions in how much they
can borrow. Constrained households can use their housing as collateral for borrowing.
Additionally, we account for “rule-of-thumb” households, who neither borrow nor save, and
instead simply consume out of their current income.8
We focus on households who are continued homeowners, i.e. those who do not buy or
sell housing assets. Households choose consumption and housing today and derive utility
from their choices. Homeowners hold positive amounts of housing stock, Ht, priced at Pt.
Housing stock is chosen and managed by household, and is affected by depreciation, δ,
and active adjustments to housing stock ht (also priced at Pt), for example maintenance,
renovations or home improvements:
Ht = (1− δ)Ht−1 + ht, (1)
8The “rule-of-thumb” households who do not save may also be more likely to suffer from self-control
problems, as in Laibson (1997), and may therefore want to consume out of housing wealth to finance
current consumption.
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Households receive a random endowment Yt, they consume Ct and save Bt (or borrow if
negative). They invest savings Bt in a single asset with the net return rt. If no purchase or
sale of a new home occurs, the flow of funds is given by:
Ct + Ptht +Bt = Yt + (1 + rt)Bt−1. (2)
Unconstrained households
Unconstrained households maximize lifetime utility:
Et
T∑
s=t
βs−tU(Cs, Hs) exp(φ′zs), (3)
where Et denotes expectation formed at time t, β is time discount factor, and exp(φ
′zt) is
utility taste shifter, which depends on demographic characteristics zt. Households choose
consumption Ct optimally by maximizing (3) subject to the constraints (1)-(2). The first-
order condition for an optimum give:
Et
{
β(1 + rt+1)
UC(Ct+1, Ht+1)
UC(Ct, Ht)
exp(φ′∆zt+1)
}
= 1, (4)
where UC is household marginal utility with respect to consumption. Equation (4) is the
standard Euler equation that connects the marginal cost of foregoing one unit of consump-
tion today to the discounted marginal benefit of consuming next period adjusted by the rate
of return earned in the next period. Under rational expectations, Euler equation (4) can be
written as follows:
β(1 + rt+1)
UC(Ct+1, Ht+1)
UC(Ct, Ht)
exp(φ′∆zt+1) = 1 + eCt+1,
where eCt+1 is the expectation error. Taking logs, applying first order Taylor series expansion
to lnUC , and writing the resulting equation one period back, we obtain estimatable Euler
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equation in log-linearized form:
∆ct = γ
c
0 + γ
c
1rt + γ
c
2∆}t + φ∆zt + ct , (5)
where rt is the net return between periods t−1 and t, ∆ct = ln(Ct/Ct−1), ∆}t = ln(Ht/Ht−1).
Shocks to house prices may affect consumption indirectly through non-separability in
preferences over consumption and housing. Equation (5) shows that consumption is di-
rectly related to housing stock through non-separability in preferences over consumption
and housing, determined by the coefficient γc2. Changes in house prices may also enter the
equation through rt+1, if house price growth properly belongs in rt+1.
Constrained households
In addition to the flow of funds given by (2), constrained households can borrow up to
a fraction mt of the value of real estate holdings:
−Bt 6 mtPtHt, (6)
where mt represents the limiting fraction on household’s net obligations. To illustrate the
problem faced by constrained households, we assume that they assign a high weight to
today’s consumption and do not discount the future (Iacoviello, 2004, makes the same
assumption in a related model). Constrained households borrow up to the constraint, which
will be binding in equilibrium. Constrained households choose consumption Ct and housing
investment ht optimally by maximizing their period utility U(Ct, Ht) exp(φ
′zt) subject to the
constraints (1)-(2) and (6). Constrained households do not save, and their inter-temporal
decisions are not affected by rt. The first-order conditions for the optimum give:
UH(Ct, Ht)
UC(Ct, Ht)
= (1−mt)Pt, (7)
from which it follows that the marginal cost of reducing consumption by one unit is equal
to the marginal benefit of shifting a unit of consumption to housing, adjusted by real estate
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prices and borrowing limit. There is no discounting, and the future marginal utility of
consumption does not appear.
We can express marginal utilities as UX(Ct, Ht) = uX(Ct, Ht)/Xt for X = {C,H}.
Equation (7) can then be presented as:9
Ct = (1−mt)PtHt
[
uC(Ct, Ht)
uH(Ct, Ht)
]
. (8)
We perform a logarithm transformation of the equation (8) and take first differences to
obtain the following empirical model:
∆ct = δ0 + δ1∆}t + δ2∆pt + ϕ∆zt + t, (9)
where the signs of δ1 and δ2 are expected to be positive, and demographic and financial
characteristics in equation (9) can capture individual differences in mt, which is a life-cycle
specific limit to borrowing.
The empirical model of consumption for constrained households in equation (9) differs
from the corresponding equation for unconstrained households in equation (5) in several
ways. The consumption of constrained households depends directly on their borrowing
capacity, which is determined by the borrowing limit. An expansion of borrowing and
therefore of consumption can be achieved by either higher house prices, or by a reduction in
the limiting fraction mt. Fluctuations in housing prices raise the amount that can be bor-
rowed and therefore affect household consumption regardless of the form of intra-temporal
dependencies between consumption and housing.
“Rule-of-thumb” households
Campbell & Mankiw (1990, 1991) consider a consumption model where households sim-
ply consume out of their current income. Empirically, myopic consumption behavior is
detected for many countries. Jappelli & Pagano (1989) and Campbell & Mankiw (1991)
9 To illustrate this transformation, suppose households have the following preferences U(Ct, Ht) = C
ζ
tH
ξ
t .
Then uC(Ct, Ht) = ζU(Ct, Ht) and uH(Ct, Ht) = ξU(Ct, Ht). Substituting these quantities in equation (8)
obtains Ct = (1 −mt)PtHt[ζ/ξ]. With arbitrary preferences over consumption and housing, the residual
term [uC(Ct, Ht)/uH(Ct, Ht)] in (8) may be a more complex function of Ct and Ht.
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provide evidence of the quantitative importance of such “rule-of-thumb” households based on
estimates of a modified Euler equation in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
France, Sweden, and other industrialized economies. Empirical evidence in Bayoumi & Mac-
Donald (1995) indicates that Denmark is not an exception in having a significant share of
myopic households. We will therefore include the consumption modeling set-up of Campbell
& Mankiw (1990), where a fraction of households consumes only their income:
∆ct = λ0 + λ1∆yt + it (10)
where ∆yt = ln(Yt/Yt−1) and λ1 captures the share of myopic consumers in economy.
3 Data, Methodology and Identification
In the first part of this section we present the data that we use in the empirical estimation
and describe how we construct consumption expenditure and other variables. In the second
part we discuss the empirical strategy and identification issues.
3.1 Data
We construct a dataset with consumption expenditures, income, financial wealth, home-
ownership, leverage, house prices, and demographic characteristics for all households in
Denmark from 1996 to 2010. We collect individual data on income, financial assets and
liabilities through the Danish Tax and Customs Administration (SKAT). We use property
transaction records collected from the Danish Official Gazette (Statstidende) to keep track
of homeowners and their housing assets, and to construct a municipality-level house price
index. Detailed demographic data is provided by population records. Individual information
is aggregated to the household level using a family identification number.
Imputing Consumption
Consumption expenditure is normally not available on the population level. To construct
a measure of total household consumption expenditure, we follow a procedure developed
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in Browning & Leth-Petersen (2003). The procedure, based on an accounting identity, de-
fines total consumption expenditure as disposable income minus the change in net wealth.
This method of imputing consumption is frequently adopted for administrative data (Leth-
Petersen, 2010; Browning et al., 2013; Andersen et al., 2014; Koijen et al., 2015), and
for survey data (Ziliak, 1998; Cooper, 2013; Khorunzhina, 2013). To construct imputed
consumption, we collect information on disposable income, financial assets and liabilities.
Disposable income is a sum of income after taxes, interest payments, rental value of owned
properties, alimony payments and repaid social benefits. Financial assets consist of individ-
ual holdings of stocks, bonds and bank deposits. Liabilities include separate categories for
bank debt and mortgage debt. All values are deflated to a base of 2006 using the consumer
price index from Denmark Statistics.
The main concern with imputed consumption is that only active savings should be
considered, and that changes in observed asset values that derive from capital gains (passive
savings) should be excluded. We can fully control for passive and active savings for housing
assets. As we observe all property transactions, any observed change in the value of housing
assets for those who do not transact is due to capital gains. We therefore remove all
households who we observe buying or selling in the housing market, and exclude changes in
housing wealth from the imputation. We also remove households who buy or sell housing
in t− 1 because their financial decisions may be different in years right after the purchase.
It is important to account for portfolio returns when imputing consumption expenditures
from data on income and net wealth (Koijen et al., 2015). Since we do not observe the exact
type of assets in the stock portfolio, we approximate capital gains on stock portfolios with
the market portfolio return. Specifically, we multiply the value of stock holdings at the
beginning of the year with the over-the-year growth in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange
C20 index, and calculate active savings as the end-of-year holdings minus stock holdings at
the beginning of the year adjusted for the capital-gains.
Variable Description
Demographic characteristics on individual level include marital status, number of children,
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years of education, age, area of residence, and a unique identification number on both the
individual and household level. We define household level education as the level achieved by
the most educated spouse, and household age as the age of the oldest spouse. We construct
an indicator for young households equal to one if the oldest spouse is less than 40 years of
age.
The registry data contain information about housing wealth for all individuals, which
allows us to confidently identify house owners. We define a household as an owner if his/her
registered housing wealth is positive. To construct measures of housing wealth and household
leverage we use an end-of-year official property valuation from SKAT, adjusted by a scaling
factor to approximate market values (see Andersen et al., 2014, for a similar treatment of
housing wealth from Danish administrative data). The scaling factor is calculated as the
sales price divided by the tax valuation for all sold properties, for each municipality, year
and property type (single-family houses and apartments).10 Whenever we discuss housing
wealth, we are referring to the adjusted market value of owned properties.
The model emphasizes the importance of credit constraints. While direct measure of
household’s credit constraints or borrowing needs is not available, data on financial assets
and income is helpful in identifying potentially credit-constrained household (Gross & Soule-
les, 2002). A standard approach to identify credit constrained households is to examine their
liquid financial assets relative to income. Households with lower levels of liquid savings rel-
ative to their income are more likely to borrow to finance their expenditures. In the absence
of other easily available means to raise liquidity, those households are more predisposed
to using housing equity as collateral than households with higher levels of liquid wealth.
In practice, the amount of housing wealth available determines the borrowing capacity for
constrained households, as housing can be used as inexpensive collateral for loans. We con-
struct two indicator for financial constraints: one indicator for borrowing constraints based
on mortgage to housing values, and another indicator based on available liquidity relative
10A similar scaling factor is provided by Denmark Statistics for the years before 2006. For the years
after the Danish municipality reform of 2006 we calculate this factor ourselves. We do not find substantial
differences between the scaling factor that we calculate and the one provided by Denmark Statistics for the
data directly comparable before and after the reform.
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to income. Specifically, we define a household as borrowing constrained if their mortgage
value is more than 0.5 times his/her housing wealth, and we define a household as being
liquidity constrained if the value of their liquid assets is lower than 1.5 months of disposable
income. Liquid assets are defined as the sum of bonds, stocks and bank deposits.
We identify whether a household extracted equity in the given year by examining whether
nominal mortgage balances increased by more than 10 percent year-over-year. Andersen
et al. (2015) briefly discuss equity extraction in Danish data, and chose a 10 percent thresh-
old to remove households who withdraw equity.11 On top of the increase in mortgage
balance, we require that nominal mortgage interest payments are unchanged or higher com-
pared to the previous year. These two requirements help us identify households who borrow
against home equity.
We construct house price indices for all municipalities. Constructing municipality-
specific house price indices and geographical controls is complicated by a Danish municipal-
ity reform in 2006 that created new municipalities and divided Denmark into five regions
based on these new municipalities. To ensure that regions and municipalities are geographi-
cally consistent over time, we match households to the new municipalities based on a unique
geographical match provided by Denmark Statistics, and assign each municipality to the
new region. After cleaning the transaction data, we use the average square meter price
of traded single-family houses for each municipality as our municipality-level house price
index. More details on the house price index can be found in Appendix A.
Finally, we calculate housing supply as the total area of each municipality that is covered
by properties. Specifically, we take the sum of the square meter size of all property divided by
the total land mass of the municipality (excluding areas covered by water). A greater fraction
of land covered by properties corresponds to a smaller area available for new construction,
and therefore to a more inelastic supply.
Sample Selection
Our theoretical model applies to households-homeowners with no drastic household com-
11Bhutta & Keys (2016) chose a 5 percent threshold. We chose a higher threshold because mortgage debt
is measured in market values in the data, which fluctuates year-over-year.
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position changes, and we select our sample accordingly. The sample selection is similar to
studies who use Danish administrative data (Browning et al., 2013; Andersen et al., 2014).
The starting sample after we remove households with missing demographic information is
approximately 2.6 million households per year. We select all two-adult households (either
married or cohabiting) between age 22 and 55 with or without children (to reduce concerns
over family composition and retirement incentives), and exclude households whose mem-
bers are entrepreneurs, as their income and wealth variables are less accurately reported.
We exclude households from three small island municipalities as their housing and financial
situation is likely different from the rest of Denmark.12 As noted previously, we also remove
households who buy or sell housing assets in year t and t− 1.
Browning & Leth-Petersen (2003) find that consumption imputed from an accounting
identity corresponds well to the self-reported consumption on average, but occasional out-
lier values can be problematic.13 We remove outliers by excluding observations where the
growth in imputed consumption is above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile,
any observations with negative imputed consumption, and a small number of households
who have no housing wealth but who have positive mortgage debt. After taking first dif-
ferences and removing non-homeowners, the final data sample of homeowners consists of
approximately 5 million households-year observations, for 1996 to 2010, which amounts to
approximately 500,000 households per year. A full sample selection table is available in
Appendix A.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on demographic characteristics (Panel A) and finan-
cial variables (Panel B). Column 1 presents summary statistics for the estimation sample,
Column 2 and 3 divides the sample into young and old households, where the age cutoff is
40 years of age. Column 4 and 5 splits the sample between liquidity constrained and un-
constrained households. The average annual total household consumption expenditure over
the sample years is 428K Danish kroner, which corresponds to approximately 57K Euros.
12The municipalities in question are Christiansø, Bornholm and Ærø.
13Koijen et al. (2015) point to a similar issue for imputed consumption in Swedish administrative data.
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This figure is close to the value of 395K Danish kroner (53K Euros) reported for two-person
households with children in the Danish Consumer Expenditure Survey. Figure 1 further
shows that both imputed and survey-based consumption closely match in levels and growth
rates. The close match between imputed consumption expenditure and survey consumption
is consistent with the findings in Browning & Leth-Petersen (2003). Moreover, the values
of consumption, disposable income and housing wealth are comparable to previous studies
that use Swedish and Danish administrative data.14 Housing wealth is approximately four
times larger than disposable income, similar to the values reported for Swedish households
in Campbell et al. (2007) and Betermier et al. (2014).
3.2 Identification
We estimate the following equation, which encapsulates the consumption response to house
price changes of three groups of households, as defined in equations (5), (9), and (10):
∆cikt = α0 + α1rikt + α2∆qkt + α3∆yikt + ϕ∆zikt + λt + ikt, (11)
where ∆cikt is log-difference in total consumption expenditure for household i living in
municipality k between periods t− 1 and t, rikt is the inter-temporal interest rate between
periods t − 1 and t, ∆qkt log-difference in house prices for municipality k between periods
t− 1 and t, ∆yit log-difference in disposable income for household i living in municipality k
between periods t− 1 and t, and ∆zt is the change in demographic characteristics between
periods t− 1 and t. A set of region, year and region-year fixed effects is denoted by λt.
As suggested by the discussion in section 2, unconstrained consumers react to a shock
to house prices if housing is a part of the net return, which thereby influences the decision
of how consumption is allocated over time. This can channel the wealth effect from life-
cycle models, where consumption is related to life-time resources (Browning et al., 2013;
Campbell & Cocco, 2007). Alternatively, house price shocks could impact consumption
14Koijen et al. (2015) find that Swedish homeowners’ imputed consumption expenditure equal to 328K
Swedish kronor (approximately 36K Euros).
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if there is non-separability in preferences over consumption and housing. For constrained
households, house price shocks affect borrowing capacity, and enable additional borrowing
against housing collateral to finance consumption.
Econometric estimation of equation (11) should take endogeneity into account. A major
concern is that both house prices and consumption may be driven by a common factor
(Altug & Miller, 1990). For example, the productivity hypothesis states that expectations
of future income growth can affect both consumer spending and house prices (King, 1990;
Pagano, 1990; Muellbauer & Murphy, 1997; Attanasio et al., 2009). Equation (6) informs us
about an additional source of endogeneity. Common factors may also affect the household’s
willingness to borrow against home equity, captured by mt. For example, easier credit
conditions or lower interest rates can induce households to borrow larger amounts against
their home equity, and can simultaneously raise house prices.15 While the maximum loan-
to-value ratio (the legal equivalent to mt) remained constant at 80 percent over the entire
sample period, the household-specific value of mt may be affected by an increase in income,
a reduction in risk or demographic changes. Furthermore, when obtaining equation (5) for
unconstrained homeowners, first order Taylor series expansion leaves higher order terms
for changes in consumption and housing (e.g. variance) outside of the equation. These
higher order terms are potentially contained in the error term t in equation (5), which may
invalidate orthogonally between the error term t and changes in house prices. Equation
(9) for constrained homeowners is obtained through direct log-linearization, therefore the
endogeneity due to approximation error in Taylor series expansion is not an issue.
Our strategy to address these concern is twofold. First, we estimate equation (11) with
OLS, and include an extensive set of interactions to control for aggregate factors that affect
households in a given year and region, and household-level income growth and changes
in demographic to both proxy for changes in individual-level income expectations, and to
address concerns over changes in mt.
16 The key identifying assumption is that the set of
15For example, Bhutta & Keys (2016) finds that equity withdrawal is strongly related to interest rates.
In urban economics, house prices is also strongly related to interest rates in the user-cost model (Poterba,
1984).
16Our measure of total consumption expenditure incorporates both housing and non-housing consump-
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interactions and time-varying controls at the individual, regional and year level capture
potentially confounding factors that drive the change in consumption. Note that we are
including controls for region-year effects, but use house prices on the municipality level. As
Denmark is a small country, the regions are small enough to capture local labor market
conditions, but large enough so that there is still variation in house price growth. To use an
analogy to the United States, we are essentially controlling for MSA-year (city-year) effects
and using county-level variation in house price growth.17 Year, region and year-region
indicators capture lower interest rates and credit conditions set on a national or regional
level. For example, shift in credit supply at a local level, for example from a local bank,
would be captured by a region-year interaction. Identification is threatened if there are
any remaining shocks orthogonal to the controls but correlated with consumption decisions.
While the extensive set of controls increases our confidence that we are taking the relevant
common factors into account, we still caution a causal interpretation. In a robustness check
we estimate whether the consumption of households without registered housing wealth is
affected by changes in house prices. The idea is that the consumption of renters should not
be affected by changes in house prices through wealth effects, but could be affected through
the productivity hypothesis.
In another robustness check, we use an instrumental variable strategy in an attempt
to account for common factors that may influence both house prices and consumption.
Specifically, we use housing supply as an instrument for house price growth (Saiz, 2010),
similar to the strategy used by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi in a series paper (Mian & Sufi,
2011; Mian et al., 2013; Mian & Sufi, 2014). Intuitively, for an equivalent demand shock, the
slope of the supply curve determines the effect on prices. In a more elastic market housing
supply can be easily increased in response to a positive demand shock, an adjustment that
is likely more difficult in inelastic areas. The theoretical insights behind this mechanism are
tion, which implies that a shift from housing to non-housing consumption leaves total which leaves total
consumption expenditure unchanged. Substitution effects is therefore not relevant in our empirical setup,
or alternatively are very difficult to identify.
17A Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is concentrated around a city, but also includes nearby areas
with close economic ties. A MSA can cover several legal administrative areas such as counties.
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discussed in Glaeser et al. (2008), and Hilber & Vermeulen (2015) find evidence in support
of the mechanism. Ba¨ckman (2016) provides evidence that housing supply in Denmark is an
important determinant of how shocks affect local housing markets, by showing that the serial
correlation in prices is negative in municipalities with low housing supply but is positive in
more constrained areas. In other words, house prices revert downwards faster following a
positive shock in elastic areas, which is precisely the intuition behind the instrument. Figure
2 shows that the annual house price growth is consistently higher in areas with constrained
(inelastic) supply, thus illustrating that the intuition behind using housing supply as an
instrument holds for Denmark. We provide more formal tests in section 5.
Throughout our analysis, we estimate and discuss four specifications. The first two
specifications include the entire sample of households, and differ by the presence of a control
for changes in disposable income in the second specification. In the last two specifications,
we split the full sample into young and old households.18 Household age is informative of
whether there is a housing wealth effects, or if common factors are influencing the results.
According to the wealth hypothesis, older households respond stronger because any wealth
shock is consumed over their (shorter) remaining life-span. The productivity hypothesis
has the opposite prediction. House price changes, if they proxy for unobserved income
expectations, have the strongest impact on young households as they have a longer life-
span to enjoy higher income growth (Attanasio et al., 2009).19 Additionally, the varying
composition of constrained and unconstrained consumers in economy is likely associated
with the life-cycle stage of the household. For example, young households are more likely
to be credit constrained, as more of their wealth is in intangible human capital. Risk and
uncertainty linked to household age could affect willingness of households to borrow based
on housing collateral. For these reasons, we present results for young and old households in
all tables, and present results in figures with more granular age cohorts.
Finally, theory suggests that constrained households may use their available collateral
18We chose to split our sample instead of using interactions. A robustness check show that the qualitative
conclusions are not affected by the choice of sample splitting.
19Berger et al. (2015) find that a more expansive model can produce the result that young households
react more than old households.
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to increase borrowing and thereby their consumption.20 We therefore report results where
we exclude households who borrow against their home-equity to test for any effect of house
prices in the absence of collateral borrowing. Whether house prices affect consumption even
after we remove those who refinance is informative of whether the housing wealth effect is
an important channel.
4 Results
This section presents the results for the OLS estimation of equation (11). We begin by
estimating (11) for the full sample of households, and proceed to investigate whether the
effect varies depending on available liquidity or leverage. Overall, we find that the effect
is small compared to the previous literature. We find an important role for borrowing
constraints, but no substantial difference based on available liquidity. Additionally, we find
that once we remove those who refinance, the estimated effect is small. Finally, we show
that the consumption of renters, who do not have access to housing wealth, is not affected
by changes in house prices.
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the baseline consumption model (11), where we
use the full sample of households in columns (1) and (2), and then split the sample into young
and old households in columns (3) and (4) respectively. All regressions include controls for
age, education, change in family size, a household-specific portfolio return, along with year
and region fixed effects and their interaction. The coefficient on house price growth in
column (1) is equal to 0.047. This corresponds to a marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
out of housing of approximately 0.01 (or 1 percent of the increase in house value).21 This is
on the lower end of the empirical literature, where the estimated effect range from 0.02 in
Gan (2010), to around 0.17 in Case et al. (2005).22 The coefficient is reduced to 0.039 after
20Cooper (2013) claims that the entire effect is driven by constrained households, who are borrowing
against collateral.
21The marginal propensity to consume is calculated as: MPC = Elasticity * Consumption / Housing
Wealth. Note that the average housing wealth and consumption of homeowners (column (6) of table 1) are
1,824,272 DKK and 428,672 DK respectively.
22Gan (2010) points out that international comparisons of MPC is not always productive, as institutional
differences in mortgage and financial markets imply that the consumption-housing value ratio varies widely
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controlling for income, but remains positive and highly significant. We do not find large
differences in the response of consumption expenditures to house price growth for different
age cohorts, in contrast to previous studies (see e.g. Campbell & Cocco, 2007; Attanasio
et al., 2009; Mian & Sufi, 2011). While the coefficient on ∆qkt is larger for young households,
the coefficients over age groups are similar after taking standard errors into account. Figure
3 illustrates this result more clearly. Note that while Attanasio et al. (2009) interpret a large
coefficient for young households as evidence against the wealth effect, Berger et al. (2015)
show that this result can arise in a theoretical model because young households have higher
debt and thus lower net worth.23
The coefficient on ∆qkt in column (1) is precisely estimated and matches the level and
significance of the estimate reported in Browning et al. (2013), who estimate an equation
similar to (11) for the period from 1987 to 1996. Unlike Browning et al. (2013) however, our
coefficient remains statistically significant after controlling for income. As they note, the low
elasticity in their study may be because house price variation was low, whereas our sample
covers a period with considerable variation. Figure 4 shows that the estimates are low and
of limited statistical significant for the period between 1998 and 2002, a period of relatively
small changes in house prices. The magnitude of the coefficients increase dramatically in
the period between 2003 and 2007, when prices expanded rapidly (see Ba¨ckman, 2016).24
Indeed, the estimated effect for 2005 is five times larger than the average effect.
Does the estimated effect vary depending on whether the household is credit constrained?
Several previous studies have used low levels of liquid assets as a proxy for credit constraints.
However collateral borrowing relies on available home equity, not available liquidity. Low
levels of liquid assets do not capture households who are borrowing constrained, at least
across countries.
23This result may be because we are limiting our sample to two-adult households who co-habit. The
prediction from Sinai & Souleles (2005) is that any wealth effect is decreasing in expected tenure, which is
presumably just the sample that we are limiting ourselves to. We wish to emphasize that even if we find
that old and young households responds similarly to house price changes, it is not certain that for example
single households would respond in the same way.
24Between 1998 and 2002 house price growth was low, with less variation between municipalities. between
2003 and 2007 house price growth was large in magnitude, with noticeably more variation between munici-
palities. As our empirical strategy exploits variation in house price growth between municipalities during a
given year, the effect may also be due to the larger cross-sectional variation during this time period.
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not in the sense emphasized by the collateral channel in our model. In Denmark the ability
to borrow against home equity is limited by a maximum LTV ratio of 80 percent, a legal
requirement that is strictly enforced.25 Leth-Petersen (2010) finds that available equity is the
key to understanding how households respond to a reform that allowed them to access their
home-equity in Denmark. To examine the presence of constraints in a manner consistent
with the theoretical model, we therefore estimate equation (11) for borrowing constrained
and unconstrained households.26
Panel A and B of table 3 report that borrowing constrained households respond strongly
to house price changes, but unconstrained households have a small and statistically insignif-
icant response. The estimated coefficients on ∆qkt for the constrained group in columns
(1)-(4) in panel A are large and precisely estimated, and are considerably larger in mag-
nitude than the estimated coefficients for unconstrained households in panel B. In fact,
the coefficient for young, unconstrained households is not statistically significantly different
from zero. The coefficients for young households in column (3) are larger than the esti-
mated coefficients for old households in column (4). The coefficients on changes in income
are similar across all models. The finer age decomposition, plotted in figure 5, shows that
the estimated effect of house prices on consumption for borrowing unconstrained households
is close to zero for all age groups, but is positive and significant for all constrained cohorts.
We also investigate whether liquidity constraints are an important determinant of con-
sumption responses to house price growth in table 4. The estimated coefficients are similar
between constrained (panel A) and unconstrained households (panel B). In contrast to the
previous literature, we do not find that a low level of liquidity is associated with a larger re-
sponse to house price changes (see e.g. Mian & Sufi, 2014, who finds that the housing wealth
effect is primarily driven by households with low levels of liquidity).27 Finally, we have tried
to combine the borrowing constraints and the liquidity constraints. Specifically, we selected
the sample of borrowing constrained households, and check whether the consumption re-
25Refinancing a mortgage is associated with an administrative cost, typically on the order of 5,000 DKK
(671 EUR).
26See Andersen et al. (2014) for further evidence on leverage ratios and consumption.
27See also Mian & Sufi (2011).
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sponse to house price changes is driven by liquidity constrained or unconstrained consumers.
The results show that the effect is mainly driven by liquidity unconstrained consumers. Al-
though the threshold value for liquidity constraints is somewhat arbitrary, a robustness
checks confirms that the results are robust to using three and five months as cutoffs. In
summary, liquidity constraints are not an important determinant of how consumption re-
sponds to house price changes in our sample.
The literature provides some intuition for why liquidity constraints are not important. In
essence, low levels of liquidity may not fully characterize borrowing constrained households.
Kaplan & Violante (2014) find evidence for a large fraction of “wealthy hand-to-mouth”
households, who own large amounts of illiquid assets (such as housing) but low levels of
liquid assets. The liquidity constrained households in table 4 are similar to the wealthy hand-
to-mouth households, as they own housing but hold low levels of liquid assets. For these
households, consuming out of the illiquid asset carries transaction costs, and the equilibrium
outcome is to consume all of their income and liquid wealth. While these households respond
strongly to a liquidity shock, they likely react less to a housing wealth shock. While their
wealth increases, the transaction costs associated with the illiquid asset implies that it is
not optimal to fully smooth consumption every period. Cochrane (1989) and Browning &
Crossley (2001) present a similar logic, where the benefit of equating marginal consumption
across periods is less than the cost of doing so. The larger coefficient on changes in income
for liquidity constrained households suggests that they may indeed be liquidity constrained,
although this does not imply that they will respond strongly to house price changes.
While it is tempting to attribute the higher estimated effects for borrowing constrained
households to collateral effects, high levels of leverage or low levels of liquidity may proxy
for other characteristics. Carroll & Kimball (1996) show that the marginal propensity to
consume is decreasing in wealth, and Mian et al. (2013) finds support for the hypothe-
sis. The crucial element of the collateral channel is that housing assets act as collateral
for borrowing when house prices change. Figure 6 plots the fraction of constrained and
unconstrained households who extract equity in a given year and shows that borrowing con-
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strained households are more likely to extract equity. Moreover, the fraction of households
who extract equity peaks during the housing boom, when house price growth is the highest.
The question that we ask is, if we remove these households from the sample, is there still a
correlation between house price changes and consumption?
If the correlation between house prices and consumption is driven entirely by a collateral
effect, as some studies suggest (e.g. Cooper, 2013), then the estimated housing wealth effect
will be zero if we remove the households who extract equity. Table 5 performs such a
test, where panel A shows the result for the full sample, and panel B shows the result for
the borrowing constrained sample, the part of the population where we found such large
effects previously. There is still a positive effect even after we remove those who extract
equity, although the coefficient is only marginally significant. After controlling for income
growth in column (2), the effect size declines to 0.016. Further, neither coefficient on
∆qkt is significant in columns (3) and (4). Panel B repeats the same exercise for borrowing
constrained households, with similar results. Overall, our findings suggest that the estimated
effect of house price changes on consumption is driven mainly by collateral borrowing, not
by the wealth effect.
5 Robustness Check – Instrumental Variable Estimation
In this section we use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate how house prices affect
consumption, following a previous literature that use the intuition in Saiz (2010).
The first stage of the IV estimation, presented in table 7, support the contention that
housing supply elasticity affects the dynamics of house prices in a municipality. The first
stage provides more formal evidence for the pattern in figure 2, where areas with inelastic
supply have higher absolute house price changes. The estimated coefficient on housing
supply is positive and highly significant, showing that municipalities with more inelastic
supply experience a larger increase in housing prices, even after controlling for demographic
characteristics and year and region effects. The F -statistic of instruments is substantially
higher than the rule of thumb threshold value of 10 suggested by Staiger & Stock (1997) and
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Stock & Yogo (2005). However, there is an on-going discussion about the validity of using
housing supply as an instrument (Davidoff et al., 2016). Table 12 in the appendix estimates
how the housing supply instrument works over time, and finds that there are several years
in which housing supply does not predict house price growth quite as well. As such, we
include these results as a robustness check to see whether the overall pattern that we find
in the previous section is still present.
In the second stage, the coefficient on house price in table 8 is now 0.607 in column (1),
which is substantially larger than the corresponding OLS estimate in table 2. This result is
robust to controlling for income in column (2). The estimate for young households is equal
to 0.596 and for old households is equal to 0.416. The larger estimated elasticity translates
into a larger marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth. Given the values for
housing and consumption from table 1 and an estimated elasticity of 0.493 after controlling
for income, the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth for homeowners
corresponds to 0.12 (or 12 percent of the increase in house value), close to the upper range
of the literature (see Bostic et al., 2009). The MPC for young and old households is 0.24
and 0.10 respectively. The lower MPC for old household reflect the fact that old household
on average hold more housing wealth, even as consumption levels are similar between young
and old households. Mian & Sufi (2014) find a marginal propensity to borrow from house
price shock of 0.26 using a similar estimation strategy.
We proceed to investigate liquidity constraints in table 9. Panel A and B report re-
sults for liquidity constrained and unconstrained households respectively. The estimates
for liquidity constrained households are larger in magnitude than the estimates for uncon-
strained households. The results indicate that young, liquidity constrained households have
the largest reaction to house price changes. However, the standard errors in panel B are
all large, and even though the coefficients are of marginal significance, the estimates are
not substantially different between constrained and unconstrained households. This result
is therefore reminiscent of the result in table 4, where there is no substantial difference
between constrained and unconstrained households.
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As previously discussed, low levels of liquid assets may not necessarily capture credit
constrained households. Panel A and B of table 10 therefore again present results for
borrowing constrained and unconstrained households, respectively. However, table 10 is not
as revealing as the corresponding OLS estimates in table 3. A potential reason is that the
instrument is not performing well for borrowing unconstrained households, especially for
the young sample. The F-test is below the threshold value of 10 for all regressions in Panel
B. Panel A shows that the estimated coefficient for borrowing constrained households is
similar in magnitude to the estimated effect for liquidity constrained households in table
9. The estimate for young households is again higher than the estimate for old households,
although the estimates are not statistically different from each other.
Overall, we find that the estimated coefficients on house price growth are substantially
larger in magnitude when we use an instrumental variable strategy. However, the standard
errors are large, especially for the sub-sample of households who are borrowing constrained.
The pattern in the IV estimation is similar to the pattern in the OLS estimation, although
the magnitude of the coefficients differs considerably. The estimated effects are larger for
young households, and for those who are liquidity constrained, regardless of whether we use
IV or OLS.
6 Conclusion
In this study we investigated how changes in housing wealth affect consumption. The
literature has emphasized that the causal effect is due to either wealth effects or due to
collateral constraints. This observation forms the basis of our study, where we attempt to
determine whether house prices affect consumption and whether this effect is driven by a
wealth or collateral effect. We find that there is a correlation between house prices and
consumption, and that this effect is indeed stronger for households who are more likely
borrowing constrained. Furthermore, we find that the estimated effect is larger during the
Danish housing boom. With regards to whether the correlation is driven by a housing wealth
effect or a collateral effect, we find that once we remove households who extract equity, as
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predicted by the collateral channel, we do not observe a statistically significant correlation
between house price changes and consumption. This suggest that the wealth effect has a
small impact on consumption, and that collateral borrowing against home equity is the main
driver of the observed correlation between changes in house prices and consumption.
For future research, we aim to discover how the sample selection influences the estimated
results. As we focus on stable two-adult households who do not trade housing assets, we are
removing many households for whom an increase in house prices may have larger effects.
For example, it is commonly argued that the wealth effect is decreasing in expected housing
tenure. Our sample selection likely selects households with a longer expected tenure, as we
select two-adult households who already own housing. Indeed, it would also be interesting
to see how the sample selection affects not only the estimated effect, but also the presence
of liquidity and borrowing constraints, and whether these constraints are in a sense more
binding for other households than the ones that are in our sample.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Imputed and Survey Consumption
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Note: Solid line is data from the Danish Expenditure Survey for total consumption of two adult households with children.
Dashed line is imputed consumption from the registry data. All consumption values are deflated to the base of 2006.
167
Figure 2: Housing Supply and House Price Growth
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Note: The figure plots the average annual house price growth for the first and fourth quantile of housing supply.
Figure 3: Age Decomposition of Consumption Expenditure Response to House Price Growth
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Note: The figure plots the coefficients on ∆qkt from an OLS estimation of equation (11). Each bar represents a separate
regression, where the sample is split according to the age group. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption.
Regressions are estimated using demographic controls for age, education, change in family size, and year, region and region-
year fixed effects with clustered standard errors.
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Figure 4: Year-by-Year Estimates of the Consumption Expenditure Response to House Price
Growth
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Note: The figure plots the coefficients on ∆qkt from an OLS estimation of equation (11). Each bar represents a separate
regression for each year. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption. Regressions are estimated using demographic
controls for age, education, change in family size, and year, region and region-year fixed effects with clustered standard errors.
Figure 5: Estimated Housing Wealth Effect for Constrained and Unconstrained Households
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on ∆qkt from an estimation of Equation 11. Each bar represents a separate regression,
where the sample is split according to age group and whether they are borrowing constrained. The borrowing unconstrained
households have a mortgage of less than 0.5 times his/her housing wealth, and borrowing constrained households have mortgages
in excess of 0.5 times his/her housing wealth. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption. Regressions is estimated
using the same controls as in Table 2 and with clustered standard errors.
169
Figure 6: Home Equity Extraction by Constrained and Unconstrained
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Note: The figure plots the fraction of households in each group who extract equity in a given year in the estimation sample.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Young Old Constrained Unconstrained
Panel A: Demographic Characteristics
Age 43.14 34.28 47.61 42.46 45.35
Number of Children 1.45 1.63 1.36 1.51 1.26
Length of Education 14.91 15.05 14.84 14.81 15.23
House Owner 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Financial Characteristics
Consumption 428,672 412,124 437,020 421,505 452,026
Disposable Income 426,900 400,503 440,217 411,031 478,609
Assets
Net Wealth 482,457 167,040 641,572 252,354 1,232,233
Housing Wealth 1,824,272 1,644,253 1,915,084 1,698,423 2,234,342
Liquid Assets 169,033 111,358 198,128 57,765 531,593
Liabilities
Total Debt 1,512,963 1,621,042 1,462,113 1,543,310 1,427,565
Mortgage Debt 959,301 1,046,127 915,501 962,549 948,719
Observations 5,036,623 1,688,833 3,347,790 3,853,884 1,182,739
Average from year 1998 to 2010. Net wealth is defined as assets minus liabilities. Housing wealth is the tax value
adjusted by the scaling factor. Debt is the sum of mortgage debt, bank debt and the value of mortgage deeds. Liquid
assets consists of stocks, bonds and bank deposits. Consumption is defined in 3.
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Table 2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
∆qkt 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
∆yit 0.326*** 0.359*** 0.310***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education Length 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in Number of Children 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Specific Return 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.026** 0.058***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Municipality-Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.017*** 0.002 -0.032*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
N 4,976,451 4,976,451 1,665,029 3,311,422
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on year-municipality
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square meter price
between t−1 and t for municipality k. ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t−1 and t. All regressions include
controls for age, education level, change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region, year
and region-year effects.
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Table 3: Borrowing Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Panel A: Constrained
∆qkt 0.093*** 0.081*** 0.096*** 0.067***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
∆yit 0.372*** 0.393*** 0.360***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 2,336,320 2,336,320 925,073 1,411,247
Panel B: Unconstrained
∆qkt 0.026*** 0.020** 0.023 0.019*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008)
∆yit 0.336*** 0.361*** 0.330***
(0.007) (0.015) (0.007)
Observations 1,550,439 1,550,439 253,404 1,297,035
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on year-municipality
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square meter price
between t−1 and t for municipality k. ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t−1 and t. All regressions include
controls for age, education level, change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region, year
and region-year effects.
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Table 4: Liquidity Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Panel A: Constrained
∆qkt 0.047*** 0.037** 0.038* 0.035**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
∆yit 0.463*** 0.472*** 0.456***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Constant -0.039*** -0.057*** -0.075*** -0.066***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 2,111,987 2,111,987 846,251 1,265,736
Panel B: Unconstrained
∆qkt 0.047** 0.040** 0.047* 0.035**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013)
∆yit 0.263*** 0.284*** 0.255***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Constant 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.030** 0.066***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Observations 2,860,701 2,860,701 817,996 2,042,705
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on year-municipality
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square meter price
between t−1 and t for municipality k. ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t−1 and t. All regressions include
controls for age, education level, change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region, year
and region-year effects.
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Table 5: Housing Wealth Effects Without Equity Withdrawal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Panel A: Full Sample
∆qkt 0.025** 0.016* 0.018 0.013
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
∆yit 0.360*** 0.396*** 0.343***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant -0.002 -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.039***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 4,382,716 4,382,716 1,460,665 2,922,051
Panel B: Borrowing Constrained
∆qkt 0.023* 0.013 0.017 0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
∆yit 0.368*** 0.396*** 0.349***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Constant 0.024*** 0.011* 0.000 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 2,498,492 2,498,492 1,104,288 1,394,204
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on year-municipality
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square meter price
between t−1 and t for municipality k. ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t−1 and t. All regressions include
controls for age, education level, change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region, year
and region-year effects.
175
Table 6: Housing Wealth Effects For Renters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Panel A: Full Sample
∆qkt -0.008 -0.011 -0.012 -0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
∆yit 0.671*** 0.641*** 0.725***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Constant 0.099*** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.029***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 1,218,973 1,218,273 655,353 562,920
Panel B: Liquidity Constrained
∆qkt 0.003 -0.003 -0.006 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
∆yit 0.760*** 0.727*** 0.816***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Constant 0.089*** 0.036*** 0.060*** 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 943,168 942,960 502,771 440,189
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on year-municipality
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square meter price
between t−1 and t for municipality k. ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t−1 and t. All regressions include
controls for age, education level, change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region, year
and region-year effects.
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8.1 Robustness Check: Instrumental Variables
Table 7: First-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Instrument:
Housing Supply 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls:
∆yit 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Region dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Preference shifters Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Partial R2 of Instrument 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
F-test of Instrument 31.8 31.7 36.0 36.0
Observations 4,972,687 4,972,687 1,664,247 3,308,440
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on municipality in
parentheses. Dependent variable is the the change in log square meter price between t−1 and t for municipality k., ∆qkt ∆qkt
is ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t − 1 and t. All regressions include controls for age, education level,
change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region and year effects.
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Table 8: Instrumental Variables – Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
∆qkt 0.607*** 0.493*** 0.596*** 0.416***
(0.066) (0.055) (0.103) (0.056)
∆yit 0.323*** 0.355*** 0.309***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education Length 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in Number of Children 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Household Specific Return 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.020 0.055***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Apartment 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.073*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Observations 4,972,688 4,972,688 1,664,247 3,308,441
F-test of Instruments 37.38 37.31 40.98 35.34
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on municipality in
parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square meter price between
t − 1 and t for municipality k. ∆yit is the change in log disposable income between t − 1 and t. All regressions include
controls for age, education level, change in number of children, a household-specific individual return, and with region, year
and region-year effects.
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Table 9: Instrumental Variables – Liquidity Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Panel A: Constrained
∆qkt 0.674*** 0.492*** 0.650*** 0.369***
(0.076) (0.071) (0.114) (0.061)
∆yit 0.439*** 0.451*** 0.430***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Observations 3,113,842 3,113,842 1,186,077 1,927,765
F-test of Instruments 31.95 31.89 33.94 30.59
Panel B: Unconstrained
∆qkt 0.476*** 0.403*** 0.383 0.415***
(0.126) (0.118) (0.327) (0.114)
∆yit 0.225*** 0.234*** 0.222***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.011)
Observations 1,858,846 1,858,846 478,170 1,380,676
F-test of Instruments 40.88 40.76 49.20 36.75
Notes: IV estimation of Equation 11 where house prices are instrumented with housing supply. Standard errors clustered on
municipality in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square
meter price between t − 1 and t for municipality k. ∆logIncome is the change in log disposable income between t − 1 and t.
All regressions include controls for age and education level, along with year and region fixed effects.
Table 10: Instrumental Variables – Borrowing Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Young Old
Panel B: Constrained
∆qkt 0.628*** 0.530*** 0.566** 0.459**
(0.177) (0.153) (0.181) (0.141)
∆yit 0.318*** 0.348*** 0.300***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 2,982,238 2,982,238 1,291,906 1,690,332
F-test of Instruments 14.17 14.12 11.93 15.52
Panel B: Unconstrained
∆qkt 0.955 0.792* 2.005 0.574**
(0.488) (0.393) (2.970) (0.222)
∆yit 0.328*** 0.365*** 0.318***
(0.013) (0.035) (0.011)
Observations 1,990,450 1,990,450 372,341 1,618,109
F-test of Instruments 2.82 2.80 0.39 4.86
Notes: IV estimation of Equation 11 where house prices are instrumented with housing supply.Standard errors clustered on
municipality in parentheses. Dependent variable is the change in log consumption, ∆cit. ∆qkt is the change in log square
meter price between t − 1 and t for municipality k. ∆logIncome is the change in log disposable income between t − 1 and t.
All regressions include controls for age and education level, along with year and region fixed effects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Municipality-Level Price Index
We construct a municipality level house price index using data on all transactions in Den-
mark. The data is from The Danish Gazette (Statstidende), and covers the universe of
Danish property transactions as a part of the judicial process of transferring ownership. We
combine the data on property sales with data on individual property characteristics from the
Housing Register (Bygnings- og Boligregister, BBR). Further, we collect data on property
ownership to identify trades between spouses and family members, and to identify trades
that occur due to the death of a spouse or due to divorce. These trades are removed from
the final sample, as they are less likely to be sold at market prices.28
After collecting the data on all property transactions, we connect each house and apart-
ment to the Housing Register (BBR) to find the property type (apartment, single-family
house or summer house). We further drop outliers in the sales price by removing the top and
bottom 1 percent in the sales price distribution, and by removing any transactions where
the transaction price is listed as zero. The resulting sample of households are then used to
calculate the average square meter price for traded properties in all municipalities.
28Removing family trades and similar non-market transactions are common in the construction of real
estate indices. See e.g. the S&PCase-Shiller index methodology: http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-
estate/sp-case-shiller).
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A.2 Sample Selection Table
Table 11: Sample Selection
Droppped Remaining
Demographics
Initial Number of Observations 40,230,677
Single-adult households 20,249,851 19,980,826
Age 18-21 107,646 19,873,180
Age 55+ 7,092,939 12,780,241
Entrepreneur 846,285 11,933,956
Small municipalities 339,088 11,594,868
House Traders and Consumption
Remaining Observations 11,594,868
Property traders 2,339,239 9,255,629
Renters with mortgage debt 15,75 9,239,879
High/low consumption growth 37,43 9,202,449
Consumption below 0 141,779 9,060,672
Estimation Sample Selection
Renters 2,361,589 6,699,083
No Demographics 641,957 6,057,126
No House Type 6,599 6,050,527
No Income Change 404,711 5,645,816
No Consumption Change 673,128 4,972,688
Final Estimation Sample 4,972,688
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A.3 Robustness of Instrument
Table 12: First-Stage Over time
(1) (2) (3)
∆qkt ∆qkt ∆qkt
Housing Supply 0.0227***
(9.49)
year=1998 X Housing Supply 0.126*** 0.128***
(8.09) (7.74)
year=1999 X Housing Supply 0.0819*** 0.0811***
(4.50) (4.36)
year=2000 X Housing Supply -0.0102 -0.0117
(-0.65) (-0.76)
year=2001 X Housing Supply 0.0628*** 0.0661***
(4.36) (4.63)
year=2002 X Housing Supply -0.00327 0.00180
(-0.35) (0.20)
year=2003 X Housing Supply 0.00217 0.00213
(0.19) (0.18)
year=2004 X Housing Supply 0.0872*** 0.0880***
(6.92) (6.53)
year=2005 X Housing Supply 0.213*** 0.212***
(7.35) (7.27)
year=2006 X Housing Supply 0.243*** 0.244***
(5.12) (5.10)
year=2007 X Housing Supply -0.129 -0.126
(-1.40) (-1.37)
year=2008 X Housing Supply -0.130 -0.122
(-1.65) (-1.53)
year=2009 X Housing Supply -0.219*** -0.219***
(-5.67) (-5.67)
year=2010 X Housing Supply 0.0173 0.0169
(1.03) (1.00)
Constant 0.0268*** 0.0262*** 0.0330***
(34.92) (33.39) (12.31)
Observations 4972688 4972688 4972688
Note: Column 1 and 2 are estimated without control variables. Column
3 includes controls for changes in disposable income, age, education level,
changes in the number of kids, a dummy for living in an apartment, controls
for the interest rate and regional dummies.
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Conclusion
This Ph.D. thesis has examined the Danish housing market in detail. While the analysis
of the Danish housing market of course interesting in of itself, the mortgage and housing
market in Denmark can give several important lessons for economists and policy-makers in
other countries. The housing market boom and bust in the 2000s had severe consequences
for the Danish economy at the time, and indeed affects the Danish economy even today. The
first chapter, “Examining the Housing Boom in Denmark”, provides a detailed overview of
the mortgage and housing market. The chapter argues that is striking that even though
the mortgage market is designed to provide the correct incentives for borrowers, investors
and lenders, we still observe such significant boom-bust dynamics. The study also shows
that it is misleading to think of one housing boom, as there is substantial heterogeneity in
both the amplitude and timing of house price gains. Furthermore, the results suggest that
fundamental factors cannot explain the full extent of the boom.
The Danish mortgage market offers a very compelling laboratory to investigate how
seemingly small changes can have substantial effects on the housing market itself and on the
real economy. In particular, the second chapter, “Prime Borrowers and Financial Innovation
in the Housing Boom and Bust”, shows how the introduction of interest-only mortgages in
2003, expected to have a small impact on house prices, led to a boom-bust cycle that al-
most matches the housing boom in the United States in magnitude. The clear advantage of
studying interest-only mortgages in Denmark is that many of the proposed explanations for
the housing boom in the United States are absent in Denmark due to institutional design.
In the third chapter, we study how changes in house prices transmit to the real economy.
In particular, we show that the correlation between house price changes and consumption
is driven by collateral borrowing, suggesting an important role for credit markets in trans-
mitting house price shock into the real economy.
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Overall, this thesis emphasizes that housing market dynamics has an important impact
on the aggregate economy, but that the dynamics may look different across different loca-
tions. The thesis has shown how seemingly small innovations in mortgage financing can
have large impacts, and has shown how the resulting changes in house prices transmits into
the economy. As such, effective public policy design should take the potential consequences
into account.
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